

## THE NEW POLICY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANISATION FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)

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### Abstract:

*The paper presents a comparative analysis of two documents forming the political basis for the concept of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, namely NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) no. MC 0411/2, approved on 5 May 2014, and its predecessor entitled NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) no. MC 0411/1, published on 6 July 2001. The analysis of the structure of both documents, their substance and thematic scope as well as their origin and background made it possible to identify the principal directions in the transformation of the CIMIC concept since its beginnings and to present its new elements, mainly the issue of civil-military interaction. The article discusses also the further anticipated directions of changes arising from the assumptions of the new NATO policy for CIMIC and CMI and the progress made so far in operationalising the strategic assumptions contained in MC 0411/2, including in particular the works on a new NATO doctrine concerning CIMIC and CMI.*

### Keywords:

*CIMIC, comprehensive approach, CMI, NATO, military policy*

## INTRODUCTION

On 5 May 2014, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved a document outlining the new military policy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for civil-military cooperation, announced by the NATO Military Committee (MC) on 25 March 2014 [24, 10]. Thus, the document entitled “NATO Military Policy on Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) and Civil-Military Interaction (CMI) No. MC 0411/2”, replaced document No.

MC 0411/1 [36], governing these issues, approved by the NAC on 6 July 2001. The inceptions of these documents were separated by over a decade, during which the North Atlantic Alliance had to face evolving threats, necessitating the introduction of innovative changes not only in the structures of NATO and in the procedures governing its operation, but also in the way of thinking adopted by the people creating it. The issues related to the broadly understood civil-military cooperation were subject to a similar evolution. The comparison of the above-mentioned documents provides an excellent opportunity to analyse the scope and direction of these transformations, the change in the NATO's approach to cooperation with non-military entities and, consequently, the present objectives of the Alliance regarding the development of its relations with the civil environment.

### **1. THE ORIGIN OF THE NATO POLICY FOR CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)**

"The Alliance's Strategic Concept", passed during the NATO Summit in Washington, on 24 April 1999, was the formal basis for developing the NATO original policy regarding CIMIC – MC 0411/1 [33, 34]. It sanctioned, to a considerable extent, the experience gained by the Alliance over the decade approaching its end [11], including predominantly the experience derived from the involvement in conflicts in former Yugoslavia. One of the conclusions was that the strictly military operations alone were not sufficient to prevent or effectively manage a crisis. In Section 60 of the *Concept* it was stated that the interaction between the Alliance's forces and the civil environment was of key importance for the success of operations and that the civil-military cooperation was interdependent, as on the one hand civil entities demanded support by military means and on the other hand civil support was important for the success of a military operation [11]. The above was the first official statement regarding CIMIC in the history of the North Atlantic Alliance. It means, in turn, that the NATO policy for CIMIC, contained in MC 0411/1, also based on the experience gained, among others, during conflicts in the Balkans, was the starting point for further considerations and development [35]. MC 0411/1 basically focused on the creation of functional premises and the implementation of the CIMIC concept into the NATO existing military structure as well as on the integration of objectives attributed to CIMIC into traditional tasks of the armed forces [35].

From the point of view of the further evolution of CIMIC, the changes made in the *Strategic Concept of 2010* [5], in relation to the above-mentioned *Concept of 1999*, are of particular importance. The new *Concept* sanctioned the solutions resulting from the experience gained by the Alliance, the characteristic gravity of which went beyond the existing formal framework far enough to make it necessary to establish new regulations, more adequate for the current situation, and to set the directions for further development. Already in the second bullet point of the Preface to the *Concept of 2010*, directly after the confirmation of the bonds between the member states of the Alliance to defend one another, NATO was obliged to prevent crises, manage conflicts and stabilise post-conflict situations by a closer cooperation with international partners, the United Nations (UN) and the European Union in particular [55]. Apart from collective defence, the basic tasks of the Alliance included crisis management and coopera-

tive security [31]. Invoking the NATO's experience gained in Afghanistan and the Balkans, the *Concept* contains an unambiguous statement that a comprehensive – political, civil and military – approach is indispensable for effective crisis management [55]. Therefore, the Alliance must cooperate actively with other international entities before, during and after averting a conflict, in the areas of analysing, planning and running operations in the field, in order to maximise the consistency and effectiveness of the international community's overall efforts [39]. It means that such cooperation has to be effected on a permanent basis and not only during respective crises or missions.

