Economic consortia in the military industry

• Autorzy: Lamek A.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.5604/17318157.1234846

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

According to the latest media reports, military consortia are more and more frequently formed. They unite Polish arms companies around the implementation of projects of key importance for the Polish Armed Forces’ armaments. In December 2012 the Ministry of National Defense (MON) announced that over the coming 10 years the military intends to have further projects performed, that is new combat vehicles, both wheeled and tracked, developed. A consortium aims to prepare plans and submit a bid on the execution of research and development works in order to draw up a joint project and then introduce it to series production. The problem may arise on the grounds of the distribution of a profit and other goods, which are generated in the process of cooperation, and not covered by the consortium agreement. The article attempts to address the question of what tool may be useful when determining fair rules for functioning of consortia in the arms industry so as to reflect the factual distribution of consortium members.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

consortium; tools for management support; fair share; military industry

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Akademii Wojsk Lądowych imienia generała Tadeusza Kościuszki
• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe / Wyższa Szkoła Oficerska Wojsk Lądowych im. gen. T. Kościuszki
• Rocznik: 2017
• Tom: Nr 1
• Strony: 31--40
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 13 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Lamek A.

• Faculty of Informatics and Electronic Economy, University of Economics and Business

Bibliografia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie ze środków MNiSW w ramach umowy 812/P-DUN/2016 na działalność upowszechniającą naukę (zadania 2017).