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THE DESTRUCTIVE NATURE OF MENDASIOUS INFORMATION IN SECURITY POLICY

ABSTRACTS: The article argues that information in security policy is a function of the prevailing political system and public relations that determine the mode of communication, intentions, expectations and necessities of ruling. If satrapy dominates, information has a manipulative dimension, while when democracy is the warp of the state and the organization of social structures, manipulation of news is subject to control. Thus the quality and reliability of information serving security is determined by the type of organization of social and state life which may take a democratic, despotic, authoritarian or totalitarian form. Depending on the prevailing order information is adapted to its nature. But the pathological and dangerous dimension of information appears only in a satrapy which takes politicosteria (dictatorship's banditry) as the proper expression of the political system. This in turn is based on privileges and benefits that determine the network of mutual connections and ways of access to wealth. After all, to ensure it, a despotic security policy is needed which is affirmed by conformists who agree to undemocratic governments if they provide a stabilized, albeit captive (apparent) existence. In other words, the satrapy and its politicians include in their strategy both the humiliation of their allies and the suffering of their opponents depicted in persecution, harassment, solitary confinement and, in its extreme form, assassination. But in order to justify repression both outside and inside the anti-democratic system, manipulative information is needed. And its direct cause, however, is access to an existence of prosperity, for which every lie and information bluff is a guarantee for survival. Thus, in order to keep the wealth and privileges, politicians must lie as long as they can and to whom they can. It is because lying serves their security that is equal to the security of the state because the country's resources are appropriated by politicians. The alternative to politicostery is ethics as the power of conscience safeguards the truth about social relations. The discussion here takes Russia as an example, although the views presented can be applied to any other autarky.

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INTRODUCTION

It is a fairly common belief that information is a set of structured data that has meaning and gives the impression of being true or plausible. At the same time, this kind of data is a transmission of knowledge behind which stands some wisdom or beliefs about its truthfulness. In each case of content transmission, the information derived from it should be useful and servile[1]. Thus, if information is truth, it is possible to derive trustworthy activity from it but if it is false, it is a source of unpredictable trouble. Information as knowledge is weighed according to its credibility and the benefits or threats it brings. Thus information is created by data (facts), while their background may become a source of polemics and inaccuracies giving a weak basis for the credibility of the news they contain. The name of each message implied by the meaning of the Latin word *informatio* thus expressing a representation, image, message content, meaning of the message, instruction or result of the message. The term here establishes what constitutes its elementary interpretation of existence itself, the content of which is its very essence. Thus, the content of a message is a form of being marked by its own name that can be defined as a multitude of manifestations of cognition forming a stream of data. Along with the invention of digital machines and the development of computer technology, this transmission ceases to be treated only as a tool of epistemology and its harbinger because it already means a set of messages expressed through linguistic signs which can be created, collected, processed, transmitted and enriched (supplemented)[2]. Thus, the basis for the dissemination of news forming the criteria of information policy is already the autopsy of reality defined by the philosophical interpretation of the causes, intentions and objectives of the manipulative, falsified and antidemocratic attitude of its disposers (and de facto leaders) for whom misrepresentation is a means of ensuring their domination in the internal environment and a method of smuggling influence (mental, ideological, moral) outside (abroad included). Therefore, to ensure this ability, there is a need for safeguards for the survival of leaders and their followers as well as for the conditions of blurring the free will of acolytes. The ascertainment of this correctness is possible with intellectually in-depth reasoning as well as

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[1] See C. F. von Weizsäcker, *Jedność przyrody*, translated by Karol Maurin and others, PIW Publishing House, Warsaw 1978.
[2] See M. Lubański, *Filozoficzne zagadnienia teorii informacji,* PWN Publishing House, Warsaw 1975.

with reasoning that is separated from the official and supportive media coverage of some authoritarian authorities. To this extent, using propaganda to determine the intent of security information policy is as effective as bringing wood into the forest. For this reason, a narrative that seeks to portray a seemingly unsparing concern for the quality of existence of information recipients depends, on one hand, on the very nature of the message and the presence of truth in it and on the other, illustrates the real concern of political leaders for public affairs as evidenced by the intentions of the mighty to shape security by manipulating the minds of the little ones. As it seems, Russia is a model example of such machinations carried out by means of tools and techniques of not very sophisticated shaping of views approved by the authorities, although the mechanism of juggling practices in the sphere of information policy serving the executive can be found everywhere where the intention to limit, and consequently to destroy democracy arises at first.

DISPENSERS OF KNOWLEDGE AND POWER

The traditional administrator of information is the state because it is always the warp of policy being most generally understood as the manifestation of the management of the legal and economic structure organized by society oriented towards the common good. The scale of this communitarianism is determined by the aspiration to improve reality and to create more and more perfect results of collective effort disseminated and modeled precisely by the presence of manipulation in social communication. Therefore, information supports the attainable benefit. If this concerns the whole community then the message addressed to the population is in fact a universal good, that is, a public and common good. If, on the other hand, the message serves only certain selected groups then the common good is transformed into a gain that is only particularistic and attainable through propaganda that is calculated solely for spectacular effect since in this form information is noticeable and arouses the addressees. Consequently the quality of the impact of information depends on its vector and purpose. After all, the direction of the message is aimed at achieving some kind of benefit by means of statements that are profitable for the authors of the news and that allow them to win the competition in which the stakes are high. Thus, the creators of information are both leaders and the ones they choose who are brought to the heights of social stratification or separated from the privileged groups. Such obedient elites, for the sake of proper functioning of the system of mutual dependence, perpetuate three basic types of organization of social and state

