PL EN


Preferencje help
Widoczny [Schowaj] Abstrakt
Liczba wyników
Powiadomienia systemowe
  • Sesja wygasła!
Tytuł artykułu

Relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity capital

Treść / Zawartość
Identyfikatory
Warianty tytułu
PL
Związek między nadzorem korporacyjnym a kosztem kapitału własnego
Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
The strategic planning of firms is highly dependent on capital investment, and corporate governance practices in firms play a critical role in seeking to invest with a risk reduction. Two emerging stock markets, India (NSE) and Pakistan (PSX), are selected to investigate the links of costs of equity capital with corporate governance. Therefore, the study's primary aim is to find out the relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity capital and the ways that can be helpful for firms to reduce risk. Data are collected from 260 firms in the chemical and pharmaceutical industries from 2011 to 2020. Dimensions used to measure the corporate governance index include committees’ existence, size and composition of board, ownership structure, and CEO duality. The pooled OLS (fixed effect) regression model has been applied to estimate the coefficient regarding data collected from companies. Study results presented a comparison of firms with strong and weak corporate governance and concluded a higher cost of equity capital for the firms with weak corporate governance compared to others. Using PEG ratio to estimate the cost of equity model is regarded as most suitable for developed countries and is currently deployed in the current study. The study's major contribution is using cross-country data to conduct a preliminary investigation on the relationship between the costs of equity capital with corporate governance. The study findings are highly significant for developing and strengthening the corporate governance structure in companies and providing protection to shareholders' interests. The current paper has presented managerial implications and suggestions for policymakers and shareholders that, in return, are likely to boost assurance in the market.
PL
Planowanie strategiczne firm jest w dużym stopniu uzależnione od inwestycji kapitałowych, a praktyki nadzoru korporacyjnego w firmach odgrywają kluczową rolę w dążeniu do inwestowania przy ograniczeniu ryzyka. Dwa wschodzące rynki giełdowe, Indie (NSE) i Pakistan (PSX), zostały wybrane do zbadania powiązań kosztów kapitału własnego z ładem korporacyjnym. Dlatego też głównym celem badania jest poznanie związku między nadzorem korporacyjnym a kosztem kapitału własnego oraz sposobów, które mogą być pomocne firmom w ograniczaniu ryzyka. Dane zbierane są od 260 firm z branży chemicznej i farmaceutycznej w latach 2011-2020. Wymiary stosowane do pomiaru wskaźnika nadzoru korporacyjnego obejmują istnienie komitetów, wielkość i skład zarządu, strukturę własności oraz dualism CEO . Do oszacowania współczynnika dotyczącego danych zebranych od firm zastosowano model regresji puli OLS (fixed effect). Wyniki badania pozwoliły na porównanie firm o silnym i słabym nadzorze korporacyjnym i wskazują na wyższy koszt kapitału własnego dla firm o słabym ładzie korporacyjnym w porównaniu z innymi. Wykorzystanie wskaźnika PEG do oszacowania kosztu kapitału własnego jest uważane za najbardziej odpowiednie dla krajów rozwiniętych i jest stosowana w niniejszym badaniu. Głównym wkładem badania jest wykorzystanie danych z różnych krajów do przeprowadzenia wstępnego badania relacji pomiędzy kosztami kapitału własnego a nadzorem korporacyjnym. Wyniki badań mają duże znaczenie dla rozwoju i wzmocnienia struktury ładu korporacyjnego w spółkach oraz zapewnienia ochrony interesów akcjonariuszy. W obecnym artykule przedstawiono implikacje zarządcze i sugestie dla decydentów i akcjonariuszy, które w zamian mogą zwiększyć pewność na rynku.
Rocznik
Strony
386--407
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 84 poz., tab.