The above-mentioned tasks facing the Alliance represent the essence of a new way of thinking in NATO, the so-called comprehensive approach (CA), i.e. the Alliance's thorough handling of crises resolution in as close as possible, multidimensional and partnership-based cooperation with the international community [16]. Thus, the birth of the CA concept betokens an important turning point in the development of CIMIC.

To carry out these plans, in the discussed *Concept* the Alliance was obliged to improve in the area of anti-crisis activities, which included the formation of appropriate but modest civil capabilities to manage crises [5]. The *Concept* declared also the strengthening of integration in the area of civil-military planning, covering the whole range of crisis-related activities, as well as the intensification of training for civil specialists, capable of acting together with the military staff. Finally, the Alliance was to enhance political dialogue and cooperation with the UN, among others by the intensified exchange of information, more regular consultations and stronger practical cooperation in crisis management, involving both these organisations [5, 47]. Although the previous *Concept* of 1999 emphasised the necessity of taking into consideration political, economic or social factors for the purpose of preventing and resolving conflicts, or the need for closer cooperation with the UN, the OSCE [47] and the then Western Europe Union, the document did not impose any specific solutions in this area. The *Strategic Concept* of 2010, however, devotes significantly more space to these issues.

Finally, the *Concept* of 2010, in Para. 25.2, instructed to further develop doctrine – which can be interpreted as a direct formal encouragement to work on the revision of political and doctrinal documents related to the comprehensive approach – including the NATO's policy, implemented so far, for civil-military cooperation [38]. The emphasis, arising from the CA, on fostering closer multidimensional cooperation with non-military entities, going beyond the traditional understanding of CIMIC, made it necessary to revise its principles.

The new NATO policy, contained in MC 0411/2, is based on the provisions of MC 0411/1 and it does not dispute the principles and functions of CIMIC described therein, but it makes their creative expansion. The greatest innovation, visible already in the title, is the concept of civil-military interaction (CMI), defined in this document for the first time in the history of NATO, although this term would appear also in the earlier NATO documents [40]. The Alliance's military entities having a functional contact with non-military external actors obviously had to enter into such interaction before, through the components of CIMIC or without them, so the fact of defining CMI in MC 0411/2 resulted to a considerable extent from the necessity of sanctioning the already

existing practice, embracing symbolically the CA assumptions and incorporating CMI officially to the Alliance's armamentarium [21]. So what is CMI discussed in MC 0411/2?

## 2. CIVIL-MILITARY INTERACTION (CMI)

The term *interaction* can be defined in the simplest way as an *interaction between phenomena, objects or processes*, where the word *interaction* is understood as the exertion of influence. In accordance with this general definition, for any interaction between specific entities to exist there must be a detectable, indirect or direct (*mutual*), dependence. Such dependence is manifested in three ways, in which the said entities can interact between each other:

- oppositely – np. one party gains, while the other one loses or all parties lose. Natural sciences use here the term antagonistic interactions for this purpose, including, among others, competition, parasitism or predation;
- neutrally – an interaction does not influence the qualitative or quantitative condition of the observed objects over a period of time subject to analysis;
- and, finally, convergently, when the parties concerned can profit from their interaction. Using once again the nomenclature of natural sciences, this phenomenon can be referred to as symbiosis. The most desirable interaction in this respect would be the one aiming to produce the synergistic effect, where the achieved result is greater than the sum of actions taken by respective participants.

The phenomenon of interaction can occur directly and indirectly – through the agency of other entities or technical means. Interaction can take place, with regard to all participants, in real time, however, there are no limitations with respect to its duration or intensity or the time when direct or indirect effects are brought about. Furthermore, non-recurrent and recurrent, accidental and planned, desirable and undesirable interactions can be distinguished. Finally, each defined object can enter into an unlimited number of interactions with the environment and its constituent entities.

