

HEIMEVERNET - THE PILLAR OF NORWAY'S DEFENCE POLICY

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*(Protect Guard Work –
the motto of Norwegian Home Guard)*

Abstract

The aim of this article is to analyse the organisation and functioning of Norwegian territorial defence (nor. Heimevernet) by showing its specificity and place in the national security system. The content of this study was intended to bring the reader closer to information on the functioning of this type of formation and answer the question posed during the research, that is, how does the territorial defence system work, which is connected to the entire defence system of the state in the military layer, i.e.: the organisational structure of the formation, the role of the formation in the national defence strategy, the organisation of the recruitment system and the training of candidates for service, as well as the civil level through the close cooperation of individual elements of the territorial organisation of military administration, Heimevernet territorial units with local government bodies at all levels in the Nordic strategic culture, and whether the conclusions of the study would provide a benchmark in the implementation of some solutions to the Polish concept of building a territorial defence system. This scientific article has been prepared on the basis of the available local literature on the Norwegian defence system, and on the basis of the research material collected in preparing the thesis.

Key words: Territorial defence, territoriality, conscription, society, total defence

Introduction

Today, the global security environment is noteworthy for the high dynamics of internal transformations with the functioning of its permanent elements, i.e. nation states, which are the foundation of its functioning. The state as a structure has tools at its disposal to guarantee the citizens' sense of security. One of the tools is the

armed forces, an instrument capable of implementing the country's security policy, taking into account its external dimension (defence of the country's independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity against aggression) as well as the internal one (providing assistance to citizens in emergency situations).

Today, we can observe changes in the global security environment caused by China's active international policy. The "Middle Kingdom" aspires to a dominant position over the USA. A final clash is to be expected at the junction of the zones of influence between China and the USA. Therefore, an increase in Russia's activity in the European theatre of warfare should be expected at the cost of a gradual reduction of interest in Europe by the US Army. These processes are reflected in the continuation of the modernisation programme of the Russian Armed Forces in the Western Military District and the Northern Fleet in the Arctic. The consequence of the measures taken is a radical increase in the effectiveness of the troops in the west and north of Russia, which are capable of taking immediate action within a dozen or so hours.

As a result, the state of functioning of Poland's total defence system as a key country in Central and Eastern Europe exposed to potential Russian aggression should be assessed. An immanent factor that may affect the development of the defender's strategic situation is time, i.e. the issue of immediate and smooth organisation of civil and military total defence, primarily in the local dimension. This is due to the danger of the functioning of the state in conditions of a high degree of decentralisation of the system of command of defence.

It is the state that is thus geared towards conducting defensive warfare, capable of mobilizing the appropriate population and material potential in a very short time to absorb and repel aggression in the initial phase of the conflict and of cooperating closely with local state structures to organise and conduct civil-military defence of the area. Moreover, in such conditions, the organisational and functional mechanisms of the government and self-government administration are prepared to operate within the framework of considerable information and communication isolation, which implies taking over the burden of responsibility for managing the defence of a particular area.

This scientific article has been prepared on the basis of available local literature on the Norwegian defence system, as well as on the basis of the collected research material used to prepare the thesis. The aim of this article is to analyse the organisation and functioning of Norwegian territorial defence forces – Home Guard (HG; nor. Heimevernet; HV) by showing its specificity and place in the national security system. The content of this paper will bring the reader closer to the information concerning the functioning of such formations in the country from the Nordic culture circle and will make it possible to understand how territorial defence functions, which is connected to the whole state defence system in the military and civil layers, and will evoke reflection on the legitimacy of the existence of territorial formations and possible implementation of some formal, legal or organisational-functional solutions in Poland.

Political and military situation

The security policy created by the Norwegians is based on close cooperation with the United States, by developing close relations at intergovernmental level in the field of armaments industry cooperation and equipment procurement. Another important partner in the field of security policy in Europe is the Federal Republic of Germany. Norway, in the framework of its naval modernisation programme, has concluded an intergovernmental agreement with Germany for the purchase of submarines for Norway, at the same time breaking the tender for these ships, which was attended by representatives of companies from France and Sweden, as well as other activities. These can be explained in such a way that the Norwegian government wants to implement the policy of the so-called *smart defence*, i.e. *to carry out actions for defence while at the same time reducing spending for armaments, but still retaining its defence capabilities together with its partners within NATO structures*¹.


