

POLISH MILITARY SECURITY DOCTRINE IN THE YEARS 2004-2014 – SELECTED ASPECTS

Paweł RYBARCZYK*

* Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Wrocław

e-mail: info@pawelrybarczyk.pl

Received on 25th April ; accepted after revision October 2016

Copyright © 2017 by Zeszyty Naukowe WSOWL



Abstract:

In view of today's physical threats, Poland has adopted a new security doctrine. This publication in its assumption intends to outline the thesis on the centralized management and command of the unified military structure, in the context of the systemic approach to our country defense strategy. The study contemplates the Russia's policy, aimed at strengthening its position of a global great power in terms of weakening ties within North Atlantic Treaty Organization, with a particular focus on the regional interests of each of its members. The presented concept of the contemporary army based on joint task forces, characterized by close co-operation of various types of forces and efficient logistics, managed by the modern chain of command, is the major development direction in the field of defense. It is of crucial importance to reorganize our military forces in correlation to the hybrid dimension of contemporary war conflicts.

Keywords:

national defense, military forces, physical, threat, hybrid warfare, jointness (joint task forces)

INTRODUCTION

In the light of current events in the region, taking the geopolitical conditions into account, military threats to Poland require our country to adopt a new defense doctrine. Contemporary armed conflicts do not represent the image of a regular front as it used to be during the World War II. Nor can we accept the assumption that the activities, in which the Polish Armed Forces participated during the mission in Afghanistan or Iraq, will determine the adoption of the defense strategy. In fact, our country faces both

terrorist and sabotage threats, and it must be borne in mind that an enemy may have a huge military potential, namely a regular army of well-trained soldiers equipped with modern tanks, aircrafts and communication means. Therefore, hybrid warfare constitutes the full spectrum of military threats, with countless variations both in the asymmetric and conventional dimensions. In this paper we attempt to answer the question: how, in the context of the above threats, our military forces are prepared to defend the country.

In this publication the term “military forces” is understood as the entire structure of the Polish Armed Forces, the Military Police Special Forces, the Police anti-terrorist and realization units, the Border Guard Operation Security Departments, the Division V of the Internal Security Agency.

The publication accepted the years 2004 – 2014 as a dividing line, within which the preparation and organization process of military units in correlation with combat experience, taking into account the aforementioned threats, will be analyzed. This duration was adopted due to the specific orientation of the Armed Forces training course dictated by preparations for the foreign missions. This specified variant of training in the context of combat operations in Iraq or Afghanistan is a legitimate objective, however the efforts of our Armed Forces, targeting only those threats, neglect the aspect of defending our state borders.

This study also indicates the essential elements of the contemporary power structure of the Polish military forces. There will be presented the thesis on the centralized management and the command of the unified military structure in our country, based on a comprehensive restructuring of the ministries of power, including the amendment of the regulations.

1. EXPERIENCES FROM FOREIGN MISSIONS OF THE POLISH ARMED FORCES

During the months from June to August 2003 Poland assumed responsibility for security in Iraq, being given the task to stabilize the region after nearly 3-week long armed conflict. The tactics adopted the variant of the fire contact only in response to a direct attack. The first human casualties occurred in the Polish contingent as a result of the Iraqi fighters’ offensive; this is why the concept of anticipative strategy was introduced at the beginning of 2004, which was associated with the change in tactics, command and reconnaissance. Information on the enemy’s actions was subject to previous analysis and the proper selection of equipment and gears for the above activities was made as well [14].

In the context of the above information, the Polish Army was by no means prepared for the new challenges, especially to fight in the asymmetric dimension. We started performing the missions without any combat experience. The then applicable standards of “the barrack army” based on the experience, tactics and organization of the People's Army of Poland (soldiers after first rotation used the term “the barrack army” thus determining the level of preparation for the mission). Initially, our forces in Iraq possessed agricultural vehicles, instead of armored personnel carriers, and the soldiers moved around the base with a mess kit instead of weapons (which was hidden in con-

tainers). Moreover, the equipment meeting the standards of high temperature resistance was not provided. Therefore, the usefulness of the Polish Forces to carry out combat operations was symbolic. The first targeted measures in respect of tactical preparation, and over time - the appropriate equipment support, date back to the mid-2004 [18].

