Methods of improving the jamming resistance of GNSS receiver

• Autorzy: Felski A.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.1515/aon-2016-0013

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Jamming of GNSS signals can be both a consequence of accidental activities and an intentional act. This issue is lately discussed as an essential threat for the use of satellite navigation systems. This is especially dangerous in the face of common usage of GPS — like systems in everyday life and the great belief of everyday users in the truth of devices indications. In spite of the legal prohibition of using them, jammers are commonly accessible, especially in the Internet. Until recently even specialists have shared the conviction that the broadband GPS signal is not a subject of disturbances in contrast to older wire-less communication techniques because its power level is below natural level of noises and in addition it is randomly coded. But nowadays jammers are very often successfully applied, which is confirmed in many reports. The average user has not the suitable knowledge about the specificity of the jamming and has no technical possibilities of the detection of jammer signals. Receivers, which can indicate the presence of perturbative signals, became accessible a few months ago only. Presently accessible jamming monitors can also determine the direction of interferer signal transmission. There are also specially designed receivers with anti-jamming mechanism, which are, however, not commonly accessible. The possible way of countermeasure the jamming in the GNSS receiver are discussed in this paper.

PL

Zagłuszanie sygnałów GNSS, które może być skutkiem zarówno przypadkowych, jak i celowych działań, jest ostatnio oceniane jako jedno z największych zagrożeń dla użytkowania satelitarnych systemów nawigacyjnych. Jest to szczególnie istotne w obliczu stosowania systemów opartych na idei GPS w życiu codziennym i przy powszechnym zaufaniu przeciętnych użytkowników we wskazania tych systemów. Pomimo oficjalnego zakazu posługiwania się zagłuszaczami, są one powszechnie dostępne, zwłaszcza za pośrednictwem Internetu. Jeszcze do niedawna specjaliści podzielali pogląd, że bardzo szerokie pasmo sygnału GPS nie jest podatne na zagłuszanie, w przeciwieństwie do klasycznych technik radiowych, ponieważ i tak w warunkach naturalnych poziom sygnału w tym systemie jest niższy od poziomu szumów, a ponadto jest kodowany losowo. Jednakże obecnie z pożądanym skutkiem stosowane są tzw. jammery, co potwierdza wiele doniesień. Przeciętny użytkownik nie ma dostatecznej wiedzy na temat specyfiki zagłuszania, jak również nie dysponuje odpowiednim oprzyrządowaniem, aby wykryć sygnały zagłuszające. Zaledwie w ostatnich miesiącach pojawiły się pierwsze odbiorniki, które są zdolne uprzedzać obecność sygnałów zakłócających. Dostępne są również monitory zagłuszania zdolne wskazać nawet kierunek, z którego sygnał zakłócający dochodzi. Istnieją też odbiorniki mające specjalne rozwiązania umożliwiające pracę w warunkach zakłóceń, jednak nie są powszechnie dostępne. W artykule przedstawiono zasadnicze możliwości przeciwdziałania zagłuszaniu w systemach klasy GNSS.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

jamming; jamming monitoring; GNSS vulnerability

• Wydawca: Polskie Forum Nawigacyjne
• Czasopismo: Annual of Navigation
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: No. 23
• Strony: 185--198
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 37 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Felski A.

• Polish Naval Academy Śmidowicza 69 Str., 81-127 Gdynia, Poland

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