Evolutionary algorithm for market simulations

• Autorzy: Stańczak J.
• Konferencja: Evolutionary Computation and Global Optimization 2009 / National Conference (12 ; 1-3.06.2009 ; Zawoja, Poland)
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

Evolutionary algorithms (EA) have recently become not only tools for efficient optimization of very difficult problems, but also are applied to simulate behavior of different kinds of systems, among them also games, economic systems and markets. This new domain of EA applications is known as Agent-Based Computational Economics (ACE). This article describes two applications of EA to simple market simulations. The main aim of EA in this approach is to find (sub-) optimal strategies of behavior for the participants of that market game. The first example is a simple market with only several participants and one product, well known as an instance of Cournot oligopoly game. The second example is more complicated and describes a market of permits for CO2 emission, created by the Kyoto Protocol and introduces to the simple Walrasian model the influence of calculated on-line permits prices.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

evolutionary computation; evolutionary algorithm; EA; market simulation; economic model simulation

PL

obliczenia ewolucyjne; algorytm ewolucyjny; symulacja rynku; symulacja modelu gospodarczego

• Wydawca: Oficyna Wydawnicza Politechniki Warszawskiej
• Czasopismo: Prace Naukowe Politechniki Warszawskiej. Elektronika
• Rocznik: 2009
• Tom: z. 169
• Strony: 163--172
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 14 poz., tab., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

Stańczak J.

• Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw, Poland,

Bibliografia

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