There was adopted tactics, hence - weapons and equipment, focusing on the special operations, patrols, convoys, military engineering tasks and the protection of databases, in order to counteract the sort of guerrilla war, hit-and-run tactics. It should be emphasized that the Polish Armed Forces have never taken on the burden of carrying out a battle within the general military meaning and under the conditions of combat operations in both Iraq and Afghanistan. [8] Stabilization activities of the Polish Forces took primarily the form of police operations, consisting in securing law and order, responding to current threats, which distinguishes them from the model of classical war, the inseparable elements of which include hidden approach, ambushes, various stratagems, surprise and, above all, the principle of the "first impact". The knowledge and experience of instructors of the national police anti-terrorist subunits and sections and platoons commanders, mainly from the USMC, initially, supported preparations for the missions. Over time, the experience of soldiers participating directly in the ISAF and the "Iraqi Freedom" missions made it possible to conduct action on their own merits. [5]. Our Army fulfilled its task as well as the Americans or the British did. The whole world looked to the Middle East, following the struggle of Western countries against spreading Islamic radicalism. The war involved in the conflict significant political, economic and military potential of Western countries. However, the process of preparation and engagement of particular NATO armies in the Middle East conflicts hindered proper defense preparation of their own countries. Furthermore, it was not possible to defend the other NATO states, which is a key objective of the Pact.

After a quarter century of relative calm in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, the threat of armed conflict became again real for our country. The war in Ukraine directly affects the security of our country [1]. Polish soldiers' combat experience drawn from the foreign missions significantly enhances the value of our Armed Forces. It should be noted, however, that the actions of our troops were held mainly by small subunits, and the enemy was poorly armed, mostly with personal weapons, grenades, grenade launchers and in, particular, improvised explosive devices. The armed conflict with the fully operational army entails the need to expand the preparations to the macro level, taking account of the complete structure of our Armed Forces and NATO forces, as part of which we have functioned.

2. RUSSIAN SECURITY STRATEGY

After the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, Russia still usurped the right to the position of a superpower by demonstrating its military activity from time to time. In both wars in Chechnya it defended the country's sovereignty [11] and during the conflict in Georgia it helped the authorities of South Ossetia to regain independence, thus affecting the geopolitical situation in the region. In 2014, after the quarter-of-a-century "Big Bear's

growling” from the East, the time came for radical military actions in Ukraine. Russia annexed the Crimea applying the hybrid warfare with the use of the Armed Forces.

In order to understand the reasons for Putin's imperialist policy, the assumptions of the Russia's security doctrine after the collapse of the USSR should be overviewed. Due to the acquired organizational and material potential and also the specific mentality and defense concepts developed over the years, the Russian Federation shaped its own security policy being a continuation of the post-Soviet superpower aspirations. Considering threats, challenges, needs and opportunities, there were identified its specific areas, including the territorial integrity (the problem of Chechnya), the Islamic threat in the south of the country (Central Asia), the expansion of NATO and the EU towards Central European countries, the global fight against terrorism (now the so-called Islamic State), the growth of China in the international arena, the distribution of military powers (own ones confronting international threats) and the economic crisis.

Russia's defense policy after the end of the Cold War is still consistent in most of the original assumptions. Starting with its first version (1993), through three consecutive ones (2000, 2010, 2013) it is a deeply thought-out strategy, resulting from the consistent foreign policy. The main lines / points in the defense policy of Russia from this period include:

- the character of the defensive doctrine;
- the possibility of using the military force after the exhaustion of non – violent measures;
- the rules for the use of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, including the certain order of the use of nuclear weapons.

The latest defense doctrine stresses the necessity to maintain the mobilization readiness. Particular attention is paid to the construction and modernization of the military infrastructure and equipment, including precise weapons and air-space defense. It introduces the concept of non-nuclear deterrence, which should be understood as the maintenance of high - level combat readiness of conventional forces. Russia reserves the right to military intervention under the pretense of defending its citizens and the Russians living in other countries, there is therefore the possibility to apply the power play, also in regions bordering with the Russian Federation. The specifically understood interests of the Russian Federation occur anywhere the Russians have already settled.

Russia has always drawn relevant post – conflict conclusions. Recent developments in the field of security began during the period of the conflict in Georgia and the associated reforms of the army. Since Vladimir Putin was re-elected to the office of the President, Russia has been effectively implementing assumptions of defense of their interests. It is associated with the process of creating a security buffer by setting an inter-cultural demarcation line. The former Eastern Bloc countries' aspirations to the Western political, economic and military systems, within the joint alliances, resulted in a rapid reduction of the buffer zone in the area of Russia's security. The politicians from the Russian Federation have been trying to significantly strengthen the position of their country in Central - Eastern Europe, e.g. by the actions of environmentalists

demonstrating the negative impact of shale gas production, by threats on cutting or limiting supplies of natural gas or by manipulating gas prices. In the fall 2014, Russian fighter - bombers over 100 times violated the air space of the Baltic countries, members of the NATO Alliance [12].

