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Hybrid use of Borda count and PROMETHEE method for maintenance strategy selection problem

Oufella Sarah

Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences

2024

Vol. 49, No. 2

139--160

For long-term success, organizations and manufacturing companies must exploit the potential strengths of collective decision making in maintenance management. The maintenance strategy selection issue has been studied in a single decision-maker framework for a long time. This research is one of the first attempts at dealing with the enhancement of maintenance management through the participation of stakeholders in the decision making process. In this context, the author introduces a participatory multi criteria decision model that combines Borda count and PROMETHEE methodology to select the most appropriate maintenance strategy; in accordance with the decision makers’ preferences on a set of strategies evaluated according to conflicting criteria. Therefore, the PROMETHEE II method is used to manage the individual decisions of each stakeholder, while the Borda count is in charge of collectively selecting the best maintenance strategy, taking as a starting point stakeholder's preferences being established thanks to PROMETHEE II. In the same context, the proposed model was applied to a real scenario: a textile company, and can be easily replicated in other industries.

Transformation into anti-manipulation method in voting. Changes in properties

Sosnowska Honorata

Control and Cybernetics

2022

Vol. 51, No. 4

487--499

This paper examines the properties of the anti-manipulation method in voting. Such a method can be used by committees and similar bodies to ensure that votes reflect genuine preferences. The anti-manipulation method is based on the Borda Count and discourages strategic voting by excluding scores that deviate excessively from the mean. The method does not eliminate strategic voting but diminishes the motivation to apply it. We compare the properties of the Borda Count and the anti-manipulation method. The properties, which are most often found in the literature, were chosen for comparison. Thus, the following properties are examined: consistency, vulnerability to the no-show paradox, vulnerability to the subset choice condition, homogeneity, monotonicity, and vulnerability to the reversal bias paradox as well as the Condorcet winner and loser paradoxes. The anti-manipulation method fails to satisfy most of these properties. A real data example, the voting of a certain jury, is used as a counterexample in most cases.