Taking into account the interests of the Norwegians with regard to their sphere of influence, they focus their main attention on the far north around their area - mainly the Barents Sea.

The discovery of huge oil and gas fields in these areas has opened up a field of new economic opportunities for Norway through the production of available hydrocarbons; it is also a source of potential risks (see Fig. 1). The area of the Norwegian and Barents Seas from the point of view of offshore operations is of strategic importance for the maritime policy of the Russian Federation. In the Cold War period it was an area of very high strategic and operational risk for NATO, due to the operation of the Warsaw Pact’s main naval strike force from the Arctic to the Atlantic². Today, these areas, in the face of the new global reality, have gained in importance by launching the Arctic trade route from Asia to Europe.

Regarding the challenges in the military sphere: The Russian Federation is seen as a major threat to the interests of the Norwegian state. The Russians have made territorial claims to the Arctic area, due to the presence in these areas of energy deposits (see Fig. 2).

¹ J. Gotkowska, *Smart defence po nordycku*, Centre for Eastern Studies, www.osw.waw.pl/pl/publikacje/analizy/2012-09-19/smart-defence-po-nordycku (25.07.2019).

² G.L. Dyndal, *50 years ago: NATO concerns about the threat posed by Soviet nuclear submarines*, NATO Review, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/pl/articles/2017/03/24/50-lat-temu-obawy-nato-zwiazane-z-zagrozeniem-stwarzanym-przez-radzieckie-nuklearne-okrety-podwodne/index.html> (04.03.2020).



Source: M. Zaniewicz, *Agreement between Russia and Norway will allow sanctions to be circumvented* <https://www.energetyka24.com/oze/porozumienie-rosji-i-norwegii-pozwoli-moskwie-obejsc-sankcje-komentarz?dp-1-page=4&dp-1-per-page=5> (Accessed: 04.03.2020).

Fig. 1. The area of territorial waters and the economic zone on: North Sea (south-western part), Norwegian Sea (western part) and Barents Sea (northern part)

Norwegians do not rule out the possibility of limited Russian pressure with the use of military force to change Norwegian policy, and even armed conflict. A factor conditioning such actions is the Russian concept of development of coastal elements of the A2/AD *Marine Bastion* system in the form of Russian deterrents. According to the data in a report prepared by the Royal United Services Institute and the British government, the aim of the Russian system is to take full strategic and operational control over the Barents Sea basin and, ultimately, the Norwegian Sea³. The effect of these security challenges is to take active measures aimed at: minimising risk in bilateral relations, deeper cooperation within NATO including the issue of deterrence, increased defence spending, increased military activity and capacity to operate in the Arctic.

³ G.L. Dyndal, *50 years ago:...*, op. cit., NATO Review, <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/pl/articles/2017/03/24/50-lat-temu-obawy-nato-zwiazane-z-zagrozeniem-stwarzanym-przez-radzkie-nuklearne-okrety-podwodne/index.html> (04.03.2020).



Source: <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/pl/articles/2017/03/24/50-lat-temu-obawy-nato-zwiazane-z-zagrozeniem-stwarzanym-przez-radzieckie-nuklearne-okrety-podwodne/index.html> (Accessed: 04.03.2020).

Fig. 2. Concept of the maritime anti-access barrier A2/AD Marine Bastion, based on cooperation and the impact forces of the Northern Fleet and missile coastal defence system “Bastion”.

Norwegian Home Guard – The beginning

The history of Norwegian *Heimevernet* dates back to World War II. The fundamental basis for the construction of the territorial defence formation was in the former underground Norwegian military organisation MILORG. Nevertheless, the organisational and functional assumptions for building territorial defence were already at the idea stage in 1941. Finally, an adequate document was developed in London as a central part of the plan of the Cabinet of War of the King Haakon VII of Norway: *Preparations for the organisation of a new defence of Norway* (nor.: *Forberedelser til organisering av det nye forsvaret av Norge*).

After World War II, the newly formed Heimevernet was implanted into an active system of state defence, operating after 1949 as part of the North Atlantic Pact,

adapted to the then environmental requirements of the battlefields of the period of the so-called *Cold War*.