life depending on the provenance of political beliefs. So, first, the animators of information can support the despotic, authoritarian, closed or totalitarian character of the state. Secondly, these people may praise its democratic, pluralistic, open or republican dimension. Third, people high up in the social hierarchy may opt for both despotic and democratic solutions depending on the nature of the community attached to authoritarian or egalitarian ideas. This predilection is then supported by information tuned to expectations that tolerate the supremacy of a single knowledge and power stratifying leaders, elites and patient taxpayers or by messages focused on pluralistic knowledge and power supported by free, equal, rational, and accountable citizens. But in the third model - the mixed model - which values ambivalent knowledge and power, evoking the dualism of information shaping a society equally unprejudiced and susceptible to heterogeneous, vague, and voluntaristic news, dissonance is allowed, confirming the possibility of conflicting interests coexisting in the political game. This is historically exemplified by the division of influence between secularists and clerics at the same time and in the same place. The mixed model thus allows for the contradiction of information belonging on the one hand to supporters of the rule of independent law and on the other hand to supporters of ecclesiastical solutions[3]. Thus in modern societies centered on democracy and the rule of law, information is pluralistic, free and multifaceted while in non-democratic, totalitarian and authoritarian societies information is one-sidedly subservient to groups managing policies with a pronounced manipulative dimension. A non-democratic society must be distanced from the search for truth because it nullifies the intentions of those holding autocratic power to maintain domination. And this intention is manifested both among the domestic and among the foreign audience on the condition that one has the instruments (mainly the media) to disseminate the only knowledge which is in fact ignorance behind which stands propaganda, illusion, deception and enslavement. In such an environment, reason and the inherent freedom of man are also superfluous. Wherever anti-democratic tendencies are revealed and put into practice, the only information is a weapon for maintaining the supremacy of some interest groups and an object of carefully planned manipulation. An example of this is Russian journalism which used disinformation, especially disseminated on the Internet, to demonstrate the incredible effectiveness of lies and manipulation in foreign policy leading to the projected electoral preferences successfully clarified. This was the case for example during

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[3] See M. Foucault, *Bezpieczeństwo terytorium populacja. Wykłady w Collège de France 1977/1978*, translated by Michał Herer, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN Publishing House, Warsaw 2010.

Brexit, the presidential election of Donald Trump or the anti-system crusade of Julian Assange of WikiLeaks against the USA. Manipulation has visually and empirically revealed its significant potential to ruin the reputation of democratic states[4]. The juggling of information for one's own citizens is systemically present when government media are used, while people living in other countries are served information pulp from transmitters subjected to the pressure of informational muddling of the truth. The example is again provided by the Russian and its English-language TV channel Russia Today that in a peculiarly exalted way disseminates the unobjectionable Kremlin viewpoint on national and international security[5]. Spreading one knowledge, one information and suggesting the source of the alleged truth. It unilaterally and obtrusively portrays all issues that undermine authoritarian and imperial Russian interests as threats in which information pluralism is treated as false. In this context, information policy has not only an ideological but also an ethical dimension because it is a sower of knowledge that does not result directly from the pursuit of truth but from the intention to falsify, conceal, segment or overtly transform the meaning of reality[6]. This reality is, by its very nature, pluralistic, fuzzy and difficult to unilaterally depict. And this is already a shortcoming of the authorities or state institutions that, through media, control, select or conceal news for specific benefits. Thus, the media is an institution that, despite the fact that it works on the order of an ethnic population or clearly defined social groups, can, with the help of appropriate intentions interpreted unilaterally, unambiguously and truncated information, defraud the truth and the public interest as understood broadly. After all, on the manipulation or secrecy of the sensitive message may depend its reception and thus change (distort) the nature of both expectations and the meaning of the news. Either way, both the plurality of fuzzy information and its distortion by reducing it to a single content and unambiguous news will always affect the functioning of the population. The choice of a fuzzy and pluralistic message or the intention to reduce it to an ambiguous or unambiguous form already determines the vectors of information policy and generates views that are false but replicable.

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[4] See C. Unger, *Trump w rękach Putina. Jak Rosjanie wybrali Amerykanina na prezydenta*, translated by Piotr Grzegorzewski and Marcin Wróbel, Otwarte Publishing House, Cracow 2019.

[5] See K. Kurczab-Redlich, *Głową o mur Kremla*, W.A.B. Publishing House, Warsaw 2012.

[6] See A. Garrels, *W kraju Putina. Życie w prawdziwej Rosji*, translated by Maria Moskal, Uniwersytet Jagiellonski Publishing House, Kraków 2017.

INFORMATION POLICY VECTORS

Information policy is understood as a conscious, planned and systematic activity of some system of authorities to communicate in a community in order to integrate it, make it aware and build bonds based on trust. Such process of building is based on a specific language communicating knowledge interpreted in the field of a specific philosophy, religion, morality and culture. But this kind of activity can essentially be reduced to an information policy with vectors specific to societies and states of liberal democracies on the one hand and authoritarian dominions on the other. The first vector (liberal-democratic) is possible in a situation of respect for civil society, care for the level of knowledge concerning important matters and creation of conditions for development that depends on the quality, validity, effectiveness and usefulness of some intention for the community. In the case of the second vector (authoritarian), what comes into play is the particularism of the intention to disseminate information intended for selected groups or filtered or isolated content. In this case we are not dealing with a pluralistic interpretation of news but with their separation according to a planned method of data transmission. In this context, information is not a report of facts but a story about them arranged for the use of the animators of some kind of messages (stories). Therefore, in this context, information policy is a fallacy and behind it there is hypocrisy, casuistry, jugglery and often perfidy, twistedness, perversity, and sophistry. Therefore, the deceit introduced into the security information allows for impurity of intentions and ambiguity of achieved benefits. On the one hand, it establishes the character of the intentions of the creators of a concrete message and on the other hand, it creates an image of their source.