The Russians have often adopted the principle of provocation, even at the cost of many lives of their own citizens. In this way, they give permission for using their own Armed Forces. This is confirmed by the fact of the collapse of buildings in Moscow in unexplained circumstances, after a gas explosion, as well as the detection of another assassination attempt in Ryazan, which, among others, led to the start of the war in Chechnya [3].

The adopted defensive concept of the Russian Federation mandates preventive strikes even before the factual threat, which translates directly into the security of our country. The strong opposition of our diplomacy to the Russian policy affected their sensitive security area. In this context, Polish membership in the European Union has been especially inconvenient for Russia.

3. MILITARY SECURITY IN PRACTICE

In the context of the aforementioned events the system security policy must be kept based on alliances in which we have been operating for years. In practice, security as a phenomenon in the era of the functioning of nation - states is an indispensable element in all fields of activity of the organizational structure of each developed country. This is an area expressing the needs of individual people, groups, nations, international communities, virtually the whole humanity, which is a guarantor of the survival, development and freedom to pursue personal interests, using specific opportunities with a reduced risk and threat. Among others, the following fields: economic, social, public, ecological, information, and also the most recognizable due to its historical aspect – military one are the same with security.

Until the mid-90s military threats were seen in the system of international relations, being the result of external military aggression. Military security (as part of the external security) and civilian security (non-military - as part of the internal security) in the assumption were separate fields, which today translates into inconsistent regulations, and hence - separate management and structures. The overall set of these concepts is often referred to a physical threat [19]. These days, due to the multidimensional aspect of military threats, as exemplified by the war in Ukraine or global terrorism, it is difficult to distinguish between its external or internal sources. Thus, their general dimension consists of protection and defense against destructive actions, using specialized manpower and resources, e.g. armed forces, police, intelligence, counter-intelligence, border guards, fire brigade, various security services, etc. Threats in this area include, among others: demonstration of power (e.g. military training field exercises, presentation of the military techniques or soldiers' training level in the media), sabotage, blockade, blackmail and military provocation, an incident and the border clash, an assault of informal groups, terrorist attacks, attacks of madmen, intentional

actions of criminal groups. These are both direct and indirect forms of military threats, operations of both formal and informal forces.

4. POLISH SECURITY POLICY AFTER 1989 [9] IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF MILITARY FORCES

During political affiliation to the Eastern Bloc, the Polish security strategy was based on the assumptions of the Warsaw Pact. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, in the new political reality of isolation, in 1990 a new security policy was developed, this time on the grounds of the old military assistance, which only apparently met the expectations of all its members. Member countries of the old military system expected to have their national interests protected. In the then reality it was necessary to determine further directions of change as soon as possible within the existing Western alliances. In 1994, after previous bilateral declarations on cooperation, Prime Minister of Poland Waldemar Pawlak signed in Brussels the Framework Document of the Partnership for Peace. In 1999, the Polish flag was hoisted on the flagpole in front of the NATO Headquarters, which meant that we had been officially accepted into its structure [20]. Equally important for Poland was the fact of having the European Union's status as a member, the common security policy of the European Security and Defense Policy as well as establishing joint battle groups.

The fact of belonging to the Western alliance's completely changed definitions and directions of threats, which was associated with the need to restructure our military forces. The infrastructure of the Polish People's Army fell ideally within the defensive doctrine of the Warsaw Pact. Due to the movement of borders after the World War II, the German military barracks in the western Poland, occupied by the then Polish Army, became the shield of the Warsaw Pact. When the priorities changed as the consequence of Poland's accession to NATO, and the direction of the threat shifted further east, the old system of dislocation of our tactical formations ceased to be a strategically good option. Unfortunately, such a deployment of forces has remained constant since we joined NATO structures. By analyzing precisely the dislocation of our divisions, and within them - individual military units, a significant advantage in the balance of power in the west of Poland can be observed, where we have two divisions, while only one in the eastern Poland. The 11th Armored Division and the 12th Mechanized Division on the left side of the Vistula River are modern tactical units, characterized by a considerable attack force and high maneuverability. On the right of the Vistula, there are located units of the 16th Mechanized Division, based on the weaponry produced under license or directly in the USSR. The Armed Forces' logistic capabilities of deploying such large forces, e.g. two brigades, to another part of Poland, at a distance of 500-700 km, are significantly limited [2], and even impossible because of the dynamics of modern warfare.

