Air Pollution Regulations in China: A Policy Simulation Approach with Evolutionary Game

• Autorzy: Chu Zhaopeng , Bian Chen , Yang Jun

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.35784/pe.2022.1.20

Warianty tytułu

PL

Przepisy dotyczące zanieczyszczenia powietrza w Chinach: podejście do symulacji polityki i gry ewolucyjnej

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

In the institutional context of China’s political centralization and fiscal decentralization, this study explores the environmental regulations that make the central and local governments join efforts in air pollution control. Policy simulations in an evolutionary game show that the best approach is to internalize environmental costs and benefits in local governments’ objective function. The effectiveness of several policy instruments is examined individually and jointly, including administrative inspection, transfer payment, and environmental taxes. It is shown that in case environmental consequences are not internalized, appropriate application of policy instruments can incentivize goal-oriented local governments to choose the socially optimal strategy.

PL

W kontekście instytucjonalnym chińskiej centralizacji politycznej i decentralizacji fiskalnej, niniejsze badanie analizuje regulacje środowiskowe, które zmuszają rządy centralne i lokalne do wspólnych wysiłków na rzecz kontroli zanieczyszczenia powietrza. Symulacje polityki w grze ewolucyjnej pokazują, że najlepszym podejściem jest internalizacja kosztów i korzyści środowiskowych w funkcji celu samorządu. Skuteczność kilku instrumentów polityki jest badana indywidualnie i wspólnie, w tym kontroli administracyjnej, płatności transferowych i podatków ekologicznych. Wykazano, że w przypadku braku internalizacji konsekwencji środowiskowych, odpowiednie zastosowanie instrumentów polityki może zmotywować zorientowane na cel samorządy lokalne do wyboru społecznie optymalnej strategii.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

air pollution; environmental regulations; evolutionary games; numerical simulation

PL

zanieczyszczenie powietrza; degradacja środowiska; gry ewolucyjne; symulacja numeryczna

• Wydawca: Lublin University of Technology
• Czasopismo: Problemy Ekorozwoju
• Rocznik: 2022
• Tom: Vol. 17, nr 1
• Strony: 222--233
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 36 poz., fig., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Chu Zhaopeng

• School of Humanities and Law, Northeastern University, 195 Chuangxin Road,Hunnan District, Shenyang 110819, China

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9284-1602

autor

Bian Chen

• School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110819, China

autor

Yang Jun

• F.C. Manning School of Business Administration, Acadia University, Wolfville, NS, B4P 2R6, Canada

• https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5796-7672

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MEiN, umowa nr SONP/SP/546092/2022 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2022-2023).