Determining preference orders based on a majority margin matrix

• Autorzy: Bury H. , Wagner D.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5277/ord130203

• Konferencja: Conference of the Polish Society of Operation and Systems Research BOS(12; 17–19.09.2012; Warsaw, Poland)
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

When determining a group ranking, the information about experts’ opinions may be sometimes incomplete. In such cases, usually only the outranking matrix L or the majority margin matrix ΔL is available. Debord [2] presented a technique for constructing the set of experts’ opinions based on the majority margin matrix. The method proposed – simple and efficient – provides a set of experts’ opinions consistent with the given majority margin matrix.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

profile of preference orders; pairwise comparisons; outranking matrix; majority margin matrix; Debord’s method

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: Vol. 23, No. 2
• Strony: 25--41
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 7 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Bury H.

• Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Newelska 6, 01-447 Warszawa, Poland

autor

Wagner D.

• Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Newelska 6, 01-447 Warszawa, Poland

Bibliografia

• [1] BURY H., WAGNER D., Group judgement with ties. A position-based approach, Badania Operacyjne i Decyzje, 2009, 4, 7–26.
• [2] DEBORD B., Caractérisation des matrices des préférences nettes et méthodes d’aggrégation associées, Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines, 1987, 97, 5–17.
• [3] LAMBORAY C., A comparison between the prudent order and the ranking obtained with Borda's, Copeland’s, Slater’s and Kemenys rules, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007, 54, 1–16.
• [4] NURMI H., Comparing voting systems, Kluwer, Dordrecht 1987.
• [5] SAARI D.G., Basic Geometry of Voting, Springer Verlag, Berlin 1995.
• [6] SCHULZE M., A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and Condorcet-consistent single-winner election method, Social Choice and Welfare, 2011, 36, 267–303.
• [7] TIDEMAN T.N., Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules, Social Choice and Welfare, 1987, 4, 185–206.