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EN
Simulator-based training assumes a very important role in the maritime domain, particularly in the education of Officers Of the Watch (OOW). In the Portuguese Navy, most of the cadet’s skills as future OOW rely on the success of this training. Beyond theory and technical training, the development of non-technical skills is a key factor for obtaining officers capable of identifying and solving problems. To optimize the training and development of non-technical skills, using the Portuguese Naval Academy Simulator, a previously designed Behavioral Marker System model was further assessed. The revised model, which comprises new parameters such as the effectiveness of the task, was validated through a set of simulated sessions, where 11 instructors and 48 students participated. After each session, data was collected with questionnaires and focus group discussion, focusing on the quality and usability of the model and on the design of the scenario. The results show that the revised model, positively addresses the limitations found on the previous version, and it has received encouraging feedback from both instructors and cadets. This new model is now under implementation in all the Naval Academy course programs, and future research aims to digitalize the behavior markers.
EN
Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) is currently on the agenda in several countries and also in the IMO. In Norway a 120 TEU container feeder is being build and will start sailing autonomously in 2022. The challenge is huge. One question is whether or not the present, quantitative, collision regulations needs to be updated to rules where expressions as “early” and “substantial” are quantified? Or if ships can sail autonomously under the present rules? Another question is if MASS should be marked to signal that the ship is in autonomous mode? Or if it is enough that she follows COLREGS? This discussion paper will take a closer look at these questions and advocate automation transparency, meaning that the behavior of an autonomous vessel has to make sense and be understandable to human operators on other manned ships and crafts.
EN
The general accessibility and high accuracy of GPS caused that for a dozen or so years it is applied commonly, not only in marine navigation. We can ascertain that in this regard there exists the monopoly. However, now it is apparently that this system can be easily disturbed, what testify numerous reports. The problem has been treated as troubles in land navigation, however nowadays became every-day reality on coastal waters as well, especially on the Mediterranean and Black Seas and Persian Gulf. Officers who survived this tell that the first impulse in such situation is to verify GPS receiver, regardless of the situation around the ship. The concentration of the officer’s attention on the GPS receiver, especially on coastal waters creates the threat for the ship, however in this situation appear other threats which many officers does not associate with GPS. Usually on the present ship GPS receiver is not only the source of positioning information. It is a source of information for many other devices, so inappropriate work of it generates problems with many other processes on the ship. Today question is who on the bridge can notice GPS problems and how? There are receivers which do not inform about the problem, or present not realistic data. Sometimes only ECDIS picture shows some abnormality, for example still the same position while ship is under the way. On the paper the analysis of possibly aspects of the problem is discussed. Presented analysis goes to the conclusion that should be prepared some procedure how to proceed in case of the lack of GPS signals, as well as the watch officer should be prepared to act in such situation. This is a task for marine academies.
EN
Despite the efforts of all stakeholders maritime accidents still occur, most commonly caused by human failure. Efficient team work is a vital tool in preventing occurrence or rectifying the errors and violations. Therefore Bridge Resource Management course focuses on developing and sustaining work teams. Unfortunately, team work can be hampered by many factors, including poor organisation, cultural differences, improper attitudes and behaviours, as shown by analysis of many accidents and it is important to address these issues during trainings. As a starting point for a discussion simulation training can be used. In this paper we propose three scenarios based on real accidents, which address problems that are usually not familiar to students: authority gradient, desire for harmony in a group and antagonism between specialties.
EN
Manoeuvring characteristics of the vessels at the head-on situation are examined in this study. The meetings between the power-driven vessels are considered based on their propellers. These vessels can either have a single propeller or double propellers. A vessel with a single right-handed propeller alters her course to port side easier than the starboard side. There exists an unnoticed gap, therefore the authors discuss the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 (COLREGs), Rule 14, considering the vessel orientation based on its propeller walk. After presenting all possible cases and their probable consequences, this paper offers authorities to embed the information of propeller characteristics into the Automatic Identification Systems (AIS) in order to prevent misunderstandings during the VHF communications, probable collision risks and discussions on liability issues in case of marine accidents.
EN
In parallel with the increase in the volume of world trade, cargo handling rates and seafarers' pace of work has increased. Although the STCW regulations and restrictions on working hours has improved, this tempo has brought with it insufficient resting hours, especially in short sea transport. It is known that individuals under stress and intensive workloads are more prone to making mistakes due to fatigue. In this study, the officers’ working hours are simulated in full-mission simulator at short sea transport to investigate errors made during the navigation and port watches. For this purpose, the data were obtained from 7 volunteers watchkeeping officers with the help of video monitoring and check lists in the full-bridge simulator system and also, system records in cargo handling simulator. With this study, introduced what types of errors made during navigation and port watches by watchkeeping officers under the intense pace of work. And the errors are evaluated under the legislation of international maritime. As a result, to comply with the limitations of working hours, it is necessary to increase the number of officers responsible for operations on short sea transport.
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