An autonomous vehicle in a connected environment: case study of cyber-resilience

• Autorzy: Hutzler Guillaume , Klaudel Hanna , Klaudel Witold , Pommereau Franck , Rataj Artur

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.15439/2024F8797

• Konferencja: Federated Conference on Computer Science and Information Systems (19 ; 08-11.09.2024 ; Belgrade, Serbia)
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

As vehicles are being increasingly connected to the Internet and equipped with autonomous driving features, this increases the potential of cyberattacks and requires sophisticated implementations of resilience capable to detect attacks and react to them. Therefore, threat analysis and risk assessment including careful modelling of resilience are essential to prepare against cybersecurity risks. In this context, we extend by complementary monitoring/fallback mechanism our framework devoted to automatically discover complex cyberattack scenarios using abstract cost criteria. We then show that this extension allows analysing a realistic resilient model of cybersecurity aspects of a level 2 autonomous connected vehicle.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

security evaluation; formal modelling

PL

ocena bezpieczeństwa; modelowanie formalne

• Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Informatyczne
• Czasopismo: Annals of Computer Science and Information Systems
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: Vol. 39
• Strony: 363–--373
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 32 poz., il., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Hutzler Guillaume

• IBISC, Univ. Evry, Université Paris-Saclay, France

autor

Klaudel Hanna

• IBISC, Univ. Evry, Université Paris-Saclay, France

autor

Klaudel Witold

• SafeTech Cybernetics, Palaiseau, France
• IRT SystemX, Palaiseau, France

autor

Pommereau Franck

• IBISC, Univ. Evry, Université Paris-Saclay, France

autor

Rataj Artur

• IRT SystemX, Palaiseau, France

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

1. This work was supported by the French government as part of the “France 2030” program, within the framework of the SystemX Technological Research Institute.

2. Thematic Sessions: Regular Papers

3. Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa nr POPUL/SP/0154/2024/02 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki II" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki (2025).