Twórcy
  • Universiti Kuala Lumpur Business School, Malaysia
  • The University of Faisalabad, Pakistan; Skema Business School, Sophia Antipolis, France
  • Economics Department, King Abdulaziz University, Saudi Arabia
  • Czestochowa University of Technology, Poland
  • Bahauddin Zakariya University, Multan Pakistan
Bibliografia
  • 1.Abdeljawad, I., Oweidat, G. A. and Saleh, N. M., (2020). Audit committee versus other governance mechanisms and the effect of investment opportunities: evidence from Palestine. Corporate Governance: The International Journal of Business in Society, 20(3), 527-544.
  • 2.Ahn, S. Y., Cha, S. M., Ko, Y. W. and Yoo, Y. K. (2008). Implied cost of equity capital in earnings-based valuation model: evidence from Korea. 한국증권학회지, 37(4), 599-626.
  • 3.Alali, F., Anandarajan, A. and Jiang, W., (2012). The effect of corporate governance on firm’s credit ratings: further evidence using governance score in the United States. Accounting and Finance, 52(2), 291-312.
  • 4.Alali, F., Anandarajan, A. and Jiang, W., (2012). The effect of corporate governance on firm’s credit ratings: further evidence using governance score in the United States. Accounting and Finance, 52(2), 291-312.
  • 5.Albuquerue, R., Wang, N., (2008). Agency conflicts, investment and asset pricing. Journal of Finance, 63(1), 1-40.
  • 6.AlHares, A., (2019). Corporate governance and cost of capital in OECD countries. International Journal of Ethics and Systems, 35(4), 665-690.
  • 7.Allegrini, M., Greco, G., (2013). Corporate boards, audit committees and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from Italian listed companies. Journal of Management and Governance, 17(1), 187-216.
  • 8.Ashbaugh-Skaife, H., Collins, D. W. and LaFond, R., (2006). The effects of corporate governance on firms’ credit ratings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 42(1-2), 203-243.
  • 9.Blajer-Gołębiewska, A., (2010). The ownership structure and the performance of the polish stock listed companies. Journal of International Studies, 3(1), 18-27.
  • 10.Banz, R. W., (1981). The relationship between return and market value of common stocks. Journal of Financial Economics, 9(1), 3-18.
  • 11.Bartkowiak, P., Borkowski, M., (2014). Financial review as an element of corporate governance in the Polish legal regulations. Journal of International Studies, 7(2), 70-82.
  • 12.Beasley, M. S., Salterio, S. E., (2001). The relationship between board characteristics and voluntary improvements in audit committee composition and experience. Contemporary Accounting Research, 18(4), 539-570.
  • 13.Bédard, J., Gendron, Y., (2010). Strengthening the financial reporting system: can audit committees deliver? International Journal of Auditing, 14(2), 174-210.
  • 14.Bedard, J., Chtourou, M. and Courteau, L., (2004). The effect of audit committee expertise, independence, and activity on aggressive earnings management. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory, 23(2), 13-35.
  • 15.Black, B.S., Jang, H. and Kim, W., (2006). Does corporate governance predict firms' market values? Evidence from Korea. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 22(2), 366-413.
  • 16.Böhm, F., Bollen, H. and Hassink, F., (2016). Audit committee charter scope: Determinants and effects on audit committee effort. International Journal of Auditing, 20(2), 119-132.
  • 17.Botosan, A., Plumlee, A., (2002). A Re-examination of Disclosure Level and Expected Cost of Equity Capital. Journal of Accounting Research, 40(1), 21-40.
  • 18.Botosan, A., Plumlee, A., (2005). Assessing Alternative Proxies for Expected Risk Premium. Review of Accounting Studies, 80(1), 21-53.
  • 19.Brickley, A., Coles, L. and Terry, L., (1994). Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills. Journal of financial Economics, 35(3), 371-390.
  • 20.Bulathsinhalage, S., Pathirawasam, C., (2017). The effect of corporate governance on firms’ capital structure of listed companies in Sri Lanka. Journal of Competitiveness, 9(2), 19-33.
  • 21.Byrd, W., Hickman, A., (1992) Do outside directors monitor managers? Evidence from tender offer bids. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(2), 195-221.
