

THE ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CARRYING OUT DIVERSION AND DISINFORMATION ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND IN CONNECTION WITH THE WAR IN EASTERN UKRAINE

Karol FALANDYS*, Przemysław ŻUKOWSKI**, Piotr BASTKOWSKI***

* *The Cadet Battalion, Military University of Technology in Warsaw*
e-mail: falandys.karol@gmail.com

** *Military Unit 3940 Agat*
e-mail: devendetta@wp.pl

*** *Faculty of Security Sciences, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military Academy of Land Forces*
e-mail: p.bastkowski@wso.wroc.pl

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Abstract:

In this article the authors focused on the possibility of carrying out diversion and disinformation on the Polish territory in connection with the ongoing war in Eastern Ukraine. For this purpose there are presented the basic assumptions of diversion and disinformation, thus revealing relations between them and the state security. The analysis of the possibility of conducting diversionary operations within the Polish territory made on the basis of public sources constitutes an important issue in this publication. In view of the above the possibilities of the occurrence and conduct of activities on the territory of our country by organized diversionary groups are subject to analysis. What is more, the authors attempt to resolve the question of whether Poland currently has the strength and means to combat these diversionary groups.

Keywords:

diversion, disinformation, diversionary actions

INTRODUCTION

The dynamic development of the political situation in Eastern Europe caused that once



again we have to face the threat of a conflict, the party of which we can become. The beginning of a potential conflict can be the situation, when armed diversionary groups of unknown origin will begin to operate on the territory of our country, and the national and international media will start running the disinformation campaign. In this publication, the authors introduce readers to the concepts of diversion and disinformation and try to present the most likely areas of conducting these activities on the territory of our country.

1. DISINFORMATION

The instructions of the Division II of the General Staff of the Polish Army of May 1926 explains that DISINFORMATION is to provide the foreign intelligence with messages hiding own intentions, and make an enemy treat the information given as true, or force the foreign intelligence to analyze the inspired messages for a longer time [1][34].

Disinformation can have strategic or tactical dimensions. Tactical disinformation can be divided into three types:

- political;
- military;
- economic.

Tactical disinformation lasts relatively short and is aimed at misleading in one or more overlapping aspects. It is carried out on a scale of months rather than years.

Strategic disinformation means systematic transmission of false political signals, information and fabrications in order to produce a distorted image resulting in faulty analysis of the situation.

According to the KGB training script "disinformation strategic objective is to mislead an enemy about fundamental issues of the state policy". However, in American literature, causing confusion for an enemy in assessing fundamental intentions and ambitions of the other side is specified as a strategic goal of disinformation [1].

Strategic disinformation is run for several years, and even for decades. *So one can say that the strategic disinformation means systematic efforts aiming to spread false information as well as distort or block information about the real situation and policy* [5].

Looking little further back in history it should be emphasized that the disinformation was widely used by the communist countries, with the Soviet Union at the forefront. Disinformation practice was to confuse, mislead and influence in a biased way the noncommunist world, to undermine its policy and to encourage the enemy from the West to contribute unknowingly to the objectives of communism. The realization of this strategic *Disinformation* program began in 1958. Its main purpose was to create the conditions for the implementation of the long-term far-reaching policy of the Communist Bloc, prevent from taking effective countermeasures by the noncommunist world and secure the strategic achievements of the Communism world. Although the understanding of the program of disinformation is crucial for the proper analysis of the situation in the communist world, its existence was (and still is) ignored or disowned by the West [5].

On a global scale, about 15,000 people performed Soviet disinformation operations and the budget for Soviet propaganda and disinformation activities was estimated at 3-4 billion dollars a year. For example, in the United States, about 400 special forces officers of the Soviet bloc led various forms of disinformation. The number of such officers in Western Europe was estimated at about 3,000. It was calculated, that each of them ran up to 5 agents or "trusted contacts" in the circles of politics and the media in the country of residence. They were people divided into two basic groups: performing specific works, for which they received appropriate fees, and the group considered as susceptible to suggestions and opinions [1].