The same applies to a *civil-military interaction*. On the basis of the general definition provided hereinabove it can be stated that within *civil-military interaction* military entities [32] and other entities originating from the civil (non-military) environment interact between each other. Both the member states and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, being an independent entity under international law, declaring their observance of the Charter of the United Nations [32], broadly understood human rights and also the rules of the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict, obviously repudiate the possibility of an *opposite* interaction between their armed forces and the civilian environment. Thus, the distinctive feature of *civil-military interaction*, in the understanding adopted in NATO, is its *convergent* direction of interaction, aimed, if not at the mutual support and cooperation with non-military entities, then at least at ensuring their neutrality or the deconfliction of operations. What is more, the principal objective of establishing relations under CMI as well as creating CIMIC elements and their functioning in the Alliance's armed forces is to work out and maintain such *con-*

*vergent, or neutral* at the minimum, way of interacting with the civilian environment. Both NATO and other international entities have been using the notion of civil-military interaction in such general sense for many years.

The first official definition of *civil-military interaction*, included in MC 0411/2, corresponds to the above-mentioned general definition of *interaction* and it reads as follows: *CMI is a group of activities, founded on communication, planning and coordination, that all NATO military bodies share and conduct with international and local non-military actors, both during NATO operations and in preparation for them, which mutually increases the effectiveness and efficiency of their respective actions in response to crises* [36].

A particular emphasis has to be placed on three issues contained in this definition, expanded also in other articles of MC 0411/2 [36]:

- CMI is effected through all military entities of the Alliance. Unlike the original definition of CIMIC, contained in MC 0411/1, which recognised solely the NATO Commander [35, 25] as an entity on the military side, the definition of CMI includes a provision stating that *all NATO military bodies* are the entities taking part in civil-military interactions on the NATO side. Furthermore, in Para. 5 of MC 0411/2, it was stated even more precisely that for NATO to be able to carry out effectively the goals arising from the assumptions of comprehensive approach, all military functions and disciplines had to be involved in CMI. These actions are subsequently harmonised by the commanders and supported by the relevant potential of CIMIC [36, 22].
- CMI is not a process controlled by the army. A statement included in the definition which says that the activities undertaken under CMI are carried out together with international and local actors means, in accordance with the idea of CA, that the military side is to be one of the numerous entities forming the network of interactions and striving towards a common goal, i.e. the prevention of crises [28, 55]. In this system NATO military bodies have exactly the same rights and obligations as the other participants and, therefore, they may not impose their principles and objectives on others and they also have to respect the objectives, principles and ways of operation of the other entities involved in the interaction [44].
- CMI emphasises the need for the participants' more flexible approach to the fulfilment of their objectives. CMI is designed to lead to a mutual increase in the effectiveness and efficiency of respective activities counteracting crises. A means to achieve it is the improvement in the flexibility in planning and the execution of activities, achieved to the same extent by all entities involved in interaction, so that all of these entities could have equal opportunities for the fulfilment of their goals. Such proceeding should translate into mutual support or at least the avoidance of disruptions to individual activities.

The term *group of activities*, included in the definition, should be understood as a *process – a series of operations or other activities, undertaken by military entities, which*

are interrelated and based on each other [27]. Hence, it is not a set of accidental activities undertaken by various military entities, without any internal order, synchronisation or a predefined specific objective [36]. It should also be pointed out that the said activities are not limited solely to those listed in the definition: *exchange of information, planning and coordination*, but they are – in accordance with the definition – *founded on them*. It opens up a possibility of extending constructively the catalogue of possible interactions by the addition of some other aspects.

Finally, there remains a fragment of the definition which is worth mentioning, stating that the actions undertaken as part of CMI are carried out *both during NATO operations and in preparation for them* – which means that CMI remains a permanent activity, which is not limited to supporting individual operations. The above statement corresponds directly with the provisions of the *Concept* of 2010, previously quoted, concerning the permanent cooperation between NATO and international entities involved in crisis management.

