Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation

• Autorzy: Sosnowska H.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5277/ord140406

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The voting procedure has been presented with rotation scheme used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. The main game theoretical approaches have been presented elsewhere. That paper considered the Shapley value computed in accordance with these approaches. The Banzhaf value has been analysed and the results compared with the results for the Shapley value.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

voting; European Central Bank; Shapley value; Banzhaf value

PL

głosowanie; Europejski Bank Centralny; wartość Shapley'a; wartość Banzhafa

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: Vol. 24, No. 4
• Strony: 75--88
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 13 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Sosnowska H.

• Warsaw School of Economics, 02-554 Warsaw, al. Niepodległości 162, Poland

Bibliografia

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• [3] BELKE A., STYCZYNSKA B., The allocation of power in the enlarged EBC Governing Council. An assessment of the EBC rotation model, Journal of Common Market Studies, 2006, 44 (5), 865–897.
• [4] EBC Monthly Bulletin, European Central Bank, Frankfur am Main, July 2009.
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• [6] KOSIOR A., ROZKRUT M., TOROJ A., Rotation scheme of the EBC Governing Council. Monetary policy effectiveness and voting power analysis, [in:] Report on the participation of the Republic of Poland in the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union, National Bank of Poland, 2008, 53–102.
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• [8] MESTERTON-GIBBONS M., An introduction to game theoretic modelling, American Mathematical Society, 2001.
• [9] OWEN G., Game theory, 3rd Ed., Academic Press, San Diego 1995.
• [10] SHAPLEY L.S., A value for n-person games, [in:] H.W. Kuhn, A.W. Tucker (Eds.), Contributions to the theory of games, Vol. 2, Annals of Mathematical Studies 28, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1953, 307–317
• [11] SHAPLEY L.S., SHUBIK M., A method for evaluating the distribution of power in a committee system, American Political Science Review, 1954, 48, 787–792.
• [12] SOSNOWSKA H., Analysis of voting method used in the European Central Bank, Operations Research and Decisions, 2013, 23, 75–86.
• [13] ULRICH K., Decision making of the EBC. Reform and voting power, Discussion Paper, No. 04-70, ZEW, Mannheim 2004.