An approach from bankruptcy rules applied to the apportionment problem in proportional electoral systems

• Autorzy: Sánchez-Soriano J. , Llorca N. , Algaba N.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5277/ord160208

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

(Discrete) bankruptcy problems associated with apportionment problems have been defined. The authors studied which allocations for apportionment problems have been obtained when (discrete) bankruptcy rules were applied to the associated bankruptcy problems. They have shown that the (dis-crete) constrained equal losses rule coincides with the greatest remainder method for apportionment problems. Furthermore, new properties related to governability have been proposed for apportionment methods. Finally, several apportionment methods satisfying governability properties have been applied to the case of the Spanish Elections in 2015.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

apportionment rules; bankruptcy rules; standard of comparisons; proportional electoral systems; governability

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2016
• Tom: Vol. 26, No. 2
• Strony: 127--145
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 36 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Sánchez-Soriano J.

• Center of Operations Research (CIO), Miguel Hernandez University of Elche, Avinguda de la Uni-versitat d’Elx, 03202 Elx, Alicante, Spain

autor

Llorca N.

• Center of Operations Research (CIO), Miguel Hernandez University of Elche, Avinguda de la Uni-versitat d’Elx, 03202 Elx, Alicante, Spain

autor

Algaba N.

• Department of Applied Mathematics II, University of Seville, Camino Descubrimientos, S/N. Isla Cartuja, C.P: 41092 Sevilla), Spain

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

PL

Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę.