The modern "Anti-Access/Area Denial" A2/AD systems are defined as a combination of all possible measures that can limit the ability of a potential opponent to enter and occupy a given area (operational theatre). Their action relies, among others, on radio-electronic disruption of digital guidance systems, communication, command and control systems, shooting down long-range maneuvering missiles, drones, and aircraft. The primary assumption of the anti-access concept is to deprive the enemy of the possibility of entering a given operational area (A2 – Anti-Access) through long-range destruction and depriving them of freedom of action in that theatre (AD – Area-Denial) by medium and short-range weapons. The Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM), Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBM), and Anti-Ship Manoeuvring Cruise Missile (ASCM) are used to carry out A2/AD tasks. Field artillery has also been used recently, particularly the Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF). The purpose of the article is to determine the chance of using field artillery against the A2/AD systems. According to the authors, the NATO forces will lose control in the air in the first period of the conventional conflict with an equivalent opponent, and its rapid recovery will be a priority. Field artillery, as a weapon with ever greater possibilities of precise and deep destruction, can become a decisive factor, allowing dominance of A2/AD systems and enabling the implementation of tasks of its air-force and army aviation, as well as ground forces.
PL
Współczesne systemy „antydostępowe” A2/AD (ang. Access Denial/Area Denial) definiowane są jako połączenie wszelkich możliwych środków, które mogą wielowarstwowo ograniczyć dostęp potencjalnego przeciwnika do danego obszaru (teatru) działań. Ich działanie polega m.in. na radioelektronicznym zakłócaniu systemów naprowadzających, paraliżowaniu systemów łączności, komunikacji i cyfrowej transmisji danych, zestrzeliwaniu pocisków manewrujących dalekiego zasięgu, dronów i samolotów. Głównym założeniem koncepcji antydostępowej jest pozbawienie przeciwnika możliwości wejścia na teren danego obszaru (teatru) działań (A2 – ang. Anti-Access) za pomocą środków rażenia dalekiego zasięgu, ponadto pozbawienie go swobody działania na tym teatrze (AD – ang. Area-Denial) przy pomocy środków rażenia średniego i krótkiego zasięgu. Do realizacji zadań A2/AD używa się pocisków typu ziemia powietrze (SAM – ang. Surface-to-Air Missile), przeciwokrętowych pocisków balistycznych (ASBM – ang. Anti-Ahip Balistic Missile) oraz pocisków manewrujących (ASCM – ang. Anti-Ship Cruise Missile), a w ostatnim czasie również amunicji artyleryjskiej o zwiększonej donośności (LRPF – ang. Long Range Precision Fires). Celem artykułu jest określenie możliwości użycia artylerii do zwalczania systemów A2/AD. Zdaniem autorów siły NATO w pierwszym okresie konfliktu konwencjonalnego z równorzędnym przeciwnikiem utracą panowanie w powietrzu i priorytetem stanie się jego szybkie odzyskanie. Artyleria, jako rodzaj wojsk posiadający coraz większe możliwości precyzyjnego i głębokiego rażenia, może stać się decydującym czynnikiem, pozwalającym na zdominowanie systemów A2/AD i umożliwienie realizacji zadań własnemu lotnictwu.
The lessons learned during wars and armed conflicts indicate that the main factor influencing the aerial defence of air bases were directly related to the rapid development of the combat capabilities of aerial threats. Air bases have been lucrative targets for enemy air strikes since the first documented attack by a British aircraft on a German airfield in 1914 and have remained so for contemporary military air operations. The article discusses the evolution of concepts and lessons learned in the field of aerial defence of air bases that resulted from armed conflicts and local wars. The analysis includes armed conflicts, which, according to the author, have reflected the changes in the organisation of the aerial defence of air bases, including the repulsion of air strikes against aviation on the ground. Attention was paid to the conditions related to the aerial defence of aviation on the ground during the First World War. A more thorough analysis was made of the Second World War period, focused on the Western Front and the defence of Poland. Particular attention was paid to the Battle of Britain, noting the importance of the organisation of the radar air surveillance system in the context of the effectiveness of air defence. The focus of the analysis then shifts to the aerial defence of air bases during armed conflicts after the Second World War: the Vietnam War (1965-1973), the Yom Kippur War (1973), the defence of air bases in the Yom Kippur War (1973), and NATO operations from the air against air bases during the Deny Flight / Deliberate Force (1992-1995) and Allied Force (1999) operations. The article also makes a preliminary assessment of the aerial defence of air bases during the ongoing conflict in Syria.
Traditional roles of air forces in combat involve the subjugation of air space and the maintaining of superiority / domination in the skies in order to create favourable conditions to conduct successful land and naval operations. They are, thus, a component supporting other forces in joint military operations. Nowadays, air forces sometimes take the role of the dominant force (a component supported by other forces) and then the joint operations of armed forces are conducted in a way (as called in the article) of dominance from the air. This allows, especially in the so-called asymmetric conflicts, to obtain the military and political goals of the war without land or naval invasion. This is a new phenomenon in the Art of War, which the author of the article tries to identify, describe and systematise. To make waging a war through dominance from the air possible, airforces must have absolute freedom to use the air space in the whole area of a conflict and in the whole territory of an opponent. The current terminology related to dominance (superiority / domination) in the air and the theory of war in the air does not provide (describe) such a situation. In this article, the views in this respect, which were in force in NATO and the Warsaw Pact and are still in force in the US Armed Forces, NATO and the Russian Federation, are critically evaluated and a new terminology taxonomy for dominance in the air is suggested.
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