### 3. CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION (CIMIC)

The emergence and definition of the term *civil-military interaction* necessitated a number of changes in the scope of meaning concerning *civil-military cooperation, CIMIC*. It has become indispensable to formulate a new definition of CIMIC – indicating its new place and tasks in the context of CMI in such a way that the functions of CIMIC coincide with the CMI activities.

The definition of CIMIC contained in MC 0411/2 reads as follows: *CIMIC is a joint function comprising a set of capabilities integral to supporting the achievement of mission objectives and enabling NATO commands to participate effectively in a broad spectrum of CMI with diverse non-military actors* [36].

In the above definition a *joint function*, apart from its traditional meaning [6], is interpreted as a set of tasks which, due to their specific nature, are allocated, in the process of task distribution, to specialised entities, formed and prepared to fulfil this *function* [26]. The terms *joint function* and *set of capabilities* [8] are brought together to underline the necessity of the further existence and development of separate structures formed by specialists trained in civil-military cooperation, operating both at all levels of command and in the field [26]. These are the structures that have the appropriate *capabilities* to fulfil a *joint function*, represented by CIMIC. Although the above statement does not go beyond the definition of the traditional role and tasks of CIMIC, it is important for balancing and supplementing the process related to the implementation of CMI.

Emphasis should also be placed on the fact of describing the issues of CIMIC, as *inseparably linked with supporting mission objectives*, and even more so since traditionally CIMIC has been perceived as an adjunct to the fundamental military functions, connected with armed combat. Although CIMIC does not necessarily support purely combat tasks in a direct manner, it remains an immanent part of the process of planning and running operations. Such description moves CIMIC closer to the centre of the Alliance's military activities.



In the definitions of CIMIC, in both MC 0411/1 and MC 0411/2, the term *mission* is understood predominantly as a *clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpos* [1], not necessarily related to a *journey abroad or expedition* – which are the other common meanings of the word *mission* [24]. And although MC 0411/1 actually limited the implementation of CIMIC to support for respective operations, it was not related to the use of the word *mission* [35] in the definition contained therein. It is worth remembering as in accordance with MC 0411/2 CIMIC ceased to be implemented only for the purpose of supporting subsequent operations and it has become a permanent function, designed to support the Alliance's military activities, especially those related to CMI, at all levels [23].

Particular attention should be paid to the part of the definition of CIMIC concerning NATO commands. The definition of CIMIC applies to commands which were specified in AAP-6 as *a unit, group of units, organization or area under the authority of a single individual* [1] – so in practice it concerns all levels of command, including the strategic level [43].

#### **4. FURTHER INNOVATIONS INCLUDED IN MC 0411/2 IN COMPARISON WITH MC 0411/1**

The evolution of the concepts of civil-military interaction and cooperation in NATO is manifested also in other fragments of MC 0411/2. The document itself is four pages longer than its predecessor. Furthermore, apart from the changed title, in which the CMI element appeared, a general reformatting of the crossheads was carried out and a new content was added.

##### **4.1 Scope**

A new element is a subsection concerning the scope of application of the NATO new policy (*Scope*), and, specifically, it enumerates the civil-military relations to which this policy does not apply. Namely, MC 0411/2 does not apply to any internal relations between the military personnel and the Alliance's civil-political command, as such relations are based on dependencies resulting from the accountability of subordinates to their superiors. This policy does not govern the relations between military and civilian personnel within the NATO structures, either, because these relations are determined by other documents [41, 2, 3]. Lastly, MC 0411/2 is not intended to govern any relations between civilian entities. Thence, the policy applies to all NATO military entities, fulfilling their tasks arising from the *Strategic Concept* at all levels.

