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2 2005

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Weight-Based Negotiation Mechanisms : Balancing Personal Utilities

Urbig D.

Fundamenta Informaticae

2005

Vol. 67, nr 1-3

271--285

Conflict resolution, e.g. negotiation, is frequently about an interactive process that forces agents to make concessions in order to resolve the conflict. In multilateral negotiations, concessions might be directed to one or another partner. In isolated negotiations such directed concessions might be less useful, but may become important for interdependent negotiations. We present weight-based negotiation mechanisms that easily implement the concept of directed concessions. As an example we implement and simulate the weighted sum approach. We show that the presented class of negotiation mechanisms results in Pareto-optimal agreements. Not all weight-based mechanisms, especially the weighted sum approach, can generate all Pareto-optimal solutions, but for every discrete negotiation space there is a weight-based mechanism based on a continuous balancing function that can generate all Pareto-optimal solutions.

Social Formation of Negotiation Space and Groups for Non-Isolated Multilateral Negotiations

Schröter K., Urbig D., Hans N.

Fundamenta Informaticae

2005

Vol. 67, nr 1-3

187--201

A mechanism is presented that allows agents in multiagent systems with private knowledge about resource endowments to establish negotiation groups with commonly known negotiation spaces. This is done by exchanging information. Specific agents that are provided by the system mediate the communication and take over some very complex calculations. The negotiating agents reveal only information to the mediators that they consider relevant for their own objectives or for the current negotiation. A broadcast of all the agents' private knowledge is not required. We label this interactive mechanism social formation of negotiation spaces and groups. Furthermore we drop the often-made assumption of isolated negotiations. Our agents remember other agents that have contributed to reach a beneficial agreement. These agents are assumed to have credits. In later negotiations our agents will be more generous towards agents with credits. The applied credit mechanism does not require that all agents participate nor does it require that other agents are aware of this mechanism. We conclude this report with hypotheses that will be evaluated by simulations.