Defense of our country is often considered in terms of military traditions as well as "workplaces" in cases of garrisons located in small towns. [21] Political arrangements and promises to potential voters prevail over common sense and defense considered in terms of utility, where the purpose in a strict sense should be the effectiveness of our military forces. Decreasing the size of our forces in the framework of existing com-

ponents is associated with the structural change and, as a result, reduction in manpower and equipment. Some mechanism appears where a brigade being restructured takes on the status of a battalion, and must operate within another brigade. An “isolated” battalion is therefore incorporated into new structures, but no one takes into account the range of responsibility. As a result, a brigade stations in the area where the division formerly functioned. Denying the speculation that today's military forces rely on maneuverability and power of impact, it should be stated that, firstly, our forces often have the same weapons compared to those possessed before the restructuration; secondly, single battalions have no operational independence, so their activity will not be efficient as they are significantly distant from each other. The above situation can be exemplified by the 7th Pomeranian Coastal Defense Brigade, where the mechanized battalions, which are nearly 200 km apart from each other between Trzebiatów and Lębork [22], while the 1st Warsaw Armored Brigade has in the structure the various purpose units at a distance of 300 km [23]. It seems completely absurd to assume operations of the 21th Podhale Rifles Brigade within our southern borders. The battalion established after the 22nd Mountain Infantry Brigade in Kłodzko is nearly 500 km away from Przemyśl and Rzeszów!

The information and decision-making process in the command system should be characterized by high efficiency. Considering the methods of command both by the instruction and by objectives, it should be emphasized that communication is a key element of the command efficiency [6]. The structure of our Armed Forces, taking into account the aspect of decentralization, provides, in my opinion, an inadequate number of officers involved in commanding. The Operational Command of the Armed Forces commanding during a potential military conflict manages forces of one army. It passes information to operational units through the division staff, which extends and often disrupts communication. The Russian Federation increased its maneuverability while implementing reforms of its army. The introduction of the system of brigade management by one commanding authority proved helpful [17].

Moreover, the achievement of combat readiness of/by units is calculated in months (manning, training, armament and equipment), when the experience of newly accepted soldiers is as low as zero. The peacetime establishment in the Polish Armed Forces differs from the personal states in subunits. Manning ratio oscillates between 20% and 80% in seven out of our thirteen brigades. This means 2-3 months to make these tactical formations ready for operations at the basic level [24]. This is a particular concern in a situation where professional and contract soldiers leave the military service, which is particularly acute because already acquired the experience during missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. There are several reasons for this:

- unclear situation as regards professional career (max. 12 years' contracts for privates);
- extended service time till retirement rights (25 years while maintaining the age of 55 years);
- adverse social changes;
- liquidation of military units;

- no pay rises;
- no mission!

As a result, soldiers with combat experience quit the army, and the average length of service decreased from 21 to 16 years. New soldiers are recruited, who begin basic courses, thus strengthening the ranks of military units without the possibility to gain experience on the battlefield (drivers of armored personnel carriers, soldiers of mechanized formations). Moreover, the military deals with the problem of staff shortages, realizing e.g. certification and training on new equipment in subunits, based on soldiers delegated from twinning units! [15]. However, the proportions between the corps in the army, the number of generals and colonels (almost 1600) remain unchanged. This means that a general could command a battalion, and a colonel – a platoon (approx. 30 people). For one commanding officer and NCO in the Armed Forces there is 0.8 of a private executing orders (in 2014 there were about 14 000 officers and more than 32 000 non-commissioned officers per only about 38 000 privates). The corresponding proportion in the US Army is of 1: 5 [25].

The Polish Armed Forces, however, are only part of the military structure responsible for security in our country. Today, operational methods of troops on the modern battlefield will not create a line resembling the classic front of the World War II. An armed conflict can adopt the concept of hybrid warfare, with the active contribution of unidentified subversive groups. In terms of organized crime or terrorism, services of foreign states can stimulate the environment in both of these groups, giving rise to a wave of attacks and general terror, and thus destabilize the country. The source of these threats can be the activity of a foreign country [10]. In principle, the Ministry of Internal Affairs is responsible for internal security. The institution was established, taking up the models of existing staffs in all of the military empires such as Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom, which integrates and coordinates the activities and efforts of all departments and government agencies responsible for security. The Anti-Terrorist Center (CAT) is a coordination and analytical unit, counteracting terrorism and combating it. The CAT consists of representatives seconded from the services: the Internal Security Agency, the Intelligence Agency, the Police, the Government Protection Bureau, the Military Intelligence Service, the Military Counterintelligence Service, the Customs Service and the Border Guard. The Center operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The idea of the CAT's activity is correct, but it is incompatible with today's reality, in the context of inter-ministerial cooperation, joint exercises, sharing information. Moreover, it does not have compact structure, management and methods of action, or even common policy regarding the equipment. Demonstrations of exercises for the needs of the media give a false picture of reality.

