O kojarzeniu małżeństw i rekrutacji kandydatów do szkół

• Autorzy: Świtalski Z.
• Języki publikacji: PL

Abstrakty

EN

In the paper we describe the model of Gale and Shapley concerning marriage matchings and college admissions (American Mathematical Monthly, 69 (1962), 9–15). We review some results and applications of the Gale-Shapley theory. We also analyze problems of recruitment of candidates to schools in Poland from the point of view of this theory.

Słowa kluczowe

PL

teoria dwustronnych skojarzeń

• Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
• Czasopismo: Roczniki Polskiego Towarzystwa Matematycznego. Seria 2: Wiadomości Matematyczne
• Rocznik: 2008
• Tom: [Z] 44
• Strony: 35--46
• Opis fizyczny: bibliogr. 29 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Świtalski Z.

• Wydział Matematyki, Informatyki i Ekonometrii Uniwersytet Zielonogórski ul. Szafrana 4a, 65-516 Zielona Góra,

Bibliografia

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