##### **4.2 Non-military actors**

Another novelty is the catalogue of civil entities with which the NATO forces are in contact (*Diversity of non-military actors*), evidencing that the Alliance is aware of the diversity of the civilian environment and the possibilities of constructive cooperation. Apart from local, regional and international organisations and non-governmental agencies as well as governmental agencies currently divided into humanitarian and development ones, listed in the original definition of CIMIC, the above catalogue includes, among others, law enforcement agencies such as police, customs service, military police, prison service, etc. It mentions also civil authorities and civil actors at the

national, regional or local level. They comprise also social organisations, local media, informal leaders, semi-official authorities and religious leaders, respected by local communities. Each of the categories mentioned above is accompanied in MC 0411/2 by the guidelines informing what actions (e.g. taking into consideration the opinion expressed by representatives of the police) and according to what principles (e.g. respecting the guiding principles of humanitarian organisations, i.e. neutrality, impartiality and humanity) should be taken with regard to them by the NATO personnel, and the CIMIC specialists in particular.

### 4.3 Relations with other areas of operation and capabilities of NATO

Some changes were also introduced in the subsections concerning the relations with other activities of the Alliance, having associations with the civilian environment. Namely, MC 0411/1 recognised the following other (other than CIMIC) aspects of civil-military relations (*Other Aspects of Civil-Military Relations*):

1. Military Assistance in Humanitarian Emergencies (MAHE);
2. Civil Emergency Planning (CEP);
3. Host Nation Support (HNS);

In MC 0411/2 this subsection concerns the relations between CIMIC and CMI and other areas of operation and capabilities of NATO (*Relationships to other NATO Policies and Capabilities*). Military assistance, *MAHE*, which was listed in the original catalogue, was removed, while a number of new categories appeared:

4. Civilian Crisis Management Capability;
5. Civilian Capability in the NATO Command Structure;
6. Stabilisation and Reconstruction (S&R);
7. Operations;
8. Comprehensive Approach Specialist Support (COMPASS);
9. Strategic Communications (StratCom).

Ad. 1. The removal of military assistance, *MAHE*, from the above catalogue in MC 0411/2 results from the implied location of CMI and CIMIC issues in a significantly broader context, concerning not only military assistance during humanitarian crises, but also all activities of the Alliance within the CA [23]. Both policies refer to NATO document No. MC 343/1, governing the NATO's military support in operations mitigating the effects of natural disasters [37]. References to MC 343/1 appear in MC 0411/2, among others in the context of respecting by the NATO forces any actions taken by humanitarian organisations (Para. 24), the catalogue of principles concerning CMI (Para. 34) and the Alliance's engagement in non-military tasks (Para. 34 g.) [21, 23, 36].

Ad. 2. CEP is perceived as a set of activities aimed at protecting the population of a given state from the effects of a natural disaster or a war. It generally represents the civilian domain and remains the direct responsibility of respective states. The role performed by the Alliance in this area is to collect, analyse and distribute the information



about national efforts aimed to ensure that civilian resources are effectively used in the course of a crisis [4]. After the *Strategic Concept* was passed in 1999, and as a result of the decisions taken by the NAC in July 2000, five functions of CEP in NATO were specified:

- civil support for NATO military operations, resulting from Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty [53];
- support for crisis response operations, not resulting from Art. 5;
- support for state authorities in the case of extraordinary threats;
- support for state authorities in protecting the population against the effects of weapons of mass destruction;
- cooperation with partners [50].

Since only the first two functions are directly relevant to support for NATO military operations [4], MC 0411/1 contained a statement that the fundamental role of CEP was its readiness to support the military process of planning NATO operations resulting from Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty and crisis response operations not resulting from Art. 5. In MC 0411/2 all of the above-mentioned functions of CEP were already listed and the CIMIC personnel was authorised to support their commands by facilitating their use of the expert knowledge of the civil entities involved in CEP. Furthermore, as the assumptions of CEP may affect the freedom of operation of the Alliance's forces, and the military planning has to take account of the need to protect and maintain functions vital to life of the civil population, elements of CIMIC were authorised to coordinate the military planning with the existing CEP plans, national, allied or developed by the UN agencies, by imposing a requirement to establish effective relations with the relevant entities of CEP and to assess the influence of their actions on crisis management operations [22]. It represents a certain extension of the NATO's mandate concerning its potential participation in crisis management operations [51], which corresponds with the above-mentioned fundamental tasks of the Alliance, described in the *Strategic Concept* of 2010.