People instinctively believe that another person - even an opponent - is not perverse, thinks alike and is guided by the same or a very similar set of concepts as well as a system of values. Meanwhile, the parties to the conflict can understand concepts such as democracy, peace, freedom, justice, decency, etc. in a different way. As it was the case with the West and the Soviet Union during the Cold War when the division between "democracy" and "socialist democracy" was in force. Adding to this the general tendency not to give faith to bad news, doubt the "black scenarios" and look for "conspiracy theories", it turns out that the manipulation of information or its interpretation is viable [1]. Such thinking makes it much easier to carry out diversion in the field of social communication.

Another factor enabling disinformation is the tendency to judge others using own measure. It is difficult for average audience to imagine that someone prominent in political terms or the so-called "authority" can simply be an insolent liar. Meanwhile, the practice confirms the thesis that "the bigger the lie, the greater the tendency to believe it" [1].

Quoting after Rafał Brzeski it should be emphasized that *disinformation aims to block communication channels and thus spread confusion, arise and fuel conflicts and prevent creating a platform for agreement. Disinformation may be addressed not only to the general public, but also to its very narrow sector, with the intent to "manipulate the decision-making elite"* [underlining added] [1].

2. DIVERSION

The foundation of functioning of the state as an entity is to ensure internal and external security of its citizens [9] [7]. Therefore, the specific purpose of its existence is to repel all types of attacks from other countries and implement prevention policy. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, challenges faced by each state enforce responding to crises not only with the use of the military potential but the whole defense system. Today, in the opinion of the authors, the greatest threat to the proper functioning of a state is diversion conducted by external entities.

The literature provides numerous concepts of it. Therefore, the authors propose the following model definition:

DIVERSION: hostile, spontaneous, conducted by any means and using all the methods to attain intended objectives activities of hostile special services or organizations created directionally for purposes, aiming to disrupt a state [3] [19].

Diversions activities can occur at any time, in many places and aspects of social life. When analyzing the history of armed conflicts a thesis can be put forward, that it will adopt a character of aggressive sabotage, economic, propaganda, ideological or psychological actions, but the goal always remains the same – a breach of a state security system, a victim of an attack. Diversions sections, which are qualified and targeted at precise operation act themselves or through engaged by them:

- agents (e.g. agents of influence [15]);
- illegals [39] [6];
- ideologically united people;
- groups of social discontent;
- ignorants with the low level of assertiveness [12] [8];
- special forces.

A characteristic feature of operating through agents is to create an information database about the object of diversion and enable a potential attack by “preparing the ground”. Introducing agents when trying to destabilize a country will lead to the leakage of information critical for the country as well as its offensive (disinformation, destruction of physical destruction, psychological operations) and defensive (protecting and developing own resources) use in order to cut off the victims of the attack of reliable data resources [2] [29].

Such activities are liable to have an impact (e.g. through blackmail, financial dependence) on decisions taken at the tactical or strategic levels [18]. An example of this may be the case of the Estonian Agent Herman Simma, whose intelligence service activity driven by the blackmail of the Russian SVR [25] and conducted in the NATO structures led to the loss of all the data on the alliance encryption system Elcrodat, which was used to encrypt the internal correspondence, phone and satellite calls, e-mails [12]. At the same time, in the last six months it can be observed that Russia has deeply penetrated the special services of Estonia [40]. At this point the question arises whether the Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish special services have not been penetrated in the same way by a foreign agency [41] [27]. If the answer to that question is affirmative, it could turn out to be disastrous for our national security system.

However, diversions actions carried out by illegals – i.e. representatives of foreign illegal intelligence - are not less dangerous. An illegal, as mentioned above, is an officer, a personnel employee of foreign intelligence, working under deep cover, with a fictional biography and the nationality of the state of residence. His/Her potential activity can be destructive for the state that is the aim of his/her activity. Illegals can be used by the headquarters in various ways, for example, they are able to operate as agents of influence.

