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Defensive lawfare and deterrence: Analysis of Latvia’s approach to legal bases in the context of hybrid warfare (2014-2022)

Bodnieks Valerijs

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2023

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Vol. 42, No. 2

55--67

EN

Following the ‘hybrid form’ of Russian aggression in Ukraine that emerged in 2014, the period after February 24th, 2022 is referred to as the ‘new reality’. Hence, the question that needs to be addressed is how to deter and prevent Russian aggression of this kind. The national legal framework against the aggressor is a part of the deterrence policy and can be construed as defensive lawfare. Focusing on Latvia, the aim of the paper is to analyse defensive lawfare and deterrence in the context of hybrid warfare. The following research question has been identified: What is Latvia’s approach to establishing defensive lawfare in terms of hybrid warfare? For the empirical analysis, the chronological framework has been set from 2014 to 2022. To complete the empirical analysis of the present paper, both qualitative and quantitative research has been implemented comprising document analysis and semi-structured interviews, as well as content analysis, respectively. The improvement of a regulatory base and the development of deterrence, whilst using regulatory acts, is an element of deterrence and a way to act legally. The law can be used as a weapon. Lawfare, a concept with three definitions, has two forms: defensive a nd offensive. Latvia’s legal base includes a regulation to overcome hybrid threats and to implement a broad-spectrum of defence measures. Latvia’s regulatory framework is designed for defence purposes, whilst also being a way of promoting deterrence. Decision makers must be able to manoeuvre with the powers assigned to them.

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The New Institutionalism: A tool for analysing defence and security institutions

Bodnieks Valerijs

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2020

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Vol. 32, No. 5

83--94

EN

The aim of this paper is to investigate new institutionalism, its trends and their application in the analysis of security and defence institutions. The research is based on an analysis of theoretical literature to explore a system of assumptions about new institutionalism. Different approaches have been examined, including historical, rational choice, and sociological approaches. Historical institutionalism can be applied to identify the usefulness of past decisions, policy choices, appropriate strategy choices, and specific acquisitions for future policymakers, whereas rational choice institutionalism allows us to determine the influence of security and defence institutions on actors and their choices, how actors use the institutional framework for their own benefit, and how actors’ choices influence the state policy. Finally, sociological institutionalism focuses on recognising actors’ cognitive scripts and the changes they undergo, as well as causes that influence and determine cognitive scripts. Defence institutions are based on a precise regulative and normative framework and cognitive scripts of the highest authorities. Therefore, the external framework and the particular political impact on the supranational level can cause changes on the national level. New institutionalism provides an important perspective on the specifics of security and defence policy, actors’ individual and collective goals, their strategies and interests as well as cognitive scripts.

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COVID-19 as a prestige-promoting mechanism: PESCO framework as an opportunity for EU member states

Bodnieks Valerijs, Broka Sintija

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2020

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Vol. 32, No. 5

55--68

EN

The goal of this study is to identify whether PESCO can be one of the tools for future projects in medicine and whether it can be used to strengthen the military medicine of the EU and, simultaneously, be in synergy with the civilian sector by providing support to the civilian field, and, finally, can EU member states increase their prestige through PESCO. The study, which is based on qualitative research methods, shows that based on Latvia’s case, strengthening the medical field by participating in PESCO can lead to countries promoting their prestige on the international stage, as well as strengthening civil-military cooperation to build much stronger policies within the EU member states. Firstly, the findings showed that from all 47 PESCO projects, only two are related to the field of medicine. Secondly, with the whole world being affected by COVID-19, PESCO can be used for new projects related to the field of medicine. Thirdly, different types of projects can be initiated under PESCO, for example, a new kind of transport for evacuation, new types of medical devices, the creation of new regional laboratories and research centres, development of new analytical and biotechnological equipment, improvement of logistic chains, the establishment of unique and specific training institutions for civilian and military medics, and the development and use of robotic technologies or drones. Finally, countries that engage in epidemiological security measures during COVID 19 are clearly enhancing their prestige by not only demonstrating their readiness to react to the current situation, but also by taking practical action.

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European Union Common Security and Defence policy and Latvian involvement in EU Battlegroups

Bodnieks Valerijs

Security and Defence Quarterly

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2019

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Vol. 24, No. 2

202--212

EN

In this article, the author analyses types of Europeanisation: top-down, bottom-up, horizontal, circular, and looks at Latvian involvement in the EU CSDP capability project - EU Battlegroups. Additionally, the author analyses the EU CSDP strategies in 2003 and 2016 with emphasis on key threats and key directions of action for the security of the EU. If it is necessary, EU Battlegroups can become involved to secure the EU. In the article, the author examines Latvian involvement in EU Battlegroups and changes in political planning documents and legal acts regarding EU Battlegroups. The author shows that for the future, it is necessary to involve an EU Battlegroup in real action in the area of operations, and that it is necessary to initiate discussions on a possible review and evaluation of the format of the EU Battlegroup.