Ad. 3. The general definition of HNS is quite similar in both documents, although in MC 0411/2 it is more universal, and thus, more useful [36]. However, the tasks and guidelines for CIMIC components in this area are stated far more precisely in MC 0411/2. While in accordance with MC 0411/1 the CIMIC personnel was to focus, under HNS, on the issues of utilising local resources in general, in MC 0411/2 its role is also to prevent the occurrence of disturbances in this area, with respect to the needs of the local population or other non-military entities. Under HNS the CIMIC specialists are also tasked with the assessment of the military's impact on the local economy and they should cooperate with civilian entities to ensure that both military and civilian needs are satisfied in a harmonised way [22]. CMI, in the context of HNS, should always be coordinated in full cooperation with the relevant authorities of the host state.

Ad. 4, 5, 6, 8. These issues remain interrelated and concern the regulation of the process of employing civilian specialists in the civil (Para. 15) and military (Para. 16) struc-

tures of NATO, creating civil or civil-military units and building databases of civilian experts in the fields of crisis management, stabilisation and reconstruction (Para. 20). In accordance with the CA concept, the above activities are designed to support the strictly military elements of the Alliance in planning and carrying out operations related to crisis management (Paras. 15 and 16) and stabilisation and reconstruction activities (Para. 17). This process is based on the conclusion drawn from the experience gained by the Alliance during its missions that specialist stabilisation and reconstruction activities will be best carried out by dedicated non-military entities. The above-mentioned experience has also shown that such dedicated institutions may be unable, for numerous reasons, to fulfil their tasks, as a result of which such tasks fall to the Alliance [56, 46]. Therefore, in MC 0411/2, in Paras. 15 and 16, the postulate, arising from the comprehensive approach and contained in the *Strategic Concept* of 2010 [18, 55], of creating within the Alliance the appropriate but modest civilian resources for crisis management and employing the appropriate but modest number of civilian experts was repeated again – though without expanding. Similarly as in the case of CMI, these provisions do not introduce any new solutions, but they just sanction, to a certain extent, the already existing ones, since civilian experts, supporting the military staff with specialist knowledge, are employed in the Alliance's structures, on the different bases, both in the permanent commands and in the contingents deployed in missions [4]. Pursuant to the decisions taken in Lisbon in 2010, in the structure of J9 of Allied Command Operations (ACO) a CMI unit composed predominantly of civilian experts was formed in December 2012 [17], and it was ready for operation in the middle of 2013. The Comprehensive Crisis and Operations Management Centre (CCOMC), also operating within the ACO since May 2012, employs civilian experts to a significant extent as well, and a civilian diplomat is the first advisor of the Director of the Centre (at the rank of Brigadier General).

Ad. 7, 9. The issues related to operations and strategic communication [22] were mentioned to discuss the tasks and emphasise the role of CIMIC components in supporting CMI processes, as the potential of CIMIC belongs to the basic communication armamentarium of NATO, as a channel used for influencing the recipients from outside the army. The target is to keep the Alliance's activities at all levels convergent with the comprehensive approach concept and to coordinate them properly with other non-military entities.

As it can be observed, the relations, mentioned in the title, of CIMIC and CMI with the said capabilities and areas of NATO's activities are based, in principle, on supporting these capabilities and areas by active CMI, supplemented and backed up by the activities in the scope of CIMIC.

#### **4.4 Military guidelines**

A subsection concerning the implementation of CIMIC in operations support contained in MC 0411/1 was replaced in MC 0411/2 with a whole section entitled *Military Guidance*, divided into four chapters focusing, respectively, on:

1. General information concerning CMI and CIMIC;

2. NATO objectives for civil-military interactions;
3. Principles of effecting CMI;
4. Applying the potential of CIMIC to support the implementation of CMI.

