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Zero-point thermal noise in resistors? A conclusion

Kish Laszlo B.

Metrology and Measurement Systems

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2019

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Vol. 26, nr 1

3--11

EN

The main points of the UPoN-2018 talk and some valuable comments from the Audience are briefly summarized. The talk surveyed the major issues with the notion of zero-point thermal noise in resistors and its visibility; moreover it gave some new arguments. The new arguments support the old view of Kleen that the known measurement data “showing” zero-point Johnson noise are instrumental artifacts caused by the energy-time uncertainty principle. We pointed out that, during the spectral analysis of blackbody radiation, another uncertainty principle is relevant, that is, the location-momentum uncertainty principle that causes only the widening of spectral lines instead of the zero-point noise artifact. This is the reason why the Planck formula is correctly confirmed by the blackbody radiation experiments. Finally a conjecture about the zero-point noise spectrum of wide-band amplifiers is shown, but that is yet to be tested experimentally.

2

The problem of information leak due to parasitic loop currents and voltages in the KLJN secure key exchange scheme

Melhem Mutaz Y., Kish Laszlo B.

Metrology and Measurement Systems

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2019

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Vol. 26, nr 1

37--40

EN

The Kirchhoff-law-Johnson-noise (KLJN) secure key exchange scheme offers unconditional security, however it can approach the perfect security limit only in the case when the practical system’s parameters approach the ideal behavior of its core circuitry. In the case of non-ideal features, non-zero information leak is present. The study of such leaks is important for a proper design of practical KLJN systems and their privacy amplifications in order to eliminate these problems.

3

Generalized DC loop current attack against the KLJN secure key exchange scheme

Melhem Mutaz Y., Kish Laszlo B.

Metrology and Measurement Systems

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2019

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Vol. 26, nr 4

607--616

EN

A new attack against the Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) secure key distribution system is studied with unknown parasitic DC-voltage sources at both Alice’s and Bob’s ends. This paper is the generalization of our earlier investigation with a single-end parasitic source. Under the assumption that Eve does not know the values of the parasitic sources, a new attack, utilizing the current generated by the parasitic dc-voltage sources, is introduced. The attack is mathematically analyzed and demonstrated by computer simulations. Simple defense methods against the attack are shown. The earlier defense method based solely on the comparison of current/voltage data at Alice’s and Bob’s terminals is useless here since the wire currents and voltages are equal at both ends. However, the more expensive version of the earlier defense method, which is based on in-situ system simulation and comparison with measurements, works efficiently.