Security problems of systems of extremely weak devices

• Autorzy: Klonowski M.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In this paper we discuss some fundamental security issues of distributed systems of weak devices. We briefly describe two extreme kinds of such systems - the sensor network and theRadio Frequency IDentification (RFID) system from the point of view of security mechanisms designer. We describe some most important particularities and issues (including unsolved problems) that have to be taken into account in security design and analysis. Finally we present some fundamental concepts and paradigms of research on security of weak devices. In the paper we also give a brief survey of ultra–light HB/HB+ - family of encryption schemes and so-called predistribution protocols.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

systems of weak devices; sensor network; Radio Frequency Identification; RFID; encryption scheme; predistribution protocol

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo UMCS
• Czasopismo: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio AI, Informatica
• Rocznik: 2011
• Tom: Vol. 11, no. 3
• Strony: 9--25
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 46 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Klonowski M.

• Institute of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wrocław University of Technology, ul. Wybrzeże Wyspiańskieo 27, 50-370 Wrocław, Poland

Bibliografia

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