Cyber Influence Defense: Applying the DISARM Framework to a Cognitive Hacking Case from the Romanian Digital Space

• Autorzy: Bârgăoanu Alina , Pană Mihaela

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.60097/ACIG/190196

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

One of the main lessons learned in the context of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine starting in February 2022 is that foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) operations are closely coupled with cyber threats. Regardless of whether cyberattacks are followed by an information manipulation component and vice versa, the merger of the two can be an early indicator of the potential for a conflict to escalate from the cyber area to the ground. Our article is premised on the idea that today’s highly technologised information ecosystem is a fertile ground for cyberattacks and information manipulation in the context of FIMI; more specifically, it enables cognitive hacking, meaning hacking the human mind and human cognition altogether through technological disruption and cyber pressure. Starting from this premise, the aim of the article is to highlight the technological determinants of cognitive hacking and identify silent or emerging threats that bypass technological sensors and seek to disrupt and manipulate the information environment. The empirical part is based on observation as a descriptive method, which is used to analyse a case of cognitive hacking carried out via a YouTube malvertising campaign targeting Romanian users. This case study is analysed qualitatively by matching the DISinformation Analysis & Risk Management (DISARM) framework with evidence collected through Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT) tools, following an innovative analysis structured according to the purposes, actions, results and techniques (PART) model. The extensive analysis of the identified case shows that applying the DISARM framework to cyber-enabled operations can be useful for anticipating and responding to FIMI threats, even when such operations do not appear to have a specific, immediately identifiable purpose.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

hacking; FIMI; cyberattack; DISARM framework; malvertising; deepfake; OSINT

PL

hakowanie; FIMI; cyberatak; struktura DISARM; złośliwa reklama; biały wywiad

• Wydawca: NASK – National Research Institute
• Czasopismo: Applied Cybersecurity & Internet Governance
• Rocznik: 2024
• Tom: Vol. 3, No. 1
• Strony: 91--121
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 57 poz., fot., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Bârgăoanu Alina

• Faculty of Communication and Public Relations, National, University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest

• https://orcid.org/0000-0003-3912-8442

autor

Pană Mihaela

• National University of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa nr POPUL/SP/0154/2024/02 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki II" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki (2025).