If these are determined by ill will, manipulation, unscrupulousness, misrepresentation, and any other deformation of the news aimed at dystopia of the addressee's environment, then every manifestation of the message serves one-sided security or falsification of expectations that serve it[7]. But in this sense, the security of one party (information givers) is a foreshadowing of the danger of another (information receivers). And this pattern of transferring power through information addressed to those whose oppression is supposed to be someone else's benefit is an algorithm of danger for the stability of interpersonal relations both in the local, state, and international space. It is from this source that the real threat to the good expressed by democracy in the sociopolitical space arises. Therefore, destruction is the goal of any system

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[7] See W. Grzelak, *Rosja bez złudzeń. Uroki demokracji suwerennej*, 3S Media Publishing House, Warsaw 2008.

oriented towards the maintenance of power, privilege, impunity, the fulfillment of ambitions and all that gives the power of possession and appropriation[8]. Thus, the security of the satrapy is synonymous with securing the possessions of its functionaries for whom the democratic will is a mortal danger. Therefore, disinformation is an appropriate means of securing peculiar interests and a tool for correcting views in democratic societies which in respect of fair play relations are a plaything for people who have contempt for what defines decent people.

In a situation of satrapy expansion, concern for security (in any form) means extreme danger for democracy. Although, until recently, it was thought that a physically and biologically tangible war is also unprofitable for the satrapy because it jeopardizes the wealth of its functionaries. Vladimir Putin by attacking Ukraine contradicted this tendency, although he did not give up those forms of expansion (aggression) that optimize the ability of a non-democratic state to achieve its goals with the help of media lies[9]. After all, the information creating one knowledge and falsified becomes not only an instrument of its own (elites') security but also a means of stupefying, weakening and humiliating people attached to the ideas of democracy and freedom. An example of this coup and victories, albeit at different levels of influence but with similar social effects, is Russia's "post-poll" initiative in the 2016 US presidential election and the oligarchization of media in Hungary. There are other inspirations, methods, influences and effects of influence but the goal is one: to nullify or at least limit the possibility of effective functioning of democracy which requires cooperation and pluralism, including information plurality, differentiating the news submitted to the judgment of free people. This possibility, according to Immanuel Kant, presents us with the criteria of what enlightenment is[10]. According to this understanding, the weakening or elimination of the private thinking judgment is always an intermediate step in promoting security of an unenlightened character, that is, one based on the renunciation of the use of one's own reason and the maintenance of a human being in a state of incapacity that requires guardians [11]. Security in this context is an expression of the intentions of both the proponents of satrapies promoting unenlightened security and of

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[8] See A. Roxburgh, *Strongman (!) u szczytu władzy*, translated by Marcin Domagała, Ole Publishing House, Warsaw 2014.

[9] See A. Antczak-Barzan, Z. Śliwa, R. Zaniewski, *Wojna XXI wieku. Początki wojny „trzeciej fali"*, Vizja Press & IT Publishing House, Warsaw 2016.

[10] Compare I. Kant, *Co to jest oświecenie?*, translated by Adam Landman, [in]: T. Kroński, *Kant*, Wiedza Powszechna Publishing House, Warsaw 1966, page 164.

[11] Compare J. Świniarski, *Bezpieczeństwo w ujęciu filozoficznym*, [in]: *Nauka o bezpieczeństwie. Istota, przedmiot badań i kierunki rozwoju. Studia i Materiały*. Volume 1, L. Grochowskiego, A. Letkiewicza, A. Misiuka (ed.), Wydawnictwo Wyższej Szkoły Policji Publishing House, Szczytno 2011, pages 120 – 138.

democracy promoting enlightened security. With democracy being victorious, ordinary but not submissive people who have the courage to use their own minds, can feel safe. However, if satrapy gains supremacy (caring for those who have given up using their minds and have chosen intellectual disability) oppositional attitudes are in danger and make public safety an illusion. In this case, the illusory information becomes a tool of oppression because the elite's sense of peace requires that the establishment's opponents listen. Thus, from the point of view of the dictatorial security policy, securing the lifetime interests of the leader is a test of his prowess and a measure of his/her ambition to allow his/hers partisans to participate in the distribution of benefits (wealth, positions, or high social status). Therefore, the exaltation of a dictator is in the interest of both his/her family and associates who agree to equate a particular person (e.g. the president) with the entire society which is personified by the state, while the information policy adapted to its needs is supposed to secure the generalized particular benefits of power[12]. Here again, it is evident that a lack of ethics in action leads to dire consequences born of disregard for the collective approval of the actions of the executive requiring special information that is one-sided and based on manipulation, propaganda and ideology in order to secure its advantage. However, the information policy itself may fail and therefore the satrapy reaches for violence or at least, does not hide its readiness to use it (an example of this is the rule of Aleksandr Lukashenko in Belarus). From the psychological point of view, the main exponent or leader of the satrapy must be a narcissistic, paranoid and charismatic personality who should (but does not have to) be embellished with appropriate skills such as, for example, the ability to speak, argue one's point or use shortcuts, and *bon mots* that appeal to the masses, or at least, arouse interest but not disgust. In short, effective information is necessary to maintain power and dominance as it ensures the secure functioning of any - not only dictatorial - authority. It is indispensable in the control and management of communities beyond the state.

AN INFORMATIONAL SECURITY CONUNDRUM

While the image of security can be either enlightened or unenlightened, the former promotes information pluralism, freedom and human reasoning, while the latter promotes informational one-sidedness, enslavement and a childish lack of courage in using reason. The unenlightened image exemplified by contemporary Russia (although not only) is a spectacular

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[12] See L. Harding, *Mafijne państwo Putina*, translated by Witold Turopolski, Vis-a-vis/Etiuda Publishing House, Cracow 2014.

manifestation of the use of information creating one's own vision of security encircling the foreign countries (i.e. the selected enemies) which are to be misled by the so called "specialists" of obscuring reality and distorting facts. That is why it is important in this manipulative project to spread care over the groupings fomenting aversion to European integration and inclined to tarnish the image of enlightened security because divisions weaken, while unity strengthens[13]. After all, Europe can only be powerful (secure) when the economic aspect is complemented by military potential. The European Union as an expression of liberal democracy is fundamentally subject to the harassment of unfriendly satrapies. Unfriendliness manifests itself in a particularly irritating way by creating conflict situations in neighboring countries through the manipulation of symbols. As a result of the social stratification that is artificially created in this way deep divisions arise because internal conflicts weaken the community and can lead to civil wars if hatred lies behind the rationale of the opposing sides[14].

