Wyniki wyszukiwania - BazTech

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Cannae Battlefield: a geomorphic-geoarchaeologic perspective

Mahaney William C.

Studia Quaternaria

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2024

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Vol. 41, Nr 1

37--42

EN

The Cannae Battlefield (216 BC), a pivotal engagement during the Second Punic War, led to the destruction of one of the largest consular armies ever raised by the Republic. Historians have for centuries paid the utmost attention to unit-by-unit dispositions and tactical maneuvers without studying the local geology and particularly the geomorphology of the battle site. A brief traverse over the battle site, adjacent to the museum in 2004, led to a hidden defile, heretofore not mentioned in the literature, one which may have helped turn the tide for the Carthaginians, and offering prospect of further geoarchaeological investigation.

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Equitum peditumque idem longe primus erat - uwagi o sprzęcie oblężniczym Hannibala

Wolny Miron

Kwartalnik Historii Nauki i Techniki

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2022

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T. 67, nr 2

99--112

EN

The author of the article investigates the role and importance of Hannibal’s military equipment. Through the analysis of available literary sources, the author indicates imperfections of descriptions concerning this aspect of the Carthaginian’s activity. In addition, he draws attention to the characteristic form of siege weapons - as described in the sources, which allows for assuming some development tendencies in both modes of operating and kinds of Hannibal’s army combat equipment.

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Taktyczne aspekty bitwy pod Kannami

Więcek W.

Zeszyty Naukowe AON

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2010

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nr 3(80)

305-322

EN

The article is a collection of the author’s thoughts concerning tactical aspects of the Battle of Cannae fought between the Roman and Carthaginian armies during the Second Punic War. It is worth stressing that the Carthaginians defeated almost two-fold numerically superior enemy, closing them in a double envelopment and almost completely destroyed them. The reasons of the victory of forces under Hannibal’s command lies in his respecting such axioms of fighting as correct defining of the point of gravity of operations and its manoeuvring in the course of fighting, the unity of command, cooperation of services, building advantage in a decisive time and place, surprise and taking advantage of its consequences, manoeuvre, maintaining reserves, correct evaluation of the enemy and the use of terrain. Moreover, the author points out mistakes made by the Romans such as improper choice of place, not seeing the possibility of Carthaginians’ counter-manoeuvre, looking for the settlement in the front assault and improper command organization. The article underlines the necessity of drawing conclusions resulting from past military confrontations that could prove useful in preparing modern variants of force operations. The material respects the criterion of historical truth that is proved by a great number of quoted sources dealing with the problem of that unprecedented battle in the history of the art of war.