Special versus general protection and attack of two assets

• Autorzy: Hausken Kjell

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.37190/ord190404

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Two independent assets are analysed, being subject to special and general protection and attack, supplementing earlier research on individual and overarching protection and attack. Sixteen analytical solutions are developed to examine how a defender and attacker choose either two special efforts, one general effort, or one special effort and one general effort. The latter occurs when the special unit effort cost for one asset is lower than that of the other asset and the general unit effort cost. The article provides a tool for each player to realise which of these three options it should choose when facing an opponent who also chooses between these three options. The solutions are explained and illustrated with examples. The article focuses on specialization versus generalization of effort which is of paramount importance.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

special effort; general effort; protection; defence; attack; reliability; vulnerability; independent assets; safety; security; terrorism

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Wrocławskiej
• Czasopismo: Operations Research and Decisions
• Rocznik: 2019
• Tom: Vol. 29, No. 4
• Strony: 53--93
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 40 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Hausken Kjell

• Faculty of Science and Technology, University of Stavanger, 4036 Stavanger, Postboks 8600 Forus, Norway

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa Nr 461252 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2020).