According to C. Kiszczak, their role can be *“Indoctrination of the public opinion or specific environments in a given country. Indoctrination in different directions. Most often it is to win the approval for the state, or sometimes for services, for which they work. These can also be more complicated combinations, for example, the creation of a climate of hostility towards someone or something”* [12]. The use of illegals in diversionary activities may also be aimed at stealing information, as well as technology important for national security.

In order to complete the act of diversion, and ultimately prepare the ground, there can be carried out a number of special operations conducted by typically for the purpose designated, organized, trained and equipped forces using tactics and operational techniques that go beyond the standards adopted in the conventional armies. The specific targets of diversion will require offensive actions performed by an aggressor, without publicity (using secretive and discreet techniques), carried out in politically sensitive environments to achieve political, military, information or economic aspirations. Special forces have the appropriate skills and technology to conduct the listed activities.

In the context of the acts of diversion that kind of weapons will probably execute the following spectrum of tasks:

- special reconnaissance (characterized by efforts to provide information of a high degree of reliability regarding the recognition of the environment, risks, objectives and the impact assessment of the past performance);
- direct actions (characterized by kinetic impact on targets of great operational and strategic importance);
- military support (actions aiming to support befriended organizations, concerning training and material and technical support and the use of local forces in combat operations, e.g. separatists, organized crime) [16];
- combinations of the above tasks aimed at e.g. making “a victim” think that the aggressor is a completely different state, organization, etc.

The activity of the aggressor’s special forces in the territory of a country - a victim of the attack - is the final stage of an act of diversion. Their work is very dangerous for the already fragile security system of the state. When subjected to diversionary acts, the entity is not able to fight off the perfectly prepared direct actions against personal targets (i.e. important positions holders) and critical infrastructure (objects important for the state security and defense). The operations of special forces involving the neutralization of objects, which are valuable from the military, economic, administration and state [4] [17] point of view, are the prelude to the invasion of the conventional armed forces and taking complete control over the territory of a country or part thereof, important for the aggressor.

The excellent, even a model, example of diversion is the destabilization of Ukraine in 2014, where the emergence of the so-called “green men” was preceded by:

- Ukraine's energy dependence;

- demoralization of a part of its population (deep division of society caused by the concentration of major industry sectors, and thus employment, in the hands of oligarchs (potential illegals) susceptible to the influence of agents);
- weakening the armed forces and the security apparatus (by introducing agents, illegals into the structures);
- aggressive actions of groups of social discontent (protests of the population on the Maidan, diversionary acts of the Russian minority – the so-called separatists);
- liquidation of human targets (journalists, leaders of the independence movement);
- military and financial support for separatists.

3. THE ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBILITY OF CONDUCTING DIVERSIONARY ACTIONS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND BASED ON PUBLIC AVAILABLE SOURCES

At the outset of the discussion on the possibility of carrying out diversionary activities on the territory of the Republic of Poland, it should be noted that the shaping its identity Polish state must take care of, first and foremost the system of internal and external security. Facing today's challenges, we have an obligation to meet any attempts of destabilization of a country. It is a difficult undertaking, taking account of the degree and the potential of the transfer of information by contemporary society. The scale of the risks generated by the possibility to manipulate information enhances the new challenges for the security of a state. One such a threat is disinformation, the destructive role of which in modern society, oriented towards transmission and reception of information, is both political and military matter [14]. According to the authors of this paper, it can be concluded that in the present era disinformation is one of the manifestations of hybrid activities aimed at the destabilization of the national security system of a state. The optimal management of information resource remaining in the possession of those responsible for national security can prevent that.

When considering the matter of the possibility of preventing acts of diversion by state institutions, the question should be asked if any such measures could be undertaken in Poland. General Stanisław Koziej, the Head of the National Security Bureau stated that the Russian intervention in Poland, which may take the form of the regular aggression, or - worse - a hybrid war, cannot be ruled out [42].

