Logics for Modelling Collective Attitudes

Porello, D.

doi:10.3233/FI-2018-1648

Artykuł - szczegóły

Tytuł artykułu

Logics for Modelling Collective Attitudes

Autorzy

Porello D.

Wybrane pełne teksty z tego czasopisma

https://fi.episciences.org/

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.3233/FI-2018-1648

Warianty tytułu

Języki publikacji

Abstrakty

We introduce a number of logics to reason about collective propositional attitudes that are defined by means of the majority rule. It is well known that majoritarian aggregation is subject to irrationality, as the results in social choice theory and judgment aggregation show. The proposed logics for modelling collective attitudes are based on a substructural propositional logic that allows for circumventing inconsistent outcomes. Individual and collective propositional attitudes, such as beliefs, desires, obligations, are then modelled by means of minimal modalities to ensure a number of basic principles. In this way, a viable consistent modelling of collective attitudes is obtained.

Słowa kluczowe

collective propositional attitudes collective rationality group agency judgment aggregation majority rule non normal modal logics social choice theory substructural logics

Wydawca

IOS Press

Czasopismo

Fundamenta Informaticae

Rocznik

2018

Tom

Vol. 158, nr 1/3

Strony

239--275

Opis fizyczny

Bibliogr. 57 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Porello D.

danieleporello@gmail.com

Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Piazza Domenicani 3, 39100, Bolzano, Italy

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2018).

Typ dokumentu

Bibliografia

Identyfikator YADDA

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