1989 saw a geopolitical revolution in the political and military sphere in Europe. The definition of threats in the European theatre of warfare highlighted the need for a reform of the territorial defence system, finalised in 2005. The number of soldiers was reduced, and deep technical modernisation of personal equipment and military equipment and other armaments was carried out. The training process was also improved in order to increase the quality of a single soldier - citizen and to increase the possibilities of conducting activities in the country.

Organisation and tasks of the Heimevernet

Norwegian Home Guard (HG; nor. *Heimevernet* – HV) is one of six types of Norwegian Armed Forces of a territorial nature. It was formed in 1946; its main task is to assist operational troops in defending national territory. At present, the Norwegian territorial defence forces have 45,000 soldiers (as of 2019). These troops serve as a rapid mobilisation resource for the Norwegian Armed Forces and the main element for organising the armed resistance of the local community against enemy occupation.

These troops are divided into two components in terms of combat readiness: territorial forces - the core of a Home Guard of 42 000 people, divided into components: support and local defence; and rapid reaction forces of 3 000 people (see Fig. 3). In the future, changes in the size of individual territorial forces are planned. According to the report from the Strategic Defense Review of 2015, the regional forces will be reduced to 30 000 soldiers in the reserve by 2020, while increasing the number of soldiers in the intervention forces to 3 250⁴. Currently, the process of reducing territorial forces has been significantly slowed down due to changes in the security environment in Northern and Central - Eastern Europe

The tasks of the Norwegian Home Guard include:


- protection of territorial integrity,
- protecting important critical infrastructure,
- supporting the institutions responsible for the national crisis management system,
- strengthening the military presence in the Norwegian sphere of influence in the Arctic⁵.

The territorial forces are the core of the Norwegian territorial defence forces with capabilities similar to those of rapid reaction forces. Their level of combat readiness

⁴ *Norwegian Armed Forces in transition. Strategic Defense Review by Norwegian Chief of Defense*, Norweskie Siły Zbrojne, Oslo 2015, s. 14.

⁵ Developed on the basis of data contained on the website of the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. More: www.forsvaret.no/en/organisation/home-guard (01.03.2017 r.).

varies, depending on the purpose of a given subdivision (maneuvering or stationary defense). The regional component has a longer response time to the threat and a low level of combat readiness.



Source: www.regjeringen.no/heimevernet (Accessed: 04.03.2020).

Fig. 3. Norwegian Home Guard basic structural organisation

The regional component of the territorial defence forces in Norway consists of:

- 220 subunits of the Home Guard Land Forces,
- 17 areas of maritime territorial defence responsibility.

On the other hand, the intervention units of the Home Guard, which are at the disposal of each regional command, consist of specially selected, trained soldiers - reservists, equipped with the latest equipment. These troops are able to react immediately and enter into operational activities in a very short time. It is a kind of peacekeeping force that is able to support the public during a crisis situation; the intervention force includes:

- 12 Land-based Home Guard rapid reaction forces,
- 3 Marine Home Guard rapid reaction squads,
- 7 Air defence troops⁶.


In the Home Guard intervention force, there was a special unit HV-016, formed in 1987. Its specificity was that it was mostly composed of reservists, performing tasks strictly assigned to special forces. In the military environment they got the nickname of commando from the reserve. In terms of its organisation, this unit consisted of

⁶ Z. Badański, H. Sołkiewicz, *Polityka i strategia bezpieczeństwa...*, op. cit., BP, Gdynia 2015, s. 120–121.

4 units stationed in Oslo, Bergen, Trondheim and Stavanger. This Norwegian Home Guard unit was the best trained and equipped, which was justified considering the purpose of this unit. In peacetime, she was involved in special tasks with the special forces of the Norwegian police. The branch was disbanded in 2014.

Territorial military organisation


The organisation of territorial defence forces in Norway is regional in nature (see Fig. 4). Thanks to their knowledge of the local area, it is an important factor in the defence of the country's territory, because if there is a threat to national security, Home Guard forces are able to move on in a short time.



Source: Personal suffering, based on database from <https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/no-homevernet.htm> (Accessed: 09.03.2020).

Fig. 4. Home Guard territorial military organisation taking into account the areas of operational and administrative responsibility of military districts, regions commanders and component training centres (land - green; air - grey; sea - navy blue)

The Home Guard are an important *link* between the armed forces and civil society, as at each territorial level there are Home Guard delegations to local governments. Cooperation in the civil and military sphere takes place within the framework of functioning Defence Advisory Committees. They operate at all levels of self-government administration (regional and district levels respectively), as well as, in a broader sense, at the commune level, as a basic unit of local government prepared to carry out defence tasks (see Fig. 5). Home Guard Municipal Committees have additional tasks which concern, in particular, the process of planning, preparing and organising the subordinate area for carrying out general defence in civil and military terms.