5. MILITARY COOPERATION WITH NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND NATO

NATO is the guarantee of our security; it means in practice joint missions, which have taken place for years in the fight against terrorism. Furthermore, the fact that Poland is the eastern border of the Alliance means that in the situation of an armed conflict it is reasonable from the point of view of Western countries to stop the fights on the Polish

territory, without the violation of their own ones. The Pact, however, has its weaknesses. The Americans, leading global politics, have been facing a wide range of other problems, directly threatening their country located on a distant continent. Long-term missions did not fulfill their role, but seriously burdened on the US budget.

The Americans are now wary of civil missions carried out by the USMC, which is largely burdened with fights, switching to the combat system using the Air Forces, taking advantage of many allies' hospitality and floating bases. The Americans are facing the need to carry out a major reform, involving substantial reduction in the number of their Armed Forces. In addition, regarding the rapid China's economic and military development they must become more engaged in the region of Southeastern Asian countries. The United States count on the EU to take over greater responsibility for the Europe's security and its immediate surroundings, particularly for the policy with Russia as well as the conflict in Syria, as was the case not so long ago in Mali. The USA wants to keep only the most important elements of the extensive, modern military infrastructure (bases and airports), because it is necessary to conduct multiple logistics and military operations outside the old continent [16].

Germany is the next economic power functioning within the NATO structures, but in military terms it is 'a colossus with feet of clay'. Years of neglect resulting from the sense of security after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, as well as the necessity of financial support for the linked territories of the former German Democratic Republic, and finally - neutral policy to engage in stabilization missions, caused that the need to maintain a strong army was relegated to second position. *"The German military forces are now in such a bad state that they are not able to fulfill all obligations towards NATO (...), many more years and additional money are required to remove the current problems associated with the equipment of the army"* - said Minister of Defense Ursula von der Leyen in 2014.

On the one hand, the German government declares the need to take on greater international responsibility, and, on the other, to avoid getting involved on a larger scale in the UN peacekeeping missions and NATO stabilization ones. Not only did Germany refuse to participate in the operation in Libya in 2011, but it also abstained from voting when deciding on the above subject in the UN Security Council [26].

The attempts to strengthen the alliance have been taken by the Nordic countries as well, which in addition to participation in the NATO Alliance established the NORDEF-CO. The small Scandinavian Alliance took up military cooperation with the Baltic countries, on the basis of the political and economic agreement on the cooperation between the countries - Nordic-Baltic Eight (NB8). However, the problem is the proximity of the Baltic States to Russia, which pursues a policy of expansion within the former USSR, thus being a direct threat to the Nordic countries.

The Visegrad Group focuses on energy and cyber security, threats to critical infrastructure, international organized crime and terrorism as well as natural and industrial disasters. What is more, threats to internal security related to illegal migration or unsta-

ble neighborhood of the Western Balkans are of great importance especially for Hungary, but also for Romania and Bulgaria [4].

The European Union conducts a very limited security policy, both in terms of external and internal threats. Joint military missions under the aegis of the UROFOR, Rapid Response Force, joint military exercises, declared police forces and finally a common security system defined in the ESDP are only symbolic in nature, taking into account the territory of states and the population of the European Union.

Summarizing, regional national interests do not provide the foundation for a coherent security policy within the EU in the context of military threats. Declining defense spending and individual projects of arms companies are a prerequisite for maintaining their own national interests, without enhancing the cohesion within NATO, although this remains the only guarantee in terms of military threats.

