Is the state really a Leviathan? Testing the model of Buchanan and Brennan in Europe

• Autorzy: Możdżeń M.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.7494/manage.20l4.15.1.83

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This article is an attempt to synthetically present and test the main conclusions of the State-as-Leviathan model. In the first part, the main assumptions of the model are described. In the second, the model is developed further in order to present main research hypotheses. In the third part, the critique and remarks on the model are reviewed. The fourth part is devoted to developing an empirical model and presenting the main findings of the analysis. The summary concludes the text with some suggestions for future research. The conducted analysis allows us to draw conclusions pointing to the less-than-perfect ability of the Leviathan model to describe real events in the areas of fiscal policy and taxation and, in some instances, seems to corroborate the conclusions ascribed to the "orthodox" theory of public finance criticized by Buchanan and Brennan. A regression model built upon a database on selected EU countries derived from the Eurostat, European Commission and European Social Survey points to the fact that indeed the broadness of the taxable base can positively influence public revenue. And it also negatively affects the way people perceive the national government (in linę with model assumptions). But when we turn to the influence of the broadness of the base on its perceived quality of life, we can find out that, in the countries with a relatively broad base, people's perceived life satisfaction is significantly higher (in line with "orthodox" theories). At the same time, the analysis corroborates to some extent Leviathan-model suggestions that progressive taxation is beneficial for the citizens in comparison to proportional, as some recent research shows.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

Leviathan; optimal taxation; government action; public choice; tax institutions; people satisfaction

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwa AGH
• Czasopismo: Managerial Economics
• Rocznik: 2014
• Tom: Vol. 15, no. 1
• Strony: 83--96
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 18 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Możdżeń M.

• Author is a doctoral candidate in the Cracow University of Economics (CUE)

Bibliografia

• [1] Apolte, T. 2007, Why Brennan and Buchanan are wrong (after all), IOB Discussion paper.
• [2] Brennan G., Buchanan J.M. 2000, The Power to Tax. Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Liberty Fund, Indianapolis
• [3] Cameron D.R. 1978, The expansion of the public economy: A comparative analysis, "American Political Science Review" 72, pp. 1243—1261.
• [4] Campbell C.D. 1994, New Hampshire's tax-base limits: an example of the Leviathan model, "Public Choice" 78, pp. 129—144.
• [5] Deacon R.T. 1979, The expenditure effect of alternative public supply institutions, "Public Choice" 34, pp. 184-192.
• [6] La Manna M., Slomp G. 1994, Leviathan: revenue maximize or glory seeker?, "Constitutional Political Economy" Vol. 5, Issue 2, pp. 159—172.
• [7] Mehay S.L. 1984, The effect of governmental structure on special district expenditures, "Public Choice" 44, pp. 339-348.
• [8] Mueller D. 2003, Public Choice Ш, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
• [9] Musgrave R.A. 1959, The Theory of Public Finance, McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York.
• [10] Nelson M.A. 1986, An empirical analysis of state and local tax structure in the context of the Leviathan model of government, "Public Choice" 49, pp. 231-262.
• [11] Niskanen W. 1971. Bureaucracy and representative government, Transaction Publishers, Chicago.
• [12] Oates W.E. 2003. Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study, "The American Economic Review", Vol. 75, No. 4, pp. 748-757.
• [13] Oishi S., Schimmack U., Diener E. 2012. Progressive Taxation and the Subjective Weil-Being of Nations, "Psychological Science" 23, pp. 796—804.
• [14] Rawls J. 1971. A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
• [15] Rodden J. 2003- Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government, "International Organization" 57, pp. 695—729.
• [16] Samuelson P 1947. Foundations of Economic Analysis, Harvard University Press, Cambridge.
• [17] Santolini R. 2009. Leviathan and legislative monopoly power: empirical evidence from OECD countries, "Societa italiana di economia pubblica working paper", no. 635.
• [18] Schneider M. 1986, Fragmentation and the growth of local government, "Public Choice" 48, pp. 255-263.