Thus, the condition for the success of development and thus guarantee of citizens safety is the skillful use of the known resources in the forms of, among others, [11]:

- drawing conclusions and learning faster than e.g. a potential enemy (through the creation of knowledge based on the resource of information available in databases);
- connection of governing a country with the optimal use of the knowledge of own resources, capabilities and military power as well as neighbors and potential antagonists;



- skillful evaluation of information in order to optimize their use in the creation of knowledge, and thus the orientation of activities of a state in sensitive areas.

Having regard to the information contained in the previous subchapters, let us consider if any special actions [13], including diversion and sabotage, are possible in our country, and if so, whether they have any chance of success.

Special actions run by employed special groups working on an enemy territory in complete isolation, using the appropriate tactics [13]. During special operations the groups are in constant motion, which implies the necessity of taking the minimum number of equipment, taking into account the transport capabilities. Sometimes the group may additionally be supplied by air [13] [38] [32] [26] [45]. With this in mind, one of the symptoms of diversionary groups activity in a given area may be the disappearance of food products and e.g. pigs from breeding farms, thefts from stores located in rural or even urban areas. There is also the likelihood that members of these groups in “civilian costumes” would do legitimate purchases in stores, since doing the shopping in the stores in the border regions of northern, north-eastern and eastern Poland by foreigners speaking Russian or broken Polish is not unusual, for which it does not raise suspicion.

In order to perform their tasks, special groups may use, among others, combat arming of the area and making damages. This involves “... *mining, setting explosives, damaging buildings and equipment, creating forest piles, removing dams, etc. Mining means setting a single mine, or groups of mines and explosives in the form of all kinds of traps, mine-traps and fougasse in appropriate places. [...] Destruction or damage can be done in relation to fixed objects (sections of the railroad tracks, pipelines of liquid fuels, power and telecommunications lines, etc.) [underlining added] and the important moving objects, both not defended and guarded [...]. The results of these operations depend on the degree of damage to an object, as well as the place in which it was made. Long-term effects result from damages made in places with poor access, where it is difficult [...] to make repairs quickly (railway tracks in the nodes, power lines and pipelines in moorlands, wetlands and in places running through a river etc.)*” [underlining added] [13].

Special groups may be moved to an objective area within the territory of the east and the south-east of Poland by land or air. The projection of the group by land is the most commonly used. In contrast, air transport is the most appropriate, as it is fast, not complicated and enables the movement over a large distance [13], and using helicopters further reduces, among other things, losses during landing and enables precise putting a group off, even in woodlands.

At this point let us consider two questions. Firstly, whether the Polish institutions established to ensure the public order are prepared to fight diversionary groups and whether and how diversionary activities can be carried out on the territory of our country.

The Police [20] is the institution, which in peacetime should physically tackle actions violating the public order - including diversion and sabotage, and in terms of intelligence information also other institutions conducting operational and reconnaissance activities. Additionally, the Border Guard [21] can carry out activities preventing diver-

sion / sabotage in the border regions. According to the authors, there may be a legitimate threat that the Police and the Border Guard does not have specialized forces and means to fight well-trained and equipped diversionary groups. Anti-terrorist units operating within the Police's structures consist of about 25 - 50 officers [30]. However, approximately 250 officers serve in the Bureau of Counter Terrorist Operations of the General Headquarters of the Police [31]. However, in the Division of Operation Security of the Border Guard there are about 45 officers in each.

To realize how great the needs are to counteract diversion and sabotage, it should be noted that the area of operation of a special group - one team of about 6 - 10 people - is about 50 - 100 km², of a platoon - three teams - it is already 100 - 200 km². Obviously, more diversionary groups will be operated on a sufficiently larger area. As it can be easily calculated, these 600¹ officers will not be able to physically protect such a large area where special groups as one platoon are operating, and what if there will be more such groups. In addition, the Border Guard officers are not trained to fight well-trained, organized and equipped diversionary groups². It should be pointed out that some officers of the Border Guard have only recently (this year) received AK-47 rifles³. However, the vast majority of these officers have never fired from weapon of this type, not to mention machine guns and sniper rifles, or even other types of arms⁴. Another question should also be raised at this point: are the Polish police prepared to take action to neutralize diversionary groups⁵?