Another manifestation of policies that weaken democracy and the image of enlightened security is the dissemination of misinformation on the Internet about the threats to local communities posed by the migration of people who allegedly constitute an economic and cultural barrier to the development of wealthy populations. There are many arguments that this information cacophony in the UK has led to the country's exit from the European Union and, by the same token, to a serious weakening of the community's partners. The main reason behind blaming everything on the immigrants (especially Poles) was to create a feeling that the well-being of the British families is under threat due to cheap labor and civilization discrepancies. This last accusation was already directed to the non-European immigrants. Such accusations were first spread on the Internet and later replicated by unwise politicians who served, though without knowing about it, Russia. Thus, fear of unemployment, cultural mimicry and even loss of national identity drove the British, teased by power-hungry demagogues, to Brexit which turned out to be the Kremlin's guideline for European nations encouraged along the way to build their alleged independence. Despite the absurdity of this message, initiatives hostile to the indivisibility of the EU are present in the domestic politics of some European countries and it cannot be ruled out that in favorable circumstances, disintegration tendencies

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[13] See A.D. Rotfeld, *Myśli o Rosji…i nie tylko*, Świat Książki Publishing House, Warsaw 2012.
[14] See M.H. Van Herpen, *Wojny Putina*, translated by Magda Witkowska and Julia Szajkowska, Prószyński Media Publishing House, Warsaw 2014.

may appear everywhere, although the war in Ukraine, patronized by Putin, has strongly reduced this perspective.

But the truly dynamic and spectacular dimension are hacking attempts of Russia to interfere in the electoral (democratic) processes in the countries regarded as its enemies, where it is possible to shape political preferences to such an extent that the verdict expected by the animators of this kind of manipulation is possible. An example of success in this regard is the penultimate presidential election campaign in the U.S. in which a seemingly promising Republican candidate wins, while the Democratic nominee is plunged into a smear campaign that cleverly involves some domestic media moguls such as Facebook to play the Kremlin's game[15]. The accusations spread by the so-called internet trolls using hackers' manipulations and disseminated among the voters by the right-wing extremists were not confirmed. This alone undermines the idea of democratic election that under properly prepared conditions turns into an instrument of pressure and manipulation which are after all practical tools of authoritarian security policy. Its effectiveness confirmed in practice suggests that interference in foreign elections will continue, if only because in free media countries election based on independence is paradoxically the Achilles heel of democracy and at the same time, the cause of danger for the recipients of disinformation. Thanks to influential propaganda and manipulation of voters' opinions, authoritarian temptations are possible because misrepresentation of unpopular intentions of political environments, governments or groups supporting democratic and liberal aspirations comes from unscrupulous authoritarian parties achieving their goals. This tendency creates an algorithm for their actions, regardless of the time, country or level of economic development. Or rather, it confirms the contempt some people have for ethics which in the broadest sense is always an encouragement to respect the rule of law, honesty, and the common good. Therefore, if a political initiative comes from people who are in favor of self-rule, the effect can already be dangerous for countries that cherish freedom and human rights. In a satrapy, these values are impossible and therefore are not tolerated and excluded from the common axiology. The case of authoritarian systems,

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[15] This is about disseminating information by the British political consultancy company - Cambridge Analytica, openly supporting Donald Trump. However, the objective reasons for Hillary Rodhan Clinton's defeat are shown, for example, in: B. Niedzielski, *Siedem głównych przyczyn porażki Hillary Clinton*, „Dziennik Gazeta Prawna" Newspaper, 10 November 2016. However, this article does not suggest that Russia was involved in the US presidential elections in 2016. See also: H.R. Clinton, What happened, Edition Simon & Schuster Inc., New York 2018.

taking into account only the European reinterpretations of democracy changing according to the autocrats' will, confirms that despite the differences in limiting freedom and respecting the rule of law, the most important desire is to retain power, to draw privileges from it, to reward one's own and one's partners' and to keep the acolytes under the illusion. This is undoubtedly fostered by the lack of power supervision by citizens or only a facade of its control[16].

Imperial ambitions stem from this authoritarian elitism on one hand and on the other from the need, being reduced to an undefined necessity, to maintain supremacy over all neighboring countries. This is the reason why the prosperous EU is a thorn in Putin's side. This need is justified by a self-serfdom (an extremely apodictic power) and an obedient society[17]. In this context, the security of Putin's domestic policy no longer consists only of asserting supremacy within the country but also of extending it beyond his own dominion. In other words, the appropriation that naturally belongs to the internal functioning of the satrapy is exposed to the outside world where there is no possibility for counteraction, sanctions to limit other's temptations and defense of one's own freedom and human rights. Appropriation thus succeeds when there is no longer any interest in the ideals of civic independence, freedom and reasonableness, or in the norms that serve to protect the public interest. The most general expression of this public interest is common and universal benefit unrestricted by someone else's interpretation of it based on foreign particularism. On the other hand, if appropriation has succeeded somewhere, then attempts to counter it are exposed to a violent reaction because the security of the satrapy requires the deterrence of opponents who usually lack the means to compete[18]. This is why regimes support each other; besides real help that has ideological and propagandistic meaning, it gives a warning to their own opposition discouraged from making rash decisions to change the authoritarian order. This can be confirmed by the Francisco Franco case, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan or Russian support for Bashar al-Assad in Syria. However, the risk of transforming the executive is always present and dictators know it (especially A. Lukashenko in Belarus), that loss of power can usually mean their lethal

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[16] Compare M. Foucault, *Trzeba bronić społeczeństwa*, translated by Małgorzata Kowalska, KR Publishing House, Warsaw 1998, page 83.