Ad. 1. MC 0411/1 generally imposed on NATO commanders involved in military operations a number of obligations related to the cooperation with the civilian environment. MC 0411/2 states precisely that at the strategic level CMI will be effected by Strategic Commanders, in cooperation with the NATO Headquarters, whereas at the operational and tactical levels CMI engaging local entities will be carried out by commanders on the basis of the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and received orders [35]. CIMIC is designed to support military operations, including CMI, at all levels. Similarly as on the basis of MC 0411/1, the CIMIC capabilities are in the hands of member states, which are responsible for supplying appropriately trained and prepared components. MC 0411/2 imposes also the obligation to educate and train all military actors in the scope of CMI, and also – similarly to MC 0411/1 – to ensure closer cooperation and exchange of experience with non-military partners as part of common training and exercises.

Ad. 2. The objectives of CIMIC, listed in MC 0411/1, were limited, in the direct perspective, to ensuring such cooperation between the NATO commander and the civilian environment entities which enabled him to fulfil his tasks. In the long-term perspective CIMIC was designed to support the creation of appropriate conditions for the achievement of NATO's objectives in its operations [35, 7, 25]. In accordance with MC 0411/2, however, the fundamental objective of CMI, and consequently also of CIMIC, is to support NATO commanders so that while commanding the operation they fulfil the objectives imposed on them by the NAC on the one hand, while on the other hand, in compliance with the CA idea, to ensure that their actions are compatible, to the greatest possible extent, with the actions of other entities and improve, mutually, their effectiveness and efficiency. This change represents a certain re-evaluation of the CMI and CIMIC functions, from a tool designed *de facto* to eliminate any obstacles to the fulfilment of NATO's mission towards a platform for cooperation and exchange of information, aimed at a mutual improvement in effectiveness and efficiency of actions of all participants, including non-military entities, and not only of the Alliance's forces. It is also confirmed by the aim of developing a new policy, specified in MC 0411/2, which is the strengthening of the NATO's participation in crisis response, by improving the NATO's military capabilities of interacting with non-military entities and increasing the possibilities of making use of the NATO CIMIC potential [36].

Ad. 3. The catalogue of principles, contained in MC 0411/2, which have to be applied by NATO military entities is, to a certain extent, a new element – supplementing the new definition of CMI [23]. However, a number of guidelines for effecting CIMIC remain the same in both documents, e.g. exchange of information, requirements for transparency and confidence in mutual relations or consent to undertaking non-military tasks by the Alliance's forces under some circumstances specified from above, based on the assumption that such tasks will be transferred to the appropriate non-military entities as soon as possible [45]. In compliance with the CA idea, all non-

military entities involved in counteracting crises are also invited to recognise these principles and engage actively in CMI.

Ad. 4. In order to describe more precisely the ways and principles of fulfilling the CIMIC functions both political documents refer to the doctrinal documents of the lower tier. MC 0411/1 refers to AJP-9 [8], whereas MC 0411/2 does not mention a specific reference document. MC 0411/2 lists as the main components supporting NATO military entities in effecting CMI not only CIMIC, but also civilian specialists cooperating with the Alliance. These two types of entities are also responsible for the provision of structured information about political, economic, social and other factors occurring in the potential and actual areas of NATO operations and for taking such information into account in the process of planning and carrying out military operations. Furthermore, the CIMIC personnel is to support, facilitate and effect CMI directly, on the basis of a number of activities, which in MC 0411/2 first of all include the following:

- acting as a liaison between the military and civilian environments;
- assessment of the civilian environment;
- planning;
- coordination of activities with other entities engaged in CMI;
- support for local authorities in resolving crises;
- support for interactions at the command level, through assistance in establishing relations between the military and civil entities appropriate for performing respective activities;
- direct support in implementing the plans usually carried out by non-military entities.

It can be clearly seen that the above-mentioned activities fully correspond with, or even are contained in, the existing traditional CIMIC functions, which, although not literally mentioned in MC 0411/1, are included in the doctrinal documents drawn up on its basis [8, 15]. The fundamental CIMIC functions comprise:

- exchange of information with civilian entities;
- support for the civilian environment;
- support for the armed forces [8].

Moreover, these traditional CIMIC functions practically form the foundations for and ensure the consistency of further military activities connected with CMI.

