Risk preference of founder and descendant of Indonesian family firms

• Autorzy: Putri Aulia Citra , Viverita Viverita

Identyfikatory

DOI

10.17512/pjms.2019.20.2.35

Warianty tytułu

PL

Preferencja ryzyka fundatora i pochodzenia indonezyjskich firm rodzinnych

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This study aims to investigate the role of CEO succession in family business and the effect on financial risk. Using a Generalized Least Square (GLS) regression analysis and unbalanced panel data of 48 family firms, the stagnation, agency perspectives, and signaling model of their behavior were tested. This study finds that CEO turnover is negatively associated with firm’s financial risk. Furthermore, CEO descendants are more risk averse than CEO founders, and older CEOs are also more risk averse than younger CEOs. In addition, CEOs with higher education are also more risk averse. This implies that the Indonesian family firms are conservative towards financial risk. In relation to the stagnation perspective, the decrease in financial risk of family firms in Indonesia will be premature to be concluded that it will be in a stagnant phase.

PL

W artykule przedstawiono rolę sukcesji dyrektora generalnego w firmie rodzinnej i jej wpływu na ryzyko finansowe. Wykorzystując analizę regresji Uogólnionego Least Square (GLS) i dane niezrównoważonego panelu 48 firm rodzinnych, przetestowano stagnację, perspektywy agencyjne i model sygnalizacyjny ich zachowania. Badanie wykazało, że zmiana prezesa jest negatywnie związana z ryzykiem finansowym firmy. Ponadto potomkowie CEO są bardziej niechętni do ryzyka niż założyciele CEO, a starsi CEO są bardziej niechętni do ryzyka niż młodsi CEO. Ponadto prezesi z wyższym wykształceniem są również bardziej niechętni do podejmowania ryzyka. Oznacza to, że indonezyjskie firmy rodzinne były konserwatywne wobec ryzyka finansowego. W odniesieniu do perspektywy stagnacji zmniejszenie ryzyka finansowego firm rodzinnych w Indonezji będzie zbyt wcześnie, aby stwierdzić, że wystąpi faza stagnacji.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

family firms; succession; founder; descendant; risk preference

PL

firmy rodzinne; sukcesja; założyciel; potomek; preferencje ryzyka

• Wydawca: Czestochowa University of Technology
• Czasopismo: Polish Journal of Management Studies
• Rocznik: 2019
• Tom: Vol. 20, No. 2
• Strony: 414--425
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 33 poz., tab.

Twórcy

autor

Putri Aulia Citra

• Ernst and Young, Jakarta, Indonesia

autor

Viverita Viverita

• Department of Management Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Indoneisa, Indonesia

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Uwagi

Opracowanie rekordu ze środków MNiSW, umowa Nr 461252 w ramach programu "Społeczna odpowiedzialność nauki" - moduł: Popularyzacja nauki i promocja sportu (2020).