[17] See S. Walker, *Na ciężkim kacu. Nowa Rosja Putina i duchy przeszłości*, translated by Mariusz Gądek, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie Publishing House, Poznań 2019.

[18] H. Blake, *Krwawe pozdrowienia z Rosji*, translated by Hanna Pustuła-Lewicka, W.A.B. Publishing House, Warsaw 2021.

end, exemplified by the Arab Spring (2010-2012) that showed that dictatorships that lose support of the regime structures end rather badly (e.g. Muammar Gaddafi or Saddam Husain).

CRITERIA FOR SECURITY OF THE EXECUTIVE

The prospect of risk, however, does not deter people from influencing the reality of the irreducible evil in interpersonal relations, manifested in the presence of organized crime, speculative economics, and dirty political games. The pathology born from it is stratified in a particular way and manifests itself in the appearance of openly criminal groups, i.e. efficient gangsters, circles aiming at maximum profit, i.e. banksters and circles of power preservation in a strictly quantifiable and restricted population forming the so called "politisters" (politician and gangster). Despite the different ways of asserting their existence and influence in society, there is a commonality of purpose that seems to be defined by the self-interest. Thus, gangsters achieve their wealth through brutal methods of participation in harming others, banksters shape their wealth through the use of proper knowledge, speculation or connections, and in the extreme form of fraud born from the use of various mechanisms (e.g. pyramid schemes) that inevitably lead to harming others. Politicians, on the other hand, reach their fortunes by means of the law which opens the possibility of access to things that are the object of desire of all voters and unattainable for the common people giving powers to people with impure intentions. Therefore, the law as an intimate veil of tolerance for others' harm promotes politicians and humiliates the people who support them. But the same law creates an expressive opportunity to push back against wealth and thus, it is also dangerous for "politisters" and needs to be corrected. Wherever opportunities to get rich are curtailed because they are subject to democratic control, there is a tendency for its opponents to revise the rule of law and to attack the independent media by hijacking the news narrative. "Politisters" thus allow for a contract (a transformed social contract) that selects among them the perpetrators of law change that establishes a satrapy with an articulate leadership that turns, in favorable circumstances, into an outright dictatorship.

When the leader of the politburo becomes the leader of the state, the appetites of his followers for privileges and perks determining the network of interrelationships and access to wealth, are whetted. However, it is not the coterie, but the supporters of the system who actively support the politicians (mainly through electoral support) that provide a veil for the dictatorship's ruthlessness. Thus, the despotic policy of national security is affirmed not so

much by opportunists who can never be counted on, as by conformists who agree to undemocratic rule if it ensures a stable, albeit enslaved (apparent) existence. In other words, in their strategy the satrapy and its politicians take into account both the humiliation of their allies and the suffering of their opponents depicted in persecution, harassment, penitentiary isolation or in its extreme form, assassination[19].

But it is precisely the indispensability of repression that makes it necessary to have a political base (one's own electorate) which in return for its support will always demand a share in the good fortune, albeit in a rationed form. Thus it may be said that the responsibility for the existence of satrapies lies less with the creators of satrapies than with the supporters of autocracies, for it is thanks to them that governments based on top-down planned human harm are possible. And it is precisely the social approval of injustice that causes dictatorships to proliferate and reappear in public life and the need to break their domination usually fails.

Although the models of appropriating the executive are different (after all, there are Asian, African or South American variants), the ways of creating authoritarianism are similar and always lead to uncontrolled power of individuals or groups of political or economic influence. After all, there are differences, for if banksters or the elites of financial supremacy are by no means opposed to civil liberties and may occasionally support them, political gangsters, whom we call politicians, are oriented toward a luxurious life, possible when the rights of others are restricted or abolished. Thus, the "politisters" or power-hungry dictators, like banksters who benefit excessively from society's resources, are oriented toward luxury, preferably for life. And although economic luminaries know that dictatorial power needs to be controlled and limited in scope, its correction (e.g. by limiting financing of the autocracy's activities) is out of question, since both circles, i.e. banksters and "politisters", benefit if some kind of social stability is ensured, at least at the level of ordered public relations. Such a balance is also a criterion of security policy which is guarded equally by an oligarchic autocracy and by the elaborate and omnipotent services of a non-democratic state[20]. The alliance between economics and politics in authoritarian systems stems from the democratic dogma that restricting wealth (or rather the pursuit of wealth) is an attack on civil liberties and thus the separation of autocracy from the pursuit of wealth is impossible. However much autarky's wealth comes from the exercise

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[19] See J. Felsztyński, W. Pribyłowski, *Korporacja zabójców*, translated by Cezary Murawski, Pruszyński i S-ka Publishing House, Warsaw 2008.

[20] See I. Borogan, A. Sołdatow, *KGB/FSB. Władcy Rosji*, translated by Agnieszka Sowińska, Agora Publishing House, Warsaw 2015.

of power and any attempt to restrict it becomes an assault on the right to own and therefore the wealth of people in a dictatorship is not only possible but, particularly irritatingly, understandable. Reasoning of this ilk is thus one of the weaknesses of democracy that is explained by the existence of dictatorship and justified by the desire for jealously guarded artifacts, access to the handsomest representatives of the fair sex and services that give health and hope for a bright future. These lines of authoritarian teleology are universal and have always accompanied the satrapy and therefore, given their hedonistic and eudaimonic nature, need to be properly addressed and secured. In other words, the manipulative security policy is a function of covering the interests of the main dictator and his entourage who in order to ensure the permanence of their own domination and access to sumptuous wealth will use all the resources of the state and society to maintain their own state of possession[21]. This current of shaping public, as well as international relations is the axis and guideline of information profiling of a non-democratic country whose security is equated with the prosperity of its rulers.