This cursory review of the institutions established to ensure public safety in our country shows that diversionary and sabotage actions have some chance of success because institutions such as the Police and the Border Guard do not have adequate amounts of properly trained forces and appropriate measures to combat those well-trained and equipped groups.

Referring to the question of whether and how subversive actions can be carried out on the territory of our country, the authors of this publication found it hard to agree with the claims created by the mass media that Poland is safe and therefore there is no rea-

¹ In total, this gives about 400 police officers (from the central and eastern provinces of Poland) and 225 officers of the Border Guard (from units located in the central and the eastern part of Poland).

² The author of this publication (Lt Dr. Karol Falandys) for 9 years served in the Border Guard, among others, in the Department of Personnel and Training and the Division of Operation Security, and during this period he was not covered by any training related to combating diversionary groups in the BG.

³ The information obtained by the authors from the officers serving in the BG. These officers do not agree for the publication of their personal data.

⁴ The author of this publication (Lt Dr. Karol Falandys) for 9 years served in the Border Guard, among others, in the Department of Personnel and Training and the Division of Operation Security, and during this period the basic training conducted for all the candidates entering the service in the BG did not provide shooting AK-47 or PK. In addition, according to the author such training and shooting were not provided even for those already serving in the BG (the exception was shooting carried out

⁵ In the absence of access to detailed training materials of the Police, the authors bring the issue into discussion.

son to believe that the diversionary and sabotage actions could take place on its territory. Below the authors show examples from the past and present, which prove that the view may be misleading.

Less than a century earlier, after Poland regained its independence in 1918, Bolshevik groups coming to Poland from the Soviet territory led diversionary and sabotage actions on our former eastern areas. In the period 1918 - 1924 the State Police and the Border Police were unable to effectively counter diversionary groups, and only in September 1924 the appointment of the Border Defense Corp⁶ brought the raids of Bolshevik diversionary groups on the Polish territory to an end.

At present, the acts of diversion and sabotage may also occur in the eastern and south-eastern Poland. This may be due to the current geopolitical situation, when Russia is in the state of military conflict with Ukraine.

After the loss of Crimea by Ukraine, having analyzed of open sources one can hypothesize that the positive for the Russian forces development of the situation may result in the connection of Russia and Crimea and Transnistria [37] through a corridor running along the southern border of present-day Ukraine. This will completely "cut Ukraine off" any supplies delivered by the sea. Anyway, now the Ukrainian State has limited opportunity to provide and maintain maritime transport [36].

Ukraine has the northern borders with Belarus, so from this site any support for the government in Kiev should not be also expected, and what is more, this direction will not be possible for the use by the withdrawing Ukrainian troops. Of course, it will take place in the situation when Russia attacks along the whole eastern border of present-day Ukraine. Given the current development of the situation it can be assumed that the Russian forces will begin the assault in the event of an overall favorable political and economic situation. In such a situation, the natural direction for withdrawal of the Ukrainian forces and the Ukrainian civilians is the western direction (excluding Transnistria [37]).

Going back in time we come to the situation when the Ukrainians claimed - and then tried to make their plans a reality - that the areas located east of the San are Ukrainian lands. Moreover, as is apparent from the current policy of Poland and the media reports, Poland and the Poles have a positive attitude towards Ukraine and the Ukrainians. Putin's Russia is well aware of this attitude of the Polish society. According to the authors, it is here where the sources of activity of foreign diversionary groups on the Polish territory can be sought.