Source: Personal suffering, based on: M. Łokociejewski, *Zadania i struktura wojsk obrony terytorialnej w wybranych państwach*, War Studies University, Warsaw 2001, s. 86–87.

Fig. 5. The role and main tasks of self-government in territorial defence systems

Regional Advisory Committees for the Home Guard are units of local government bodies, closely cooperating with local military administration bodies. They consist of representatives of civil organisations and delegated members of each National Defence unit deployed in a given military region. In peacetime, the Committee should meet once a year at a reporting meeting organised by the Regional Commander for the Home Guard; within its territorial range, it covers the same area as the military region concerned.

County Advisory Committees for the Home Guard represent all National Defence institutions in the area of a given region. The composition of the County Committee consists of approximately 3 to 10 members; it focuses on making decisions on all major issues relating to the functioning of the Territorial Defence System. The tasks of the team should be presented by an Executive Committee composed of seconded officers and specialists. It should also deal with disciplinary matters arising from the subordination of the County Commander of the Home Guard area.

Home Guard Municipal Committees are elected from among the citizens of a given town (municipality). They are an organisational part of the national defence area. The Committees have an advisory function for the commander of the national defence area. They often consist of three members: two elected by the citizens and one by the police. These committees merge into advisory teams of the district commander in a given area⁷.


The structure of the Norwegian Home Guard

The Norwegian Home Guard consists of three types of troops: The Land Home Guard, which has tasks related to the area of residence of the soldiers in it, consisting of direct defence of the territory, performing guard and protective service as well as conducting reconnaissance and observation; the Maritime Home Guard, whose tasks are reduced to conducting reconnaissance, determining, supervising and reporting on the situation along the coast; and the Air Defence Home Guard, whose task is to conduct direct defence of the most important air bases against air strikes, protection of military aviation infrastructure and serving in the anti-chemical defence.

In the event of a crisis or war, the Home Guard Forces goes through to the operational command of the Army, Navy and Air Force (see Fig. 6). During peacetime, *Heimevernet* is liable to the Home Guard General Inspector, while during war it would be placed under the operational command of the Operational Forces. The Land Home Guard is under the operational command of the land forces, the Marine Home Guard under the command of the Navy, while the Air Defence units are under the command of individual airports.

The Norwegian Home Guard is headed by a Home Guard General Inspector appointed by the king, who performs the function of coordinating actions and supervision for regional commanders, as well as organising the structures of the Home Guard during a war. The Inspector, who reports directly to the Norwegian Armed Forces Chief of Defence, bears full responsibility for the operation and functioning of the formation. The Home Guard General Inspector performs his functions with the assistance of the Home Guard Inspectorate.


⁷ M. Łokociejewski, *Zadania i struktura wojsk obrony terytorialnej w wybranych państwach*, War Studies University, Warsaw 2001, s. 86–87.



Source: Personal suffering, based on data base from the website of the Norwegian Home Guard: www.forsvaret.no/hv (Accessed: 11.03.2020).

Fig. 6. The system of steering and commanding the land component of the Norwegian Armed Forces

The responsibility for the functioning of territorial forces lies with eleven regional commanders, concentrated in four military districts (see Fig. 7). They direct all operational and territorial defence forces in a subordinate defence area. A particular task of the military district HQ's in organising the territorial defence system is concentrated to arrange logistical and infrastructural security, as well as to ensure the smooth functioning of the armed forces' training centres in their area of operational and strategic responsibility. The role of the Home Guard General Inspector is similar to the tasks of military districts HQ's, in the field of logistics, supervising, organisation and combat training. But the burden of responsibility for the functioning of territorial forces lies with regional *Heimevernet* commands. They are responsible for organising the recruitment to the Home Guard, conducting training for reservists, continuous monitoring of the safety status of the area of responsibility and maintaining close relations with the local community.



Source: Personal suffering, based on database from the website of the Ministry of Defense of Norway: www.forsvaret.no (Accessed: 09.03.2020).

