Stability kernel in finite games with perturbed payoffs

• Autorzy: Emelichev Vladimir , Nikulin Yury

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.2478/candc-2022-0001

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The parametric concept of equilibrium in a finite cooperative game of several players in a normal form is introduced. This concept is defined by the partitioning of a set of players into coalitions. Two extreme cases of such partitioning correspond to Pareto optimal and Nash equilibrium outcomes, respectively. The game is characterized by its matrix, in which each element is a subject for independent perturbations., i.e. a set of perturbing matrices is formed by a set of additive matrices, with two arbitrary Hölder norms specified independently in the outcome and criterion spaces. We undertake post-optimal analysis for the so-called stability kernel. The analytical expression for supreme levels of such perturbations is found. Numerical examples illustrate some of the pertinent cases.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

post-optimal analysis; multiple criteria; kernel stability radius; independent perturbations; finite games; Pareto optimality; Nash equilibrium

• Wydawca: Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Control and Cybernetics
• Rocznik: 2022
• Tom: Vol. 51, No. 1
• Strony: 6--20
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 21 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Emelichev Vladimir

• Belarusian State University, Faculty of Mechanics and Mathematics, Nezavisimosti 4, 220030 Minsk, Belarus

autor

Nikulin Yury

• University of Turku, Department of Mathematics and Statistics, 20014 Turku, Finland

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