Dynamic Key Generation During a Communication Instance Over GSM

• Autorzy: Zalaket J. , Challita K.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Mobile phone may become the protagonist of the new electronic technology. If we compare it with that of other technologies, the infiltration rate of mobile phones in the world is extremely high, both in cities than rural communities of the most of the countries. According to estimates made by the International Telecommunication Union the access to mobile networks is growing much faster than the access to Internet. This emergence has led many companies to allow new activities which were previously running strictly over the Internet to run over the mobile network such as the electronic payment. These circumstances make the security of mobile communication a priority to preserve the authentication, confidentiality and integrity of data sent between subscribers and mobile network. In this paper, we propose a dynamic key generation for the A5 GSM encryption algorithm to enforce the security and protect the transferred data. Our algorithm can be implemented over any GSM generation GSM/3G/4G.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

mobile communication; encryption; GSM; A5 algorithm

• Wydawca: Społeczna Akademia Nauk w Łodzi
• Czasopismo: Journal of Applied Computer Science Methods
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: Vol. 5 No. 1
• Strony: 47--57
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 14 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Zalaket J.

• Holy-Spirit University of Kaslik, Faculty of Engineering, 446, Jounieh, Lebanon

autor

Challita K.

• Notre-Dame University, Louaize, Faculty of Natural & Applied Sciences, 72, Zouk Mikael, Zouk Mosbeh, Lebanon

Bibliografia

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• 14. Paglieri N., Benjamin O., 2011, Implementation and performance analysis of Barkan, Biham and Keller's attack on A5/2, Ensimag- Grenoble Institute of Technology - INP