Assessment of the historical policy mixes for Poland using the game approach

Kruś, L.; Woroniecka-Leciejewicz, I.

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Tytuł artykułu

Assessment of the historical policy mixes for Poland using the game approach

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Kruś L. , Woroniecka-Leciejewicz I.

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Abstrakty

The study here presented pertains to the analysis of mutual interactions of the monetary and ﬁscal policies in the case of Poland. The historical policies carried out during diﬀerent periods of time and their economic eﬀects are compared with the possible strategies, obtained from the analysis of the proposed monetaryﬁscal game. In the study, the methods of non-cooperative game theory are combined with macroeconomic modeling. The respective game is formulated for monetary and ﬁscal authorities as players. Strategies of these players refer to the respective instruments of their policies: the real interest rate and the budget deﬁcit in relation to GDP. Payoﬀs include inﬂation and GDP growth, respectively. The payoﬀs are calculated using a recursive macroeconomic model estimated for the Polish economy. The model describes inﬂuences of the instruments of the monetary and ﬁscal policies on the state of the economy. The best response strategies, the Nash equilibria and Pareto optimality are analyzed. Changes of the policies towards the more restrictive or more expansive ones and their eﬀects in comparison to the historically applied are discussed. This is performed for two diﬀerent time periods – the time of recovery after 2004 and the time of the global ﬁnancial crisis after 2008.

Słowa kluczowe

game theory economic modeling policy-mix decision analysis Nash equilibrium Pareto optimality

Wydawca

Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences

Czasopismo

Control and Cybernetics

Rocznik

2018

Tom

Vol. 47, no. 3

Strony

277--300

Opis fizyczny

Bibliogr. 55 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Kruś L.

Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, Newelska 6, 01-447 Warsaw, Poland

autor

Woroniecka-Leciejewicz I.

Warsaw School of Information Technology, Newelska 6, 01-447 Warsaw, Poland

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2019).

Typ dokumentu

Bibliografia

Identyfikator YADDA

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