Currently, the nationalist political party Right Sector conducts its policy in the political space of Ukraine. Andriy Tarasenko, a spokesperson for this radical organization, said

⁶ The BDC was a military formation established on 17 September 1924 to protect the eastern border of the Second Republic of Poland against the penetration by agents, terrorists and armed diversionary troops moved by Soviet special forces from the territory of the USSR to the territory of the Second Republic. In peacetime the BDC was subordinate to the Ministry of the Interior, and in wartime it had to support units and sub-units of the regular Polish Armed Forces in accordance with the mobilization plan.

that *“justice would require the return of Przemyśl and several districts to Ukraine”* [33]. At the same time, he stated that the return of the land should take place with the use of *“diplomatic methods”*. *“We are not an imperial nation, we do not reach for other people's lands, we only want what is ours”* [33] [28].

The authors of the publication believe that these two words can be the basis for all the activities of diversionary groups. The Russians trying to play off the Poles and the Ukrainians will deploy their own special groups on the Polish territory, where they will conduct diversion and sabotage operations in uniforms of Ukrainian soldiers (due to the ongoing war in eastern Ukraine they have them in excess). Certainly, knowing the effectiveness of the Russian diplomacy in the international arena, they will begin to pass on false information about the fact that the Ukrainian Right Sector started the forcible transfer of parts of the territory of the Polish state being a member of NATO and the EU. At the same time they will begin to demand the recognition of the organization as the terrorist one, which de facto they have been fighting since 2014. In this way, they will justify all their aggression towards the Ukrainian state. There is a suspicion that aiming at further realization of its foreign policy, Russia will offer to assist Poland in combating these groups. In this way, the conflict Russia - Ukraine will reach the European Union and NATO.

In the opinion of the authors, the most convenient way of the special groups enter the territory of the Republic of Poland will be the Polish - Belarusian border region. It is quite long, afforested and not densely populated. From there, the groups will move south reaching the Subcarpathian region, where they will conduct the appropriate diversionary and sabotage actions. It seems obvious that as the activities escalate it is possible that objects outside Subcarpathia will be destroyed as well.

An important aspect of the activities of diversionary groups may be an attempt to support both financial and information - personal activities of radical organizations and organized crime groups. The activities of those organizations based on illegal financial and material circuit may become a bridgehead to support separatist (terrorist) organizations and attempts to destabilize the country [23].

Organized crime groups with hierarchical or network structures have well developed links with criminal activity allowing cooperation with legitimate business and even political structures. This activity may imply difficulties in determining the degree of organization of saboteurs as well as the scope and nature of the participation of individuals in such activities [10].

The authors believe that in terms of commencement of such activity, the emergence of the political party *“ZMIANA”*[46] (Eng. *“CHANGE”*) in Poland should be taken into account, as its activists in their statements do not hide sympathy and support to the Russian activity in foreign policy [43]. These types of organizations can become a foothold for foreign agents and diversionary groups.

It is believed that in the course of the conflict development the first objects of kinetic diversionary actions can be e.g. bridges, energy networks, railway infrastructure, etc. According to the authors, at the beginning there will not be any casualties, but as the

situation evolves, it is possible that the third persons or officers of the uniformed services will be killed when they 'inadvertently' take action with the use of firearms aiming to stop the members of diversionary groups.

The next targets of diversionary activities may be underground gas and propelling charge storage facilities, energy- and gas-producing facilities, other objects strategic for security, defense, and energy sectors of Poland, such as the Solin Dam. Probably most of these facilities were built during the communist era, which is connected with the fact that Russia possesses the exact location of these objects, and they are not the ones that can be moved from place to place. The attack on fuel / gas storages can be combined with the attack, e.g. on the Yamal gas pipeline and the Druzhba pipeline. In this way, the conflict between Warsaw and Kiev will "flourish", and Russia is the only country that can benefit from that.

CONCLUSION

Summing up the above considerations it must be emphasized that it is very important to make people holding public administration positions related to ensuring the state security aware of potential acts that can take place in our country. One should not exclude the possibility that foreign officers would secretly operate on the Polish territory, leading diversion and sabotage. The fact that Poland is the Member State of the EU and NATO will not safeguard us from the moves of the hostile countries. Suitable attitude of state and local authorities and the proper equipment and training of services responsible for public safety can only protect us.

