Probability timed automata for investigating communication processes

• Autorzy: Piech H. , Grodzki G.

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.1515/amcs-2015-0031

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Exploitation characteristics behaves as a decreasing valors factor (DVF) which can be connected with degradation processes. It is a structure that consists of independent attributes which represent situations generally connected with a given exploitation factor. The multi-attribute structure contains attributes directly and indirectly referring to the main factor. Attribute states, by definition, can only maintain or decrease their values. Such situations are met in security, reliability, exploitation, fatigues and many complex one-directed or irreversible processes. The main goal refers to protocol security analysis during the realization of the communication run that specifies the assessment of the level of current and oncoming threats connected with cryptography authentication. In the communication run, the operations of different protocols mutually interleave. Our concept is based on the algorithm of attributes correction during exploitation process realization (Blanchet et al., 2008). The monitoring and correcting procedures make it possible to provide forecast information about possible threats on the basis of the structure of the current attribute values.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

protocol logic; probabilistic timed automata; communication security

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Uniwersytetu Zielonogórskiego
• Czasopismo: International Journal of Applied Mathematics and Computer Science
• Rocznik: 2015
• Tom: Vol. 25, no. 2
• Strony: 403--414
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 17 poz., rys., tab., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

Piech H.

• Institute of Computer and Information Sciences, Częstochowa University of Technology, ul. Dąbrowskiego 73, 42-201 Częstochowa, Poland

autor

Grodzki G.

• Institute of Computer and Information Sciences, Częstochowa University of Technology, ul. Dąbrowskiego 73, 42-201 Częstochowa, Poland

Bibliografia

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