6. REVOLUTION IN THE MILITARY SECTOR

Armed conflicts involving the US Armed Forces have defined in recent years strict criteria for a modern army. Here are several components determined by technique. The recent economic and social order was initiated in the age of positivism, and symbolic creation of the steam engine outlined a new way of making goods in factories, in quantities on an unprecedented scale. Also the arms industry as a branch of the field was characterized by mass production of machinery, which along with the military “training conglomerate” created mass forces and resources for combating purposes. This is the amount of these two factors, which largely determined the victory on the battlefield, and also the outbreak of wars. Two World Wars, wars in Korea and Vietnam and nearly 160 - 170 other armed conflicts in the world after the World War II were based on the use of the huge amount of “mindless” machines and the great mass of humans. The simple design of machines for military operations allowed the rapid introduction into their use. Working factories provided spare parts and ready-made war gears.

A striking phenomenon in the modern world is how the civilization progress also changes the war theater. Today, the knowledge and the flow of information create a key resource of the new era economy. It is precisely these factors, which determine the production of material goods. Electronic systems, among others, analyze and choose appropriate methods of working devices, ensure rapid transmission of data that organizes the proper operation chain. The value of the economy is dependent on ideas and concepts of people managing the system, which in correlation with the received data turns into a key intangible asset.

The Gulf War (1990-1991), where the US Armed Forces together with the coalition partners fought against the Iraqi army of approximately one million people, was the clash between the two civilizations. In the course of war maneuvers there were adopted two variants of the air campaign. The first of them were carpet bombings on the Iraqi bunkers, causing massive destruction and loss. The second variant included precise raids of the stealth Lockheed F-117 Nighthawk aircrafts, which destroyed strategic objectives, i.e. crippled communications and the command system. Numerical superiority of Iraqi troops was overwhelmed by the technical advantage of the coalition forc-

es. After the war ended, the US Department of Defense in the report prepared to Congress recognized this concept of a war as revolutionary. The doctrine adopted in principle changed the face of successive wars. The new –generation weapons, “undetachable” aircrafts, dynamics and maneuverability of combat actions contributed to the victory of the anti – Iraq coalition campaign. The indispensable element was the rapid flow of information in the chain of command, both vertically between the Pentagon, the operational command to the commanders in the fighting line, and horizontally between the commanders involved in the battle [13].

Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) means changes in the conduct of a war based on information technologies transferred by modern communication systems (both satellite and terrestrial), enabling the continuous collection of information from the battlefield and its use to carry out combat operations with technologically advanced conventional weapons, including, in particular, unmanned aerial vehicles and precision – guided projectiles. Currently, RMA is defined as C4ISR, which refers to the following areas: command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, that is the center of modern command. An efficiently performed operation requires the close cooperation of various types of armed forces and management based on C4ISR. Furthermore, the dynamics of contemporary warfare is also determined by the so-called “oriented logistics”, equipped with modern means of transport, which ensures the supplies, transport of troops and their deployment in an appropriate location. Thus, the C4ISR system enables the coordination of the flow of information between the land forces, Special Forces, air forces, navy and logistics. The contemporary battlefield made a modern army use the specific hybrid functions in the course of war operations. Differences between the different types of armed forces are becoming blurred, since in each of them formations are created, which in theory should belong to another part of the army – e.g. the Naval Air Force, Marines, etc. Joining different types of the armed forces is called *jointness* (multi-purpose forces) [7].

7. CONCLUSION – CENTRALIZING THE MILITARY STRUCTURE IN POLAND

The analysis of the military security of Poland induces the adoption of a clearly defined defense policy, which will take into account the realities of the geopolitical situation in the context of current as well as foreseeable events. In our Armed Forces some substantial changes have occurred: equipment modernization, restructuration, not to mention professionalization. This, however, is not enough. Our Armed Forces still need further funding. An equally important aspect of the changes in the organization and infrastructure, and consequently - moving military units from the west and their location allowing for fast transfer and embattling. Manning achieving the readiness state allows for the dynamic transfer of forces into unstable regions. Periodization of training and education of personnel in the field of the training theory ensure proper physical, mental, and also tactical preparation. Understanding of such preparation principles and knowledge of the mechanism of the human physiology will highlight the need to implement the training macro cycle, adequately to the time and purpose of preparations. This knowledge reveals the absurdity of the functioning of the National Reserve Forces, where both professional soldiers and reservists (exercising only occasionally)

fill the twin posts. Thus, the restructuring of the Armed Forces is necessary, including the NRS, whose tasks should be limited to broad support of the main forces, the Civil Defense on the model, for example, of the US National Guard.

