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EN
This paper examines the factors which influence sharing of the strategic information (in other words, electronic coordination) in a buyer–supplier dyad. The antecedents of this coordination are examined rather well in the transaction cost economics (TCE) theory and resource-dependency theory (RDT), while the supply chain management perspective is contemplated. The mentioned frameworks are used in the analysis. However, the research focus is narrowed down to the exploration of the antecedents of information exchange conducted via inter-organisational information systems (IOS). The empirical analysis is based on 198 observations of Norwegian companies operating in different types of industries. A regression model is used to test the hypotheses about the antecedents of strategic electronic coordination. The research results indicate that the direct effect of the supplier-specific investments in the IOS on the exchange of strategic information in the buyer–supplier dyad is not statistically significant. The supplier-specific investment in the IOS becomes positively associated with the strategic information exchange in the buyer–supplier dyad only when the buyer is dependent on the supplier. The buyer dependency creates a high motivation for the company to exchange the strategic information with the supplier who is more powerful in the dyad. This research concludes that the companies making substantial investments in the IOS for electronic coordination purposes may not reach their goals if relation-specific factors, such as buyer dependency, are not comprehensively considered.
EN
In this paper, we attempt to explain how the ownership mechanism of an interorganisational information system (IOS) may impact strategic information exchange (electronic coordination) induced by specific investments in the IOS. Recent research and practice show that heavy investments in IOSs demonstrate mixed results with respect to their impact on the electronic coordination. Consequently, the search of additional factors is needed to help and explain under what circumstances the IOS investments for strategic purposes become beneficial for the companies in a buyersupplier dyad. Transaction cost economics (TCE) and the hostage model are used as a framework for the research. 198 observations of Norwegian companies in different branches of industry constitute the base of the empirical study. A buyer-supplier dyad is the unit of the analysis. A regression model of the relation between the IOS ownership mechanism and the strategic information sharing is used to test two hypotheses about the buyer-supplier collaboration via an IOS. The results demonstrate that the risk of unilateral specific investments in an IOS made by the buyer or the seller is attenuated by the ownership mechanism of the IOS. The willingness of a buyer to share their strategic information with the supplier via the IOS increases if the supplier invests in the IOS which is owned and controlled by the buyer. Conversely, the supplier becomes motivated to share certain sensitive strategic information with the buying company if the latter invests in the IOS which is owned and controlled by the supplier.
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