Wyniki wyszukiwania - BazTech

1

On the core of a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information

Kamishiro Y.

Operations Research and Decisions

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2015

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Vol. 25, No. 1

17--32

EN

We study a cost allocation problem under asymmetric information, and show that the ex ante incentive compatible core is non-empty. We also obtain a non-emptiness result for the incentive compatible coarse core, which is one concept of an interim core.

2

Pułapki opodatkowania gazu łupkowego w Polsce

Garbicz G., Sokół H.

Rynek Energii

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2012

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Nr 3

22--26

PL

Pojawienie się potencjalnie dużych zasobów gazu łupkowego stawia przed polską gospodarką problem czy i na jakich zasadach opodatkować wydobycie tego surowca. Autorzy argumentują, że wybór systemu podatkowego zależy w decydującym stopniu od tego czy stawiać będziemy na maksymalizację wydobycia tego paliwa czy także uwzględniać będziemy dochody budżetu. W artykule rozpatrzono kilka wariantów opodatkowania wskazując na kluczową rolę asymetrii informacyjnej w jaką uwikłane są władze podatkowe konstruując system podatkowy dla sektora gazowego. Bariera informacyjna, przed jaką stoi państwo w swych relacjach z firmami wydobywczymi pozwala tym ostatnim prowadzić skuteczną grę z fiskusem i prawdopodobnie przechwycić znaczącą część renty surowcowej.

EN

After the discovery of potentially huge reserves of shale gas in Poland authorities should decide whether and how gas exploitation should be taxed. Authors analyzed several tax scenarios arguing that key problem is govern-ment decision whether the volume of gas extracted is to be maximized or may be also tax revenues should be taken into account. All tax scenarios are producing problems mainly due to asymmetric information. It is highly probable that asymmetric information will enable the operators to capture most of the resource rent.

3

Nash equilibrium design and price-based coordination in hierarchical systems

Karpowicz M. P.

International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science

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2012

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Vol. 22, no. 4

951-969

EN

This paper deals with the problem of designing Nash equilibrium points in noncooperative games in which agents anticipate values of Lagrange multipliers coordinating their payoff functions. The addressed model of agents' interactions, referred to as the price-anticipation game, is studied within the framework of coordination and mechanism design theory for hierarchical systems. Sufficient conditions are formulated for Nash implementation of a regular and isolated solution to a coordination problem. An equilibrium design procedure is proposed and applied as an analytic tool in a study of mechanism design games. In the setting considered the well-known fact is demonstrated that gains from reaching a desired solution to a coordination problem in a Nash equilibrium point need not balance the overall costs of its implementation. However, it is also demonstrated how these costs can be distributed among the agents and related to the particular organization of interactions in the system. Finally, application of the developed framework in the field of Internet traffic engineering is presented.