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1

Recycling strategy of green closed-loop supply chain under urban and rural low-carbon planning

Li Menggang, Wang Tianyang

Ecological Chemistry and Engineering. S

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2023

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Vol. 30, nr 4

595--615

EN

The low-carbon ecological city aims to harmonise sustainable urban development with low-emission planning approaches. Emissions from business production processes are central to low-carbon planning. This paper explores three closed-loop supply chain recycling models - manufacturer, retailer, and third-party considering carbon trading and emission reduction technology investment. Respective Stackelberg game models are developed incorporating carbon emission reduction costs, recycling costs, carbon trading price, emission intensity, and recycling price. The influence of these variables on carbon emission reduction and profit is examined through numerical analysis. Results indicate the government’s free carbon quota does not impact perunit carbon reduction or manufacturer profit, nor optimal recycling mode selection. Under specific remanufacturing emission intensity and production cost saving conditions, carbon quota trading can substantially incentivise manufacturers to invest in emission reduction and recycling. With carbon trading and emission reduction technology investment, manufacturer recycling optimises economic and environmental benefits when remanufactured products provide high production cost savings. This fosters sustainable development supporting low-carbon planning.

2

Optimizing the interaction between two closed-loop supply chains based on inverse logistics using the game theory method

Trung Nguyen Dinh, Huy Dinh Tran Ngoc, Chetthamrongchai Paitoon, Mohsen Karrar Shareef, Iskandar Ahmad Syarief, Nurjaya A., Sunarsi Denok, Singh Krishanveer, Chupradit Supat

Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences

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2022

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Vol. 47, No. 4

455--467

EN

Over the past few years, attention to environmental problems, legal necessities, and economic advantages emerging from reproduction activities has attracted attention to reverse logistics activities in the form of a closed-loop supply chain, whether in industry or scientific research. The current study aims to model competitiveness and comparison between two closed-loop three-level supply chains, each of which includes a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third party to collect the products used by the customer, taking into account the concepts of game theory and the existence of aggregates. Moreover, a separate supplier for each chain is considered. In the forward supply chain, the manufacturer produces new products using new components or re-used products that have been collected from the consumer, then sells these products mainly to the retailer, and the retailer sells them. In the reverse chain, the collector provides the used products to the manufacturer after collection. The study utilized the definitions and concepts of game theory to model this closed loop chain as a Stackelberg game to obtain the optimal value of wholesale and retail price and the optimal value of the product return coefficient for the collector. Finally, the models based on some numerical examples are solved. Given the results, the remanufacturing costs have a significant role in making more profits for all members in such chains, and competitive chains should attempt to remanufacture the products at lower costs.

3

Extended warranty of medical equipment subject to imperfect repairs: an approach based on generalized renewal process and Stackelberg game

de Santana J. M. M., Santiago R. L. V., Moura M das C., Lins I. D.

Eksploatacja i Niezawodność

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2018

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Vol. 20, no. 4

567--578

EN

Due to its advanced technology, maintenance services of healthcare equipment have been commonly executed by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM), which can be characterized as a monopolist. In this context, hospitals require high availability of their equipment at a reasonable servicing cost, whereas OEM aims to maximize its profit by selling extended warranty (EW) services for multiple consumers. The issue of drawing a maintenance contract between OEM and hospitals has already been treated by adopting a Stackelberg’s game. However, the “as good as new” and “as bad as old” assumptions are usually considered, which are rather difficult to observe in practice, especially for healthcare institutions and their technology-intensive equipment. Thus, we here adopt generalized renewal processes (GRP) for modelling imperfect repairs, and we develop a discrete event simulation method for finding the best strategies of each player: OEM sets the prices for EW and on-demand maintenance that optimize its profit, while hospitals choose which option they should hire. We also present an application example with real data gathered from an angiography device, which is used for mapping blood vessels and diagnosing heart diseases.

PL

Ze względu na zaawansowanie technologiczne sprzętu medycznego, jego obsługą serwisową zazwyczaj zajmuje się producent sprzętu oryginalnego (OEM), co czyni go monopolistą w tym zakresie. Podczas gdy szpitalom zależy na wysokiej gotowości sprzętu przy rozsądnych kosztach obsługi, OEM dąży do maksymalizacji zysku poprzez sprzedaż rozszerzonej gwarancji na usługi serwisowe wielu klientom. Istnieją już badania, w których kwestię zawierania umowy o świadczenie usług serwisowych między OEM a szpitalami analizowano z zastosowaniem modelu Stackelberga. Jednak zwykle badania te zakładają, że stan po naprawie może być albo "jak fabrycznie nowy" albo"jak przed uszkodzeniem", co rzadko spotyka się w praktyce, zwłaszcza w przypadku placówek służby zdrowia i ich zaawansowanego technologicznie sprzętu. W związku z tym, w przedstawionej pracy, przyjęto uogólniony proces odnowy (GRP) do modelowania niepełnych napraw oraz opracowano metodę symulacji zdarzeń dyskretnych w celu znalezienia najlepszych strategii dla każdego gracza: OEM ustala ceny rozszerzonej gwarancji oraz konserwacji na żądanie, tak by zoptymalizować swój zysk; szpital natomiast ustala, którą opcję powinien wybrać. W pracy przedstawiono również przykład zastosowania omawianego podejścia z wykorzystaniem rzeczywistych danych zebranych z angiografu, który służy do obrazowania naczyń krwionośnych i diagnozowania chorób serca.

4

A Stackelberg game in a production-distribution system with multiple buyers

Bylka S.

Operations Research and Decisions

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2010

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Vol. 20, No. 2

5-24

EN

This paper investigates the coordination of deliveries between a vendor (or manufacturer) and multiple heterogeneous buyers (or retailers) in a two-level supply chain with a decentralized decision process. A continuous deterministic model is presented. To satisfy the buyers’ demands, the vendor delivers the product in JIT shipments to each buyer. The buyers’ demands (continuous) have to be satisfied by the vendor. The production rate is constant and sufficient to meet the buyers’ demands. The product is delivered in discrete batches from the vendor’s stock to the buyers’ stocks and all shipments are realized instantaneously. A special class of production-delivery-replenishment policies of the vendor and the buyers are analyzed. In a competitive situation, the objective is to determine schedules, which minimize the individual average total cost of production, shipment and stockholding in the production-distribution cycle (PDC). This paper presents a game theoretic model without prices, where agents minimize their own costs. It is a non-cooperative (1 + n)-person constrained game with agents (a single vendor and n buyers) choosing the number and sizes of deliveries. The model describes inventory patterns and the cost structure of PDC. It is proven that there exist equilibrium strategies in the considered Stackelberg sub-games with the vendor as the leader. Solution procedures are developed to find the Stackelberg game equilibrium.

5

Dynamic consistency under private information

Correa R.

Control and Cybernetics

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1999

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Vol. 28, no 2

225-232

EN

Time inconsistency is often demonstrated in the context of the global Sta.ckelberg solution of a two-person, two-stage dynamic game. The loop model of dynamic games is used. The recommended solution to the problem is for both players to adopt open-loop strategies. VVe recast the problem in an imperfect informa-tion framework. In contrast to the standard result, (i) a consistency in the outcomes of the lash game and the associated Stackelberg game is shown and (ii) it is proved that under feedback information patterns, both players prefer to play the Stackelberg game rather than the associated Nash game.