Th e paper deals with extending the obligatory methods of safety proof of railway control and management computer systems towards more formalized methods based on mathematical apparatus. Such semi-formal methods are recommended by existing EU standards for the design, but also to demonstrate safe operation in accordance with the principle of the rail fail-safe rule, where no single error does not lead to catastrophic situations. Th e paper proposes an extension method of FTA (Fault Tree Analysis) method to FTTD (Fault Tree with Time Dependencies), and an analysis of THR method (Tolerable Hazard Rate) to the analysis of probability of catastrophic fault based on stationary Markov processes. Basic methods and their extension are shown on typical examples of rail automation systems: cross-level protection system and interlocking system.
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