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Tytuł artykułu

Are we done with preference rankings? if we are, then what?

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Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
Intransitive, incomplete and discontinuous preferences are not always irrational but may be based on quite reasonable considerations. Hence, we pursue the possibility of building a theory of social choice on an alternative foundation, viz. on individual preference tournaments. Tournaments have been studied for a long time independently of rankings and a number of results are therefore just waiting to be applied in social choice. Our focus is on Slater’s rule. A new interpretation of the rule is provided.
Rocznik
Strony
63--74
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 23 poz., rys.
Twórcy
autor
  • Department of Political Science and Contemporary History, University of Turku, 20500 Turku, Finland
Bibliografia
  • [1] ARROW K., RAYNAUD H., Social choice and multicriterion decision making, MIT Press, Cambridge 1986.
  • [2] BANKS J.T., Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control, Social Choice and Welfare, 1985, 4, 295–306.
  • [3] BEZEMBINDER T., VAN ACKER P., The Ostrogorski paradox and its relation to nontransitive choice, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, 1985, 11, 131–158.
  • [4] BRUNK H.D., Mathematical methods for ranking from paired comparisons, Journal of the American Statistical Association, 1960, 55, 503–520.
  • [5] CHARON L., HUDRY O., Maximum distance between Slater orders and Copeland orders of tournaments, Order, 2011, 28, 99–119.
  • [6] ELKIND E., FALISZEWSKI P., SLINKO A., Distance rationalization of voting rules. Manuscript, 2014.
  • [7] KEMENY J., Mathematics without numbers, Daedalus, 1959, 88, 571–591.
  • [8] KENDALL M.G., BABBINGTON SMITH B., On the method of paired comparisons, Biometrika, 1939, 31, 324–345.
  • [9] KLAMLER C., The Dodgson ranking and its relation to Kemeny’s method and Slater’s rule, Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, 23, 91–102.
  • [10] LAMBORAY C., A comparison between the prudent order and the ranking obtained with Borda’s, Copeland’s, Slater’s and Kemeny’s rules, Mathematical Social Sciences, 2007, 54, 1–16.
  • [11] LASLIER J.- F., Tournament solutions and majority voting, Springer, Berlin 1997.
  • [12] LICHTENSTEIN S., SLOVIC P., Reversal of preferences between bids and choices, Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1971, 89, 4655.
  • [13] LIST C., PETTIT P., Aggregating sets of judgments: Two impossibility results compared, Synthese, 2004, 140, 207–235.
  • [14] MAY K.O.,Intransitivity, utility and aggregation of preference patterns, Econometrica, 22, 1954, 1–13.
  • [15] MESKANEN T., NURMI H., Distance from consensus: a theme and variations, [in:] B. Simeone, F. Pukelsheim (Eds.), Mathematics and Democracy. Recent Advances in Voting Systems and Collective Choice, Springer, Berlin 2006, 117–132.
  • [16] NITZAN S., Some measures of closeness to unanimity and their implications, Theory and Decision, 1981, 13, 129–138.
  • [17] NURMI H., Making sense of intransitivity, incompleteness and discontinuity of preferences, [in:] P. Zaraté, G. Kersten, J. Hernández (Eds.), Group decision and negotiation. A process-oriented view, Springer, Heidelberg 2014, 184–192.
  • [18] ÖSTERGÅRD P.R., VASKELAINEN V.P., A tournament of order 14 with disjoint Banks and Slater sets, Discrete Applied Mathematics, 2010, 5158, 88–591.
  • [19] PAULY M., Can strategizing in round-robin subtournaments be avoided?, Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, 43, 29–46. 74 H. NURMI
  • [20] RAE D., DAUDT H., The Ostrogorski paradox. A peculiarity of compound majority decision, European Journal of Political Research, 1976, 4, 391–398.
  • [21] SAARI D.G., Decisions and elections. Explaining the unexpected, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001.
  • [22] SLATER P., Inconsistencies in a schedule of paired comparisons, Biometrika, 1961, 48, 303–312.
  • [23] STOB M., Rankings from round-robin tournaments, Management Science, 1985, 31, 1191–1195.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-c2db0034-93cc-4f38-9102-a235eda4628c
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