Thus, we would say that security policy is "politisterical" when its goal is, for example, privatized benefit achieved through nationalized harm to neighboring countries (in the case of Russia this concerns Georgia, Chechnya or Ukraine) or the entrapment or liquidation of internal oppositionists (such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Anna Politkovskaya, Alexander Litvinenko, Boris Nemtsov or Alexei Navalny). In this context, the information disseminated among the supporters of the "politisters'" concept of security and addressed to its opponents reveals the rather uncontroversial message that the "politister" is almost exclusively a creator of his own good (according to the Platonic vision of politics), a sower of common happiness for himself and his followers (according to the Aristotelian concept of politics) and a guardian of the gains guaranteed by maintaining power (according to Niccolo Machiavelli's interpretation of politics).

MEDIA SECURITY POLICY STRUCTURE

Any information policy, including that of security, has two main aspects. Firstly, the media facilitate the assimilation of social norms and create ethical, legal, cultural and transcendental values, thus becoming an instrument for shaping forms of social control determined by morality, law, customs, and religion. And these combined influence the determination of the

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[21] See G. Kuczyński, *Tron we krwi*, Czerwone i Czarne Publishing House, Warsaw 2017.

executive power proper functioning, i.e. the executive, the judiciary and the legislature, influencing the good functioning of the economy, education or the widely understood concept of security, including health care, defense, internal relations, diplomacy, and any other socially useful field, influencing the expected and high quality of life. Secondly, the media are also a system of informal shaping of social (and private) opinions, that is, dissemination of cultural codes influencing. However, it is a specifically promoted image of the world, public relations, economic relations, ecological issues, peacekeeping and everything that seems to be current and most important in the current narrative and interest[22]. In this field, however, the information provided can be either post-knowledge which is based on the pursuit of truth and reliable knowledge or speculative, which uses propaganda, manipulation and ideology to spread carefully planned accounts that serve particular interests. And such is the nature of information serving e.g. Russia's security. An example of this is (or was) the Russia Today television channel's activity, being focused on a message that unilaterally supports the Kremlin's political goals in every field of its interest, has set a pattern of falsified contemporary media expansion. This observation applies to every media outlet in every country where the news is based on untruth.

Thus, information is both objective (moving toward the truth) and subjective (manipulated) and its content may be systematized and consistent with the goal of conveying facts or contrary to that goal and rooted in the will to create social and political life where it is not subservient to one's own reasons. So, the mass media are an effective tool for disseminating information that influences social consciousness because they primarily affect the interpretation of various political, cultural, sociological, economic, legal, moral, religious, and noble events. Thus, information becomes a carrier of ideas that can positively or detrimentally shape social attitudes towards specific and important topics. By the same token, information policy affects the vector of public interest and influences the direction of the development of views that may be hostile or friendly to a particular policy, grouping, or idea depending on the narrative. Accordingly, the operational significance of the use of depreciation or affirmation in the transmission of news shaping, depending on the intentions of the sources, a positive or unflattering attitude toward a given issue. However, sometimes what is not disseminated by network communication does not have such an intensive impact on the views

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[22] See W. Babik, *Ekologia informacji*, Uniwersytet Jagielloński Publishing House, Cracow 2014.

of the society as gossip which, as unofficial information that fits into a conspiracy interpretation of the development of history, has its effect. After all, gossip is the nature of hackers' leaks of information used by Russians in the electoral game of democratic countries. It allowed to determine the final outcome of the presidential election (in the U.S., such an attempt was unsuccessful in 2020) and maybe even the parliamentary one. However, what is more effective than gossip is information that is posted on the web (the Internet) because its quality or validity is not always determined by its content but by the fact that it is published[23]. And there is a bizarre conviction that whatever is on the Internet - full of various lies - exists; however, the mere appearance of information already suggests its validity. Thus, in the popular consciousness there is a belief that if the message is published, it must be reasonable because it has been announced. This itself suggests that since the message has occurred, then the media using the information must have control over it. In this combination, the possibility of manipulation is not credible for all audiences and thus opens up the opportunity to create reality, as it were, anew and according to specific tastes[24]. Media specialists know this and therefore try to decide what current issues are most important for them and what form of communication should be used for this knowledge. And this can use both diplomatic methods and hacking tricks which effectiveness in the way of manipulative use of information in the propaganda electronic media (especially in television stations and the Internet) has been confirmed.

It can be assumed that the technology of artificially created environment of media influence on social consciousness shaped by axiological falsification of reality, manipulative interpretation of facts and acquiescence to double standards of evaluation of their quality, is an alternative to the reality depicted in democratic and more reliable media. The reason for the subjectivity of the media that distorts information and makes the collective mind susceptible to manipulation is the ambivalence of the real world, its overwhelming presence of various threats and the inability of governments to solve the pressing problems that are always accompanied by the media's stimulation of interest through sensationally exposed content and constant broadcasting of terror to focus the attention of the audience[25]. The preference for

[23] See D. Barney, *Społeczeństwo sieci*, przekł. Marcin Fronia, Sic! Publishing House, Warsaw 2008.