  • 22.Byun, H.Y., Kwak, S.K. and Hwang, L.S., (2008). The implied cost of equity capital and corporate governance practices. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 37(1), 139-184.
  • 23.Carcello, J. V., Hollingsworth, C. W., Klein, A., and Neal, T. L. (2006). Audit committee financial expertise, competing corporate governance mechanisms, and earnings management. Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management (February 2006).
  • 24.Carney, W., Child, B., (2013). Changes to the ownership and control of East Asian corporations between 1996-2008: The primacy of politics. Journal of Financial Economics, 107(2), 494-513.
  • 25.Chen, C., Chen, Z. and Wei, C., (2011). Agency costs of free cash flow and effect of shareholder rights on implied cost of equity capital. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 46(01), 171-207.
  • 26.Chen, C., Chen, Z. and Wei, J., (2009). Legal protection of investors, corporate governance, and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(3), 273-289.
  • 27.Chen, K. C., Chen, Z. and Wei, K. J., (2009). Legal protection of investors, corporate governance, and the cost of equity capital. Journal of Corporate Finance, 15(3), 273-289.
  • 28.Chen, S., Komal, (2018). Audit committee financial expertise and earnings quality: A meta-analysis. Journal of Business Research, 84, 253-270.
  • 29.Choi, K., Han, H. and Lee, S., (2014). Audit committees, corporate governance, and shareholder wealth: Evidence from Korea. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 33(5), 470-489.
  • 30.Derwall, J., Verwijmeren, P., (2007). Corporate governance and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from gmi's governance rating. European Centre for Corporate Engagement Research Note, 6(1), 1-11.
  • 31.Easton, D., (2004). PE Ratios, PEG Ratios, and Estimating the Implied Expected Rate of Return on Equity Capital. Review of Accounting Studies, 79(1), 73-95.
  • 32.Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S. and Wells, T., (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35-54.
  • 33.Elsayed, K., (2011). Board size and corporate performance: the missing role of board leadership structure. Journal of Management and Governance, 15(3), 415-446.
  • 34.Elton, J., (1999). Presidential address: expected return, realized return, and asset pricing tests. Journal of Finance, 54(4), 1199-1220.
  • 35.Fama, F., French, R., (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics, 33(1), 3-56.
  • 36.Faysal, S., Salehi, M. and Moradi, M., (2021). Impact of corporate governance mechanisms on the cost of equity capital in emerging markets. Journal of Public Affairs, 21(2), e2166.
  • 37.Fraz, A., Hassan, A., (2016). Information Efficiency Premium can also Explain Expected Stock Returns: Evidence from Karachi Stock Exchange. The Pakistan Development Review, 341-357.
  • 38.Giannetti, M., Simonov, A., (2006). Which Investors Fear Expropriation? Evidence from Investors’ Portfolio Choices. Journal of Finance, 61(3), 1507-1547.
  • 39.Hamza, T., Mselmi, N., (2017). Corporate Governance and Equity Prices: The Effect of Board of Directors and Audit Committee Independence. International Management, 21(2), 152-164.
  • 40.Hsieh, T., Bedard, J., (2018). Impact of XBRL on Voluntary Adopters' Financial reporting quality and Cost of Equity Capital. Journal of Emerging Technologies in Accounting, 15(2), 45-65.
  • 41.Jensen, C., (2018). The employment impact of Poland’s special economic zones policy. Regional Studies, 52(7), 877-889.
  • 42.Joh, W., Jung, Y., (2012). The Effects of Outside Board on Firm Value in Emerging Market from Perspective of Information Transaction Costs. Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies, 41(2), 175-193.
  • 43.Jurgelevicius, A., Tvaronaviciene, M., (2021). Assessing the impact of human capital's structure on high value-added economic sectors in European countries: illustration of mining industry. Acta Montanistica Slovaca, 26(1), 106-116.
  • 44.Khafid, M., Arief, S., (2017). Managerial ownership, corporate governance and earnings quality: The role of institutional ownership as moderating variable. Pertanika Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 25, 241-254.
