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Nuovo DRM Paradiso: Designing a Secure, Verified, Fair Exchange DRM Scheme

Wybrane pełne teksty z tego czasopisma
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Języki publikacji
EN
Abstrakty
EN
We introduce Nuovo DRM, a digital rights management scheme aimed to provide formal and practical security. The scheme is based on a recent DRM scheme, which we formally specify in the ěCRL process algebraic language. The original scheme stated the following security requirements: effectiveness, secrecy and resistance of content masquerading. We formalise these security requirements as well as strong fairness and formally check the original scheme against these requirements. This verification step uncovered several security weaknesses, which are addressed by Nuovo DRM. In addition to that, Nuovo DRM introduces several procedural practices to enhance the practical security of the scheme. A finite model of Nuovo DRM is subsequently model-checked and shown to satisfy its design requirements, including secrecy, fairness and resistance to content masquerading.
Słowa kluczowe
Wydawca
Rocznik
Strony
393--417
Opis fizyczny
bibliogr. 35 poz.
Twórcy
autor
autor
autor
  • Eindhoven University of Technology, P.O. Box 513, 5600 MB Eindhoven, Netherlands, h.l.jonker@tue.nl
Bibliografia
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  • [3] Asokan, N.: Fairness in electronic commerce, PhD thesis, Univ.Waterloo, 1998.
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  • [7] Blom, S., Calamé, J., Lisser, B., Orzan, S., Pang, J., van de Pol, J. C., Torabi Dashti,M.,Wijs, A.: Distributed Analysis with μCRL, TACAS '07, 4424, Springer, 2007.
  • [8] Blom, S., Fokkink, W., Groote, J. F., van Langevelde, I., Lisser, B., van de Pol, J. C.: μCRL: A Toolset for Analysing Algebraic Specifications, CAV'01, 2102, Springer, 2001, ISBN 3-540-42345-1.
  • [9] Cederquist, J., Torabi Dashti, M.: An Intruder Model for Verifying Termination in Security Protocols, Technical Report TR-CTIT-05-29, University of Twente, Enschede, The Netherlands, 2005.
  • [10] Cederquist, J., Torabi Dashti, M.: An Intruder Model for Verifying Liveness in Security Protocols, FMSE '06, ACM Press, 2006.
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  • [15] Evans, N., Schneider, S.: Verifying security protocols with PVS: widening the rank function approach, J. Logic and Algebraic Programming, 64(2), 2005, 253-284.
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  • [17] Fernandez, J.-C., Garavel, H., Kerbrat, A., Mateescu, R., Mounier, L., Sighireanu, M.: CADP: A Protocol Validation and Verification Toolbox, CAV '98, 1102, Springer, 1996.
  • [18] Fischer,M., Lynch, N., Paterson,M.: Impossibility of distributed consensus with one faulty process, J. ACM, 32(2), 1985, 374-382.
  • [19] Francez, N.: Fairness, Springer, 1986.
  • [20] Groote, J. F., Ponse, A.: The syntax and semantics of μCRL, Algebra of Communicating Processes '94, Workshops in Computing Series, Springer, 1995.
  • [21] Gürgens, S., Rudolph, C., Vogt, H.: On the Security of Fair Non-repudiation Protocols, ISC '03, 2851, 2003.
  • [22] Halderman, J., Felten, E.: Lessons from the Sony CD DRM Episode, the 15th USENIX Security Symposium, 2006.
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  • [24] Jonker, H. L., Krishnan Nair, S., Torabi Dashti, M.: Nuovo DRM Paradiso, Technical Report SEN-R0602, CWI, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2006, http://ftp.cwi.nl/CWIreports/SEN/SEN-R0602.pdf.
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  • [27] Kremer, S., Raskin, J.: A Game-Based Verification of Non-repudiation and Fair Exchange Protocols, CONCUR' 01, 2154, Springer, 2001.
  • [28] Mateescu, R., Sighireanu, M.: Efficient on-the-fly model-checking for regular alternation-free μ-calculus, Sci. Comput. Program., 46(3), 2003, 255-281, ISSN 0167-6423.
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  • [30] Nair, S., Popescu, B., Gamage, C., Crispo, B., Tanenbaum, A.: Enabling DRM-preserving digital content redistribution, 7th IEEE Conf. E-Commerce Technology, IEEE CS, 2005.
  • [31] Pagnia, H., Vogt, H., Gärtner, F.: Fair Exchange., Comput. J., 46(1), 2003, 55-75.
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Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-article-BUS8-0003-0067
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