Safety and Human Factors Considerations in Control Rooms of Oil and Gas Pipeline Systems: Conceptual Issues and Practical Observations

• Autorzy: Meshkati N.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

All oil and gas pipeline systems are run by human operators (called controllers) who use computer-based workstations in control rooms to “control” pipelines. Several human factor elements could contribute to the lack of controller success in preventing or mitigating pipeline accidents/incidents. These elements exist in both the work environment and also in the computer system design/operation (such as data presentation and alarm configuration). Some work environment examples include shift hours, shift length, circadian rhythms, shift change-over processes, fatigue countermeasures, ergonomics factors, workplace distractions, and physical interaction with control system computers. The major objective of this paper is to demonstrate the critical effects of human and organizational factors and also to highlight the role of their interactions with automation (and automated devices) in the safe operation of complex, large-scale pipeline systems. A case study to demonstrate the critical role of human organizational factors in the control room of an oil and gas pipeline system is also presented.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

human factors; pipeline; control centers; automation; human error; accidents; safety

PL

rurociąg; olej Diesla; gaz ziemny; transport rurociągiem; automatyzacja; bezpieczeństwo pracy; wypadki przy pracy; czynnik ludzki; błąd człowieka

• Wydawca: Taylor & Francis
• Czasopismo: International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics
• Rocznik: 2006
• Tom: Vol. 12, No. 1
• Strony: 79--93
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 49 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Meshkati N.

• Viterbi School of Engineering, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA

Bibliografia

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