Human error in pilotage operations

• Autorzy: Ernstsen J. , Nazir S.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.12716/1001.12.01.05

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Pilotage operations require close interaction between human and machines. This complex sociotechnical system is necessary to safely and efficiently maneuver a vessel in constrained waters. A sociotechnical system consists of interdependent human- and technical variables that continuously must work together to be successful. This complexity is prone to errors, and statistics show that most these errors in the maritime domain are due to human components in the system (80 ? 85%). This explains the attention on research to reduce human errors. The current study deployed a systematic human error reduction and prediction approach (SHERPA) to shed light on error types and error remedies apparent in pilotage operations. Data was collected using interviews and observation. Hierarchical task analysis was performed and 55 tasks were analyzed using SHERPA. Findings suggests that communication and action omission errors are most prone to human errors in pilotage operations. Practical and theoretical implications of the results are discussed.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

safety at sea; human error; Systematic Human Error Reduction and Prediction Approach (SHERPA); pilotage operations; sociotechnical system; maritime domain; Hierarchical Task Analysis (HTA); safety climate

• Wydawca: Faculty of Navigation, Gdynia Maritime University
• Czasopismo: TransNav : International Journal on Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation
• Rocznik: 2018
• Tom: Vol. 12, no. 1
• Strony: 49--56
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 21 poz., rys., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Ernstsen J.

• University College of Southeast Norway, Vestfold, Norway

autor

Nazir S.

• University College of Southeast Norway, Vestfold, Norway

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu w ramach umowy 509/P-DUN/2018 ze środków MNiSW przeznaczonych na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (2018).