Fig. 7. Organisational structure of Norwegian Heimevernet..

Each regional command, whose area of responsibility is closely related to the territorial division of the state, is subordinated to subdivisions of the Home Guard; the number of subdivisions is dependent on the number of county level local government units in a given region. In each regional command is a subordinate intervention unit, composed of active reservists, acting as a rapid reaction force in the event of a sudden crisis situation. According to the report of the Chief of Defence of 2015, the number of regional commanders is to be reduced to 10 headquarters. In terms of the maritime branch of the Home Guard, there is the Maritime Home Guard Command with a lot of autonomy of action, comparable to that of military districts' headquarters. It is responsible for 17 areas of maritime responsibility and 3 rapid reaction units closely cooperating with the Norwegian Navy. The Maritime Home Guard will be dissolved by 2020. After that, all of the maritime territorial component units will be controlled by local military district HQs⁸. With regard to the Home

⁸ *Norwegian Armed Forces...*, op. cit., Oslo 2015, s. 14.

Guard Air Defence, they belong to the group of the intervention forces. In 2015, the air defence units had lost their operational independence. Nowadays, they precisely cooperate with local land rapid reaction forces, although their distinctiveness is still maintained from other forces⁹.

Recruitment and training

Recruitment to territorial forces is mainly based on general conscription. Every Norwegian between the ages of 19 and 44 is obliged to perform basic service in the armed forces. The period of basic service is 19 months, including 12 months of intensive military training (including 6 months as part of the Home Guard) and 7 months are spread out over annual exercises to improve the skills acquired. In connection with the professionalisation of the army, the number of conscripts in service is severely reduced (in 2007 there were 10 786 of them), and a large number of them are volunteers; since 2006, women have also been accepted. Currently, both men and women are appointed as part of the general conscription. In Norway, military units are on permanent active duty and are entirely made up of professional soldiers, so the conscripts serve in the reserve and national defence branches¹⁰. Medical commissions examine about 30,000 young citizens annually and physical fitness is also tested (e.g. swimming), of which approximately one in four are called up for service or volunteer.

Soldiers of the Home Guard initially undergo basic military training as part of general conscription. Within the framework of the training, classes are organised in the field of: weaponry, shooting, basics of tactical activities in non-urbanised areas (the so-called *green tactics*), first aid on the battlefield (the so-called *red tactics*) and other areas. The soldiers are then trained to play within a subdivision (team, platoon, company level). Exercises are organised under various climatic conditions, including in the North Pole in the region of Finnmark, where the Home Guard Forces exercised in maneuvers under the code name *Joint Viking '17*, response time to a military threat in the Arctic area¹¹, or NATO exercises *Trident Juncture '18* or the recent exercise *Cold Response '20* from 2 to 13 March when the allied countries were engaged in collective defence of NATO’s northern flank on Norwegian territory.

⁹ Ibidem, s. 14–16.

¹⁰ Z. Badeński, H. Sołkiewicz, *Polityka i strategia bezpieczeństwa...*, op. cit., BP, Gdynia 2015, s. 112.

¹¹ J. Karlsen, O.K. Christiansen, *Heimevernet sikret flyplasser i Finnmark*, Heimevernet, <https://forsvaret.no/aktuelt/hv-sikret-flyplasser> (07.03.2017).

The role of Heimevernet in the national security strategy

The concept of using territorial defence in Norway was presented in a document entitled *The future of the world. Strategic Defence Review 2015*, developed by the office Chief of Defence of Norway in 2015. The publication provides a new look for the use of territorial defence forces in Norway. According to the programme the Norwegian Home Guard will be profoundly reorganised in structural and organisational terms. With regard to territorial command organisation the Regional Command HV – 11 in Setnesmoen will have been cancelled by the end of 2017. In structural terms, the maritime component of Home Guard will be disbanded by 2020, but an equipment and armaments are to be transferred to the Royal Norwegian Navy. The *Heimevernet* intervention force is to be reinforced in terms of personnel; its size is to be increased to 3 250 HV soldiers. Nowadays, the process of reducing Home Guard units has been significantly slowed down due to changes in the security environment, especially the situation in Northern and Central - Eastern Europe. In addition, the response time to the combat alarm for the intervention force will be reduced from 72 hours to 48 hours.

