Conflicts in Legal Knowledge Base

• Autorzy: Żurek T.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The simulation of inference processes performed by lawyers can be seen as one way to create advisory legal system. In order to simulate such a process as accurately as possible, it is indispensable to make a clear-cut distinction between the provision itself, and its interpretation and inference mechanisms. This distinction would allow for preserving both the universal character of the provision and its applicability to various legal problems. The author’s main objective was to model a selected legal act, together with the inference rules applied, and to represent them in an advisory system, focusing on the most accurate representation of both the content and inference rules. Given that the laws which stand in contradiction prove to be the major challenge, they will constitute the primary focus of this study.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

legal expert system; knowledge representation; conflicting rules

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Poznańskiej
• Czasopismo: Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences
• Rocznik: 2012
• Tom: Vol. 37, No. 2
• Strony: 129--145
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 30 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Żurek T.

• Intitute of Computer Science Maria Curie-Sklodowska University, pl. Marii Curie-Sklodowskiej 1. Lublin

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