According to the authors, the implication of the conflict in Ukraine is just the beginning. The Russians have spread the process of destabilization of our region of Europe over years. This is confirmed by the recent press reports concerning the fact that the Latvian Russians asked their "foreign" homeland for intervention [44]. At the same time, Russia may try to put Poland into conflict with its north - eastern neighbor - Lithuania. In this case, it may use the national card, which has been valid since the days of imperial Czarist Russia, namely attempt to bring into conflict the Lithuanians and the Poles living in Vilnius and areas adjacent to the city. It can take advantage of the structures of the Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania. That political party may not be aware of the consequences of taking any cooperation with the Russians, who will use any means to achieve their desired political or territorial goals [24].

Therefore, it is proposed to replace stereotyped (predictable) and defensive behaviors in political thinking / activity, and not only political, by unconventional (unpredictable) and offensive thinking / activity.

Those, who are bold and active in the fight, constantly show initiative and impose their will to an enemy achieve success. The initiative is manifested in the pursuit of active operations, carried out even in the most difficult situation in search for the best ways to accomplish a task. The wait and passivity are opposite to an initiative. Passivity in action leads to disaster [13].

Only such an approach can paralyze the intentions of states that have imperialistic and revisionist aspirations, like present-day Russia with President Putin as the president of the country.

With regard to the behaviors of the Russian side, actions can be observed in addition to verbal declarations. According to the deputy of the Ukrainian Supreme Council on behalf of the Popular Front Serhiy Vysotsky, Vladimir Putin has precise plans for the continuation of the hybrid war not only in Ukraine, but also in other countries. The parliamentarian relying on his/her own source of information said that in late January at the meeting of the Security Council of the Russian Federation the head of the Russian presidential administration Sergei Ivanov presented the concept of the so-called "Russian foreign legion" – the secret paramilitary formation, which would break the state structures of the Baltic States, Poland, Greece and other European countries. The Legion would be composed of 10 to 15 thousand people, and its full development is to be completed by 2018. The action plan of the formation is to provide the organization of the military-political underground in the Baltic States, Belarus, Kazakhstan and other countries; the creation of the underground information network and non-confidential efforts to create autonomous regions in areas inhabited by Russian-speaking population [22].

And here the last question in this article arises. Having such knowledge, were the appropriate actions taken to prevent such an invasion? Given the above considerations and public sources, the authors, unfortunately, failed to see concrete steps in the security policy of the Polish state, tasked with hindering or paralyze such aggression.

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BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

Piotr BASTKOWSKI, MSc. Eng-The captain of the Polish Armed Forces. He is a PhD student at the Department of National Security at the National Defense Academy. He graduated from the Military Academy of Land Forces in Wrocław and the Department of Management and Command at the National Defense Academy. He also completed postgraduate studies at the University of Wrocław. His scientific interests include issues associated with military history and widely understood national security as well as national defense.

Karol FALANDYS, Lieutenant of the Polish Armed Forces, Ph.D in political sciences.-The graduate of the General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military Academy of Land Forces in Wrocław and the Academy of Physical Education in Wrocław. He also completed postgraduate studies at the University of Warsaw and doctoral studies at the Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw. He served in the 21st Podhale Rifles Brigade in Rzeszów. Then he served in the Border Guard. Since 2013 he has served in the Polish Armed Forces at the Military Academy of Technology in Warsaw. The author and co-author of several publications in the field of personnel recovery.

Przemysław ŻUKOWSKI, MSc. Eng-The captain of the Polish Armed Forces. He graduated from the Faculty of Management at the Military Academy of Land Forces in Wrocław and the Faculty of Security Management at the National Defense Academy. In the course of individual development he also completed postgraduate studies at the Department of Law and Administration at the Warsaw University on the issues of organized crime and terrorism. He took part in the 10th rotation of Polish Military Contingent in Afghanistan serving as an analyst in the section of reconnaissance - intelligence information. Currently, he is a soldier in one of the Polish military special units. He deals with the issues of information analysis both in professional terms and as a hobby.

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