[24] See A. Bard, J. Söderqvist, *Netokracja. Nowa elita władzy i życie po kapitalizmie*, translated by Piotr Cypryański, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne Publishing House, Warsaw 2006

[25] See V. Volkoff, *Dezinformacja – oręż wojny*, translated by Anatol Arciuch, Antyk Publishing House, Warsaw 1999.

intimidating information concerns not only how threats are communicated but also determines the susceptibility of the collective to the appropriate content and form of messages that perpetuate a sense of insecurity in the collective[26]. And this susceptibility is the result of the relationship between social resistance to real or imagined threats and the ability of the community to control the spread of terror. Its reduction depends already on the planned education of society in order to sensitize it to techniques of pressure and limit the media impact of manipulative actions[27]. This is possible because the rapid dissemination of information changes quite efficiently the perception of traditional values and the perception of reality. As a result, the possibility of controlling the media makes it easier to control public opinion which ensures the acquisition and maintenance of power. And the hegemony of the executive requires the involvement of citizens in the consumption of information because their active participation in the reception of media facilitates control and supports the acceptance of imposed values and content which are given, designed meanings and ways of integration or disintegration of society[28]. This changes (shapes) the axiological status of information depending on the needs of people in power and influence the transformation of consciousness, thus becoming an effective instrument of political hegemony and mental pressure (manipulation).

The source of effectiveness of information in shaping any vision of security (whether unenlightened or enlightened) is therefore the susceptibility of minds to suggestion, of which collective hypnosis is a particularly spectacular manifestation. This inability to resist (confirmed in the larger picture and in the longer term by the process of solicitation) favors the influence of information disseminated in propaganda and agitation oriented toward managing people or their views. Information, rather than violence brutalizing and discouraging people from a certain policy or system of power, becomes a pragmatic and effective tool for achieving goals that belong to the zone of one's own security[29]. When it was confirmed that our psyche can be

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[26] See P. Sienkiewicz, *Media kształtujące społeczne wzburzenie*, [in]: *Media a opinie i postawy społeczne*, Zbigniew Pucka and Joanna Bierówka (ed.), Oficyna Wydawnicza Krakowskiej Akademii im. Andrzeja Frycza Modrzewskiego Publishing House, Cracow 2011.

[27] See P. Sienkiewicz, *Zagrożenia demokracji w społeczeństwie informacyjnym*, [in]: *Transformacje demokracji: doświadczenia, trendy, turbulencje, perspektywy*, Lech W. Zacher (ed.), Difin Publishing House, Warsaw 2011.

[28] See R.B. Cialdini, *Wywieranie wpływu na ludzi. Teoria i praktyka,* translated by Bogdan Wojcieszke, Gdańskie Wydawnictwo Pychologiczne Publishing House, Gdańsk 2001.

[29] See U. Beck U., *Społeczeństwo ryzyka. W drodze do innej nowoczesności*, translated by Stanisław Cieśla, Scholar, Warsaw 2002.

susceptible to foreign influences, information, especially in the form of propaganda and agitation, became an efficient (if not the main) instrument of community management. In the light of the experience of social cybernetics, it turned out that information is more useful for the exercise of power than direct physical violence because the latter, after crossing the threshold of tolerance for brute force, naturally triggers social resistance which is in no way in the interest of the establishment[30]. Moreover, repression can be used on one's own territory but not on foreign territory which is usually inhabited by a population insensitive to foreign ambitions or aspirations. This is why the proper means for the possibility of pausing over a foreign community is a suitably tailored information which mystifies the intentions in a strictly political, economic or cultural perspective according to an interpretation belonging to the circles having hostile intentions[31]. But this belief was redefined by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 which did not confirm Richard Nixon's thesis that manipulation spread widely, however costly, is more profitable (efficient) than armament. Years ago, this president of the United States, speaking before the National Security Council, stated that, when planning budget expenditures, one should take into account the fact that every dollar put into information and propaganda is more effective than ten times the amount invested in new weapons systems. However, the probability of its use is completely incompatible with the current impact of information that is not limited by time, space or even circumstances[32]. This view is appropriate for the current information activity of the consumer society that considers media messages as a part of the technology of knowledge transmission influencing the character and ways of managing social consciousness depicted in specific cultural codes.

After all, the methods for doing so are available to anyone and transform technically equipped and unscrupulous enemies into truly dangerous adversaries[33]. And in the arsenal of instruments of pressure and influence there is usually - as we can see in the actions of the Russians - electoral meddling, advertising speculation, neurolinguistic programming, political interference and any other action useful and present in the social sphere which can be

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[30] See K. Czuba, *Media i władza*, Soli Deo Publishing House, Warsaw 1996; as well: J. Curran, *Media and Power*, Routledge, London–New York 2002.

[31] See D.E. Denning, *Wojna informacyjna i bezpieczeństwo informacji*, translated by Jarosław Bloch, Wydawnictwa Naukowo-Techniczne Publishing House, Warsaw 2002.

[32] Compare H. Batorowska, R. Klepka, O. Wasiuta, *Media jako instrument wpływu informacyjnego i manipulacji społeczeństwem*, LIBRON Publishing House, Cracow 2019, page 9.

[33] See J. Curran, *Media and Power*, Routledge, London–New York 2002; as well: N. Postman, *Technopol. Triumf techniki nad kulturą*, translated by Anna Tanalska-Dulęba, Muza Publishing House, Warsaw 2004.

manipulated for one's own use[34]. This is the manipulation of language, knowledge, moral attitudes and the effects of human activity. An example of this kind of manipulation is the labeling of people according to their context, support, sympathy, education, outlook or attitude which at a given moment concerns them and is the basis for determining their social meaning or rather current usefulness. After all, anyone who finds himself or herself in the orbit of social prejudices or stereotypes that are personally related to a particular person may be a spy, thief or thug for some as well as a patriot, altruist or hero for others. In the case of security, a spy may indeed be a patriot, since the assessment of his actions depends on who he or she serves and for whom he or she steals information. But this ambivalence of judgment always has an expressive dimension and direction of service which does not have to be morally praiseworthy because it should be effective and useful. This utilitarian conclusion defines the usefulness of information, although it does not establish the source of the information which can be either wicked or decent. It is this ethical parameter that determines the quality of information and evaluates the commitment to its dissemination. For just as the executive (the governing authority), the judiciary (the judicial authority) or the legislature (the parliamentary authority) may - although they should not - use knowledge tailored for their own use (read: manipulated), so the ethical authority, that is, the authority of conscience belonging to all people, should base our cognition of the world exclusively on truth as a testimony of reality that has not been falsified by anyone.

