Iranian cyber capabilities as a tool of domestic and foreign policy

• Autorzy: Stachoń Monika

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5604/01.3001.0054.4537

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Iran is among the most advanced countries in terms of cyber capabilities. Activities in the digital sphere have both offensive and defensive dimensions and are directed both outward and inward. This article attempts to systematize information on Iran’s cyber capabilities, both internal and external. The purpose of the article is to discuss the challenges to individual states and the international community as a whole posed by Iranian activities in the digital sphere. The question the author seeks to answer in the article is how Tehran uses the digital tools it possesses to implement its security strategy. The author used theoretical methods related to the analysis and criticism of available sources, such as reports of technology companies and research institutes, intelligence documents, and legal acts. She also used a case study method, which enabled it to examine specific cases of Iranian cyber activities to find answers to the question of the strategic importance of cyberspace for the Iranian government.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

cyberspace; cyberterrorism; cyber espionage; cyberattack; state terrorism; Iran

• Wydawca: Szkoła Główna Służby Pożarniczej
• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe SGSP / Szkoła Główna Służby Pożarniczej
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: Nr 89 (tom 2)
• Strony: 267--290
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 65 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Stachoń Monika

• University of Warsaw, Warsaw, Poland

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0679-9621

Bibliografia

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