  • 45.Khalid, B., Urbański, M., (2021). Approaches to understanding migration: a mult-country analysis of the push and pull migration trend. Economics and Sociology, 14(4), 242-267.
  • 46.Khlif, H., Samaha, K. and Soliman, M., (2019). Internal control quality, voluntary disclosure, and cost of equity capital: The case of an unregulated market. International Journal of Auditing, 23(1), 144-160.
  • 47.Klein, A., (2002). Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and Economics. 33375-400.
  • 48.La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., (2000). Investor protection and corporate governance. Journal of financial economics, 58(1-2), 3-27.
  • 49.Laksmana, I., (2008). Corporate board governance and voluntary disclosure of executive compensation practices. Contemporary Accounting Research, 25(4), 1147-1182.
  • 50.Larmou, S., Vafeas, N., (2010). The relation between board size and firm performance in firms with a history of poor operating performance. Journal of Management and Governance, 14(1), 61-85.
  • 51.Lee, H., Kang, Y., (2012). Hybridisation of employment relations in era of globalisation? A comparative case study of automotive and banking industries in South Korea. International Journal of Human Resource Management, 23(10), 2034-2050.
  • 52.Lepore, L., Paolone, F. and Cambrea, R., (2018). Ownership structure, investors’ protection and corporate valuation: The effect of judicial system efficiency in family and non-family firms. Journal of Management and Governance, 22(4), 829-862.
  • 53.Lim, M., (2012). Structural fundamentals of Korean corporations: this time was different. Global Economic Crisis: Impacts, Transmission and Recovery, 250-272.
  • 54.Main, M., Johnston, J., (1993). Remuneration Committees and Corporate Governance. Accounting and Business Research, 23(1), 351-362.
  • 55.Mayer, C., (1997). Corporate Governance, Competition, and Performance. Journal of Law and Society, 24(1), 152-176.
  • 56.Mazzotta, R., Veltri, S., (2014). The relationship between corporate governance and cost of equity capital. Evidence from Italian stock exchange. Journal of Management and Governance,18(2), 419-448.
  • 57.McKnight, P.J., Weir, C., (2009). Agency costs, corporate governance mechanisms and ownership structure in large UK publicly quoted companies: A panel data analysis. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49(2), 139-158.
  • 58.Mulyati, Y., (2017). The influence of voluntary disclosure, stock beta, and firms size on cost of equity capital. Jurnal Keuangan dan Perbankan, 21(3), 387-396.
  • 59.Pavolová, P., Bakalár, T., Kyšeľa, K., Klimek, M., Hajduová, Z. and Zawada, M., (2021). The analysis of investment into industries based on portfolio managers. Acta Montanistica Slovaca, 26(1), 161-170.
  • 60.Reverte, C., (2009). Do better governed firms enjoy a lower cost of equity capital? Evidence from Spanish firms. Corporate governance. International Journal of Business in Society, 9, 133-145.
  • 61.Rosenstein, S., Wyatt, G., (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(2), 175-191.
  • 62.Siekelova, A., Belas, J., Podhorska, I. and Durana, P., (2020). Accrual-Based Earnings Management: A Case Study in V4 Focusing on Mining And Quarrying Sector. Acta Montanistica Slovaca, 26(1), 70-83.
  • 63.Saha, R., Kabra, K. C., (2020). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure: A synthesis of empirical studies. Business Perspectives and Research, 8(2), 117-138.
  • 64.Shahzad, I. A., Bhatti, K. K. and Khalid, G. K., (2007). Impact of Technological Change on Human Resource Development Practices in Pakistan: An Analytical Study. International Review of Business Research Papers, 3(2), 400-419.
  • 65.Shahzad, I. A., Farrukh, M., Ahmed, N. O., Lin, L. and Kanwal, N., (2018). The role of transformational leadership style, organizational structure and job characteristics in developing psychological empowerment among banking professionals. Journal of Chinese Human Resource Management, 9(2), 107-122.