SUMMARY

Today, the practice of information cannot be seen only as a set of means necessary for the comprehensive handling of news broadcast by computer and constituting the subject of IT prevention provided by television or radio. It must be the warp of communication based on the collection, processing and transmission of data using telecommunications and microelectronic equipment and technology appropriate to the needs. As a result of modernity, advertising and political information seemingly reach the recipient (consumer) free of charge. However, behind their production and broadcasting there are powerful powers at their disposal with huge expenditures that confirm both the wealth of the issuer and his desperation to provide himself

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[34] See U. Beck, *Społeczeństwo światowego ryzyka. W poszukiwaniu utraconego bezpieczeństwa*, translated by Bogdan Baran, Scholar Publishing House, Warsaw 2012; as well: M. Broda, *„Zrozumieć Rosję"? O rosyjskiej zagadce-tajemnicy*, Ibidem Publishing House, Łódź 2011.

with specifically understood security, also coming into collision with foreign interests. In essence, then, information in the service of self-defined security becomes a source of real danger for everyone or at least for the addressees of some manipulated message[35]. After all, the senders of such messages are called by some a fourth power existing alongside legislation, the judiciary and the executive branch (management). The danger from this side may therefore come not only from aggressive politics but also - as we want to demonstrate - from media intrigues spread by distorting information and deliberately misleading the audience. These machinations serve the purpose of exercising power and misinformation creates not only the transformation of original news into over generalized or detailed content but also the creation of news composed of words taken out of context or falsified to such an extent that the effect of the message is completely different from that intended. Deliberate distortions made by way of reduction and one-sidedness of news thus create statements that contradict the original message and make it a collection of words without content or meaning. Such exaggerations are only calculated to mislead the audience[36]. Another way of manipulating information is to shift facts, change their importance, use sophistic rhetoric and introduce simplifications and stereotypes. This distorted information almost always excludes alternative news and introduces deliberate repetition blurring its meaning and fragments and accentuates the sensational dimension of the content of the message[37]. Its unreliability is also reinforced by excluding alternative sources of information from circulation or neutralizing them. All this makes manipulation an unfavorable and undesirable activity which can rarely be avoided, because even the measures taken to suppress the spread of an untruth will not silence its reverberations. In other words, gossip takes the place of untruth which, given the clandestine nature of its dissemination, does not assure anyone of the possibility of protecting themselves from falsehood. An example of such impotence was the failure of Hilary R. Clinton to defend herself against slander during her clash with D. Trump in the 2016 presidential campaign. The pattern of thinking born by rumors does not at all seek to correct uncertain information and rationalize it. On the contrary, it seeks to create a picture of reality designed and corresponding to a particular policy or ideology. It is obvious that this susceptibility of people to fame and their

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[35] See J. Arnoldi, *Ryzyko*, translated by Bartek Reszuta, Sic! Publishing House, Warsaw 2011.

[36] See B. Dobek-Ostrowska, J. Fras, B. Ociepka, *Teoria i praktyka propagandy*, Uniwersytet Wrocławski Publishing House, Wrocław 1997.

[37] See W. Chudy, *Kłamstwo jako metoda. Esej o społeczeństwie i kłamstwie 2*, Oficyna Naukowa Publishing House, Warsaw 2007.

tendency to mystify the world by approving the conspiracy theory of the history development becomes a breeding ground for people hungry for sensation and a spectacular tool for the manipulation of circles or people who sense some interest for themselves. After all, intrigue hates democracy because it is based on values where truth is not negotiable or elevated. It is just a fact and because of its obviousness it can be trivial, common and therefore unattractive. Therefore, easy manipulation in a dictatorial surrounding creates an information offer that is boring because it is contrived and tailored for the use of those who want to believe but not to know. Thus, the illusion of truth equaled with a lie is just as possible as a lie made in the name of good [38].

It is the tolerance of the lesser evil that condones authoritarian practices, among which juggling with information is a way to achieve goals that are considered socially desirable if there is some support for the despotism behind it[39]. And this requires an audience that confirms its aspirations and therefore the media are an efficient instrument for dictatorial rationale that cannot be sustained without manipulation and falsification of the truth (facts). In the face of this, it is essential to know how to recognize and counteract the manipulation of information which is a dangerous weapon for a satrapy understanding that indiscriminate use of mass media and submission to their narrative is a way to maintain power and introduce content useful for some privatized sense of security[40]. This parameter is present even in the information policy of countries that consider themselves democratic although they use authoritarian methods to influence public opinion, as it is in the case of Hungary and Poland. On the other hand, in despotic countries such as Russia and Belarus, the authorities do not care at all about masking their intentions and distancing themselves from lies. The mystification of reality is no longer based on falsifying it but on spreading untruth, also called post-truth, i.e. deception and insincerity practiced in everyday life[41]. And this, unfortunately, succinctly already suffices to ensure the sole rule and supremacy of authoritarian circles.

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[38] See D. Doliński, *Techniki wpływu społecznego*, Scholar Publishing House, Warsaw 2006.
[39] See J. Bańka, *Świat poręczenia moralnego. Medytacje o etyce prostomyślności*, Uniwersytet Śląski Publishing House, Katowice 1988.
[40] See M. Goodman, *Zbrodnie przyszłości. Jak cyberprzestępcy, korporacje i państwa mogą użyć technologii przeciwko Tobie*, translated by Michał Lipa, Helion Publishing House, Gliwice 2016.
[41] See R. Keyes, *Czas postprawdy. Nieszczerość i oszustwa w codziennym życiu*, translated by Paweł Tomanek, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN Publishing House, Warsaw 2017.

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