The new concept of using Home Guard is mainly focused on the use of territorial defence forces as a support component for the Land Forces. In the future, *Heimevernet* tasks are to be focused solely on the support of the ground-based operational troops. This is because the solution is to surrender to the marine part of the Home Guard. In addition, the number of regional forces will be reduced from 42,000 to 30,000 soldiers.

The Norwegians plan to strengthen and increase the territorial defence presence in the north of the country. The area is considered a priority area and is the responsibility of Regional Command HV – 17 in Finnmark. The area has been identified as important for Russia's activities in this area, in the form of strengthening its military capabilities on the Kola Peninsula, including by deploying *Iskander* missile systems on the Peninsula, which poses a direct threat to the security of northern Norway.

In order to ensure the optimum level of security in this area of responsibility, Regional Command HV – 17 is to be provided with additional combat resources with the ability to defend itself against attack by armoured and mechanised troops and air raids by an opponent, in the form of short range anti-tank and anti-aircraft kits and systems designed for electronic combat and reconnaissance.

Conclusions

The Norwegian territorial defence forces are organised in a hierarchical manner, on the basis of a separate type of armed force. Within the Territorial Defence Forces, there are strategic level commanders who are responsible for the overall functioning; they make it possible to coordinate training, recruitment during peacetime as well as promotional activities for those concerned. In Finland, on the other hand, territorial

defence functions mainly as a territorial component within operational troops, supplementing the human resources of infantry brigades.

Recruitment to territorial forces is based on general conscription. This makes it possible to conduct cyclical training of new yearbooks in the basics of military crafts; in principle: *The nation has no army, the nation is an army.*

In terms of mobilising human and material resources, these are based on the general conscription system in Norway. It’s an opportunity to engage a large spectrum of society’s defence activities. Citizens serving within Norwegian territorial defence structures are obliged to take part in annual military exercises to consolidate the foundations of military training, or in cooperation with operational troops. In addition, the Heimevernet soldiers are obliged to attend training courses and receive training to improve their skills in schools and training centres of territorial forces, independent of the framework programme.

From the Polish point of view, the problem of fulfilling the reserve HR of the Polish Armed Forces was partially solved by reconstituting the territorial defence troops. These forces give an opportunity to create the quantitative and qualitative potential of the Polish Army in the face of potential aggression, where time plays a key role. However, they do not fill the gap in the resources of personnel reserves in the long-term perspective of the national defence operation. Therefore, in the face of a shortage of personnel reserves, a favorable option would be to take action to significantly increase the universality of military training; ultimately, with public support - the restoration of short-term compulsory military service, leading to the gradual restoration of effective resources of the Polish Army personnel reserves

The organisation of the national defence system allows for the active and active participation of the entire society in the process of the state’s defence preparations in various dimensions. Involvement, in fact, of the whole of civil society in various forms of activity. The fact that a potential aggressor is not a member of the defence (e.g. membership of territorial defence structures or other structures performing pro-defence tasks) guarantees that it will be difficult for the potential aggressor to control the territory and break the fighting spirit of the defenders.

In highlighting the overall organisation and functioning of the Norwegian territorial defence system, it has been shown that in conditions of peace and war, the entire public administration is actively involved in the process of defence preparations; it cooperates closely with the armed forces in the process of planning and organising the defence of the territory. The tasks of all components of a territorial defence system are defined in documents of strategic importance (e.g. *Strategic Defence Review*) and implementing documents. In the Norwegian view, there is a strong emphasis on the organisation of defence of the country’s territory under conditions of significant disruption to the system of directing the defence of the country. The territorial self-government is responsible for the process of defence planning and preparation in the military and non-military dimension, while cooperating closely with local Heimevernet units.

The Norwegian paradigm of functioning of the territorial defence system requires radical doctrinal and formal-legal actions to be taken, which have to develop a new

organisational and functional model of the territorial defence system in Poland. From an administrative point of view, a thorough functional reform of the county self-government should be carried out by a new intermediate level of governmental and local government administration. It is here that the basic forces and services operate continuously from the point of view of state security: Police, State Fire Service and Medical Rescue; recently, most Polish counties have had a subdivision of the Territorial Defence Forces of the Light Infantry Company level, which is the basis for the organisation of multidimensional total defence.

Norway's territorial defence forces forms the basis of state security. The position of the formation in the security structure is very strong, as evidenced by plans to further develop the territorial defence of the *land of a thousand fjords*.

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