  • 66.Shahzad, I. A., Farrukh, M. and Yasmin, N., (2020). Career Growth Opportunities as Non Financial Compensation - A New Induction: Reciprocation of Performance by Combining Social Exchange Theory and Organizational Support Theory. TEST Engineering and Management, 83, 16905-16920.
  • 67.Shahzad, I. A., Raju, V., Farrukh, M., Kanwal, N. and Ikram, M., (2018). Quality of work life: a significant dimension of non-financial compensation or managers’ tool to generate reciprocity. International Journal of Human Resource Studies, 8(3), 218-240.
  • 68.Shahzad, I., Bhatti, K., (2008). Antecedents of compensation and relationship among compensation, motivation, and organizational profitability. The Business Review, Cambridge, 10(2), 236-247.
  • 69.Sharpe, W. F., (1964). Capital asset prices: A theory of market equilibrium under conditions of risk. The journal of finance, 19(3), 425-442.
  • 70.Shivdasani, A., Yermack, D., (1999). CEO involvement in selection of new board members: An Empirical Analysis. Journal Of Finance, 54(5), 1829-1853.
  • 71.Shleifer, A., Vishny., (1997). A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737.
  • 72.Spira, L.F., (1999). Ceremonies of Governance: Perspectives on Role of Audit Committee. Journal of Management and Governance, 3(3), 231-260.
  • 73.Srivastava, V., Das, N. and Pattanayak, J. K., (2019). Impact of corporate governance attributes on cost of equity: evidence from an emerging economy. Managerial Auditing Journal, 34(2), 142-161.
  • 74.Suchard, A., Pham, K. and Zein, J., (2012). corporate governance and cost of capital: evidence from Australian Firms. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 24(3), 84-93.
  • 75.Tanaś, J., Trojanek, M., (2014). Changes in land use structure in suburban zones in Poland after the 90. Journal of International Studies, 7(3), 81-89.
  • 76.Temiz, H., (2021). The effects of corporate disclosure on firm value and firm performance: evidence from Turkey. International Journal of Islamic and Middle Eastern Finance and Management, 14(5), 1061-1080.
  • 77.Tengamnuay, K., Stapleton, P., (2009). Role of audit committee in Thailand: a mature monitoring mechanism or an evolving process? Journal of Management and Governance, 13(3), 131-161.
  • 78.Teti, E., Dell’Acqua, A., Dell’Acqua, A., Etro, L., Etro, L. and Resmini, F., (2016). Corporate governance and cost of equity: Empirical evidence from Latin American companies. Corporate Governance. International Journal of Business in Society, 16(5), 831-848.
  • 79.Turley, S., Zaman, M., (2004). The corporate governance effects of audit committees. Journal of Management and Governance, 8(3), 305-332.
  • 80.Vafeas, N., (1999). The nature of board nominating committees and their role in corporate governance. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 26(1-2), 199-225.
  • 81.Yung, K., Nguyen, T., (2020). Managerial ability, product market competition, and firm behavior. International Review of Economics and Finance, 70, 102-116.
  • 82.Zandi, G., Torabi, R., and Shamsudin, M. (2020). Trust, uncertainty and investment: an exploration of a hidden link. Polish Journal of Management Studies, 22(2), 594-607.
  • 83.Zandi, G., Aslam, A., Selamat, M. H. and Umar, M., (2018). Organizational learning, employee benefits and performance: A study on the manufacturing SME’s in Malaysia. International Journal of Management and Business Research, 8(1), 127-135.
  • 84.Zhu, F., (2014). Corporate governance and the cost of capital: an international study. International Review of Finance, 14(3), 393-429.
Uwagi
Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MEiN, umowa nr SONP/SP/546092/2022 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2022-2023).
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-d339743d-7e15-4c8f-882d-c8c4444aaa69
JavaScript jest wyłączony w Twojej przeglądarce internetowej. Włącz go, a następnie odśwież stronę, aby móc w pełni z niej korzystać.