Nearly ten - year presence and active participation in stabilization missions of NATO troops distorted the course of preparation for the territorial defense within the Alliance states. Poland also focused on quasi – war activity, basically getting ready for hit – and - run, partisan actions. Given the situation in Eastern Europe, the change in the direction of the preparations in the context of an opponent having conventional forces is indispensable. The Armed Forces are the main pillar of our state defense, but the contemporary military doctrine has adopted methods of asymmetric operations together with a classic armed conflict. The solution would be to create structures and legal provisions allowing for centralized, immediate action in the face of military threats in the Polish territory. The CAT activity essentially provides for the management of certain forces in crisis situations, however, the knowledge of the elementary principles of action and the pragmatics of conduct as part of its individual components is here indispensable. In addition, efforts should be made to unify the system of training and operating procedures, and above all, to create and specify legal provisions. It is therefore necessary to centralize the whole course of preparations for such threats, not to limit them to only emergencies.

In the adopted variant of our country defense we initially have to rely only on our Forces, with the support declared by the NATO Response Force, where the conflict may take the form of hybrid activities. Only after the first wave, we can count on the adequate support from NATO. The adoption of the principle of *jointness* related to the centralization of activities in connection with the integration of various types of military forces and special services will be the answer to the hybrid dimension of the contemporary image of a war. In his interviews General Stanislaw Koziej has emphasized the need for a systemic approach to the defense strategy, both at the level of our country as well as in the framework of alliances, European and NATO ones [27].

Paraphrasing some words of Churchill: “The price of greatness is responsibility” (said by him in 1943, on the occasion of negotiations with the Americans on the participation in the World War II) – those, who are responsible for the security of Poland should honestly implement a recovery plan in this area. A number of the issues described in the above study gives a clear picture of the mediocre state of readiness of our military forces to defend society, values and the borders of our country, and unequivocally indicates that we are not prepared for contemporary threats of hybrid warfare.

REFERENCES

1. Bajor P. *Uwarunkowania i konsekwencje dla bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego* [in:] *Polityka bezpieczeństwa w wymiarze globalnym, europejskim i krajowym. Konflikt na Ukrainie*, Rzeszów 2015, p. 32-44.

2. Bursztyński A. *Analiza przydatności gałęzi transportowych do przewozu wojsk na podstawie oceny kryteriów kosztów i czasu*. [in:] *Zeszyty Naukowe Akademii Marynarki Wojennej*, Gdynia 2011, p. 113 – 138.
3. Gessen M. *Putin bez twarzy*, Warszawa 2012, p. 204-231.
4. Gotkowska J., Osica O. *W regionie siła? Stan i perspektywy współpracy wojskowej wybranych państw obszaru od Morza Bałtyckiego do Morza Czarnego*, Warszawa 2012, Passim.
5. Klupa K., Smolarek M. *Afganistan: poradnik żołnierza*, Wrocław 2006, Passim.
6. Kręcikij J., Wołęjszo J. *Podstawy dowodzenia*, Warszawa 2007, p. 57-65.
7. Lekowski M. *Współczesna rewolucja w dziedzinie wojskowości. Analiza wybranych aspektów i cech charakterystycznych*, Warszawa 2011, p. 265 – 283.
8. Panek I. *Operacje reagowania kryzysowego*, Warszawa 2007, p. 8-12.
9. Przepis dygresyjny - nawiązując do genezy zjawiska polityki bezpieczeństwa narodowego naszego kraju na przełomie zmiany ustrojowej oraz w III RP, powyższa analiza pozwoli na odniesienie układu sił w ramach naszej armii, w kontekście porządku pojałtańskiego i upadku „żelaznej kurtyny”.
10. Rybarczyk P. *Bezpieczeństwo Polski w kontekście doświadczenia bojowego zdobytego podczas współpracy działań integralnych komponentów sił międzynarodowych* [w:] *Polityka bezpieczeństwa w wymiarze globalnym, europejskim i krajowym*, Rzeszów 2014, p. 281-292.
11. Seierstad A. *Dzieci Groznego*, Warszawa 2009, p. 354 – 377.
12. Sielezin J. *Kontekst Rosyjski* [w:] *Polityka bezpieczeństwa w wymiarze globalnym, europejskim i krajowym. Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe i narodowe we współczesnej Europie Środkowo – Wschodniej*, Rzeszów 2015, p. 153-168.
13. Toffler A., Toffler H. *Wojna i antywojna. Jak przetrwać na progu XXI wieku?*, Warszawa 1988, Passim.
14. Wągrowska M. *Raporty i analizy*, Warszawa 2004, p. 15 – 22.
15. Wywiad z „A”, w sierpniu 2015, oficerem średniego szczebla Wojska Polskiego, odpowiedzialnego za wyszkolenie kompanii, odręczny zapis w zbiorach autora.
16. Wywiad z „B” w sierpniu 2015, wyższego oficera w pionie prewencji Żandarmerii Wojskowej, odręczny zapis w zbiorach autora.
17. Wywiad z „R”, we wrześniu 2015 r., emerytowanym oficerem Wojska Polskiego odpowiedzialnym także za rozpoznawanie militarnych zagrożeń zewnętrznych, odręczny zapis w zbiorach autora.
18. Założenia programowe w toku prowadzonych przez autora szkoleń taktyczno - strzeleckich w Siłach Zbrojnych w latach 2002 – 2013,