#### **4.5 Obligations**

Both documents are concluded with the catalogue of obligations of the top-level decision-making military entities in NATO in the context of CIMIC and CMI. Whereas in MC 0411/1 obligations were distributed between the Military Committee and, jointly, Strategic Commanders, in MC 0411/2, apart from the Committee, the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), heading the ACO, and, separately, the Supreme Allied

Commander Transformation (SACT), commanding the ACT, are listed [35, 36]. The role of the Military Committee has not been subject to any fundamental changes and it is limited to providing guidelines and directions for the activities of CIMIC and CMI in the subordinated structures, ensuring that the CIMIC and CMI aspects are appropriately addressed in other political documents, advising the NAC and monitoring the compliance of the actions taken by the Alliance's military entities with the guidelines of the policy for civil-military relations. In MC 0411/2 the tasks for the respective Strategic Commanders were described in more detail and extended by adding the CMI issues, and also distributed in accordance with the functional specifics of these commands. Thus, for example on the basis of the OPLAN and the guidelines of the North Atlantic Council, the SACEUR authorises the subordinate commanders to start cooperation with the local authorities and agencies of other international organisations (Para. 40 i.), while the SACT gathers and analyses conclusions and focuses on conceptual work to improve the activities of CIMIC and CMI (Para. 41 a. and b.).

## **5. IMPLICATIONS RESULTING FROM THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE'S NEW POLICY WITH REGARD TO CIMIC AND CMI**

To begin with, it should be pointed out that when in May 2014, the North Atlantic Council approved MC 0411/2 document, it did not finalise the works on the NATO's new policy with regard to CMI and CIMIC, which started in 2011. By approving the said document the NAC accepted the framework for the new policy proposed by the Military Committee, however the works on its implementation are still in the conceptual phase [19, 20].

Despite this, the above analysis provides several conclusions concerning the further role of CIMIC and the development of CMI:

- fundamental functions and the way of operation of CIMIC components, especially at the tactical level, will not be subject to any radical changes, as the NATO new policy sanctioned to a certain extent the existing and already proven practice;
- intensification of the cooperation of NATO military components, including CIMIC in particular, with the national and international crisis management bodies can be expected, and also with specialist agencies, in the scope of training, planning and exchange of experience;
- publication of the new doctrinal document concerning CIMIC and CMI is not likely to produce any radical changes to the doctrinal assumptions or techniques and procedures directly related to the practice of CIMIC, as the applicable doctrine – above-mentioned AJP 3.4.9 of 2013 – takes account, to a considerable extent, of the Alliance's new experience regarding CIMIC and the comprehensive approach assumptions. The implementation of CMI, however, requires new doctrinal solutions, techniques and procedures [20];
- development of the CA idea, the necessity of implementing CMI and putting MC 0411/2 into effect will contribute to an increase in the significance of CIMIC specialists in the process of creating new doctrinal documents and

procedures and revising the old ones, particularly those which were not directly related to CIMIC, starting from AJP-01 [6] and ending with the documents containing detailed techniques, tactics and operational procedures of military branches;

- for the same reasons the number and scope of training initiatives concerning the cooperation with non-military partners will increase, because, apart from the training for the CIMIC personnel focusing strictly on CIMIC, it is necessary to develop the allied and national training systems related to CMI and intended for other military specialties;
- leading function of the CIMIC personnel will be to support other military entities in effecting their interactions with the civilian environment according to the CA principles, including the modification, where possible or advisable, of temporary or ad hoc relations, aiming at permanent cooperation;
- scope and rules of operation of civilian experts as well as the process of their training in the Alliance's military structures will potentially expand, including the channels of their cooperation with the military personnel, carried out directly or through the CIMIC specialists;
- as threats evolve, the process of the Alliance's adaptation is still ongoing, so probably a subsequent strategic concept will be created in the following decade, adjusting once again the NATO operations and, consequently, setting new directions for the Alliance's policy with regard to CIMIC and CMI;
- it can be expected that the Alliance will further implement and improve the CA idea and, consequently, intensify the functional integration with non-military entities aimed at the common, more effective and efficient response to new crises and threats.

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