19. [online], [access: 2015.09.26], Available on the Internet: www.koziej.pl, Koziej S. *Wstęp do teorii i historii bezpieczeństwa*, Warszawa 2010, p. 2-3.
20. [online], [access: 2015.09.24], Available on the Internet: www.msz.gov.pl kalenda-
rum_przystapienia_do_nato,http://brukselanato.msz.gov.pl/pl/polska_w_nato/kalendarium_przystapienia_do_nato/.
21. [online], [access: 2015.09.26], Available on the Internet: www.gryfickie.info.pl,
<http://gryfickie.info/zalobna-salwa-nad-trzebiatowskim-garnizonem-plan-likwidacji-juz-realny/>.
22. [online], [access: 2015.09.24], Available on the Internet: www.7bow.pl, [http : //
7bow.wp.mil.pl/pl/20.html](http://7bow.wp.mil.pl/pl/20.html).
23. [online], [access: 2015.09.24], Available on the Internet: www.1bpanc.pl, [http: //
1bpanc.wp.mil.pl/pl/39.html](http://1bpanc.wp.mil.pl/pl/39.html).
24. [online], [video], [access: 2015.09.20], Available on the Internet: Pospieszalski J.(red) (2015),[http://vod.tvp.pl/audycje/publicystyka/jan-pospieszalski-blizej /wid
eo/18092014/16627202](http://vod.tvp.pl/audycje/publicystyka/jan-pospieszalski-blizej_wideo/18092014/16627202).
25. [online], [access: 18.09.2014] Available on the Internet: "Gazeta prawna" (2014),
[http://praca.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/600201,mlodzi-zolnierze-uciekaja-z-armii-
generalowie-i-pulkownicy-zostaja.html](http://praca.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/600201,mlodzi-zolnierze-uciekaja-z-armii-generalowie-i-pulkownicy-zostaja.html).
26. [online], [access: 2015.08.25], Available on the Internet: [www. newsweek.pl](http://www.newsweek.pl),
[http://swiat.newsweek.pl/niemieckaarmiasiesypiepolskamaztymproblemnewswe
ekpl,artykuly,348838,1.html](http://swiat.newsweek.pl/niemieckaarmiasiesypiepolskamaztymproblemnewswe
ekpl,artykuly,348838,1.html).
27. [online], [video], [access: 2015.09.20], Available on the Internet : [http:// tvn24bis.
pl/swiat,104,m/swiat-31-08,573239.html](http://tvn24bis.pl/swiat,104,m/swiat-31-08,573239.html).

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

Paweł Rybarczyk - MA, lecturer at the University of Wrocław. His achievements include 7 scientific articles and dissertations. Research interests combine several areas. The Academy of Physical Education in Wrocław and the trainer specialization allowed him for carrying out research in the field of physiology; the specialization in Crisis Management at the Military Academy of Land Forces consolidated his professional experience in the field of physical and industrial security. Service in the Police anti-terrorist subunit and the position of a specialist in the Special Squad of the Military Police are nearly 20 years of experience: physical fighting criminal terror, participation in actions and counter-terrorist operations, anti-terrorist VIP protection. Honors for the above activities include: Special Award of the Special Squad of the Military Police, the United Nations Medal of Honor, Presidential Cross of Merit for Bravery. Currently, Representative of the Specialized Armed Protective Formations (SUFO) for personal and business protection and Industrial Safety Leader.

HOW TO CITE THIS PAPER

Rybarczyk P., (2017). Polish military security doctrine in the years 2004-2014 – selected aspects. *Zeszyty Naukowe Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. gen. Tadeusza Kościuszki Journal of Science of the gen. Tadeusz Kosciuszko Military Academy of Land Forces*, 49 (1), p. 59-73, <http://dx.doi.org/10.5604/17318157.1201739>



This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution International License (CC BY).
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>