The Generosity of Jordanian Pension System: Equity vs. Adequacy Measures

• Autorzy: AlZarari A. A. , Rahahleh H. T. S.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

The concept of generosity has gained considerable attention from many policy makers as well as ii much of the literature about pensions. Generally, the concept of generosity differs in the dimensions of considerations among the pension schemes sponsors and agents. From the financial point of view, sponsors condense on pension benefits in the context of monetary value measures e.g. rates of return, present values, etc. since these measures accurately address the financial viability of their schemes and the fairness of the benefits structure. While for some groups of participants, social adequacy measures that are often generalized by the replacement rate criterion, sit at the top of their priorities, some other groups of schemes' participants, withal, might be also more concerned with the monetary value measures besides the replacement rate. For both concepts, there is either an implicit or an explicit benchmark at which pension benefits can be classified as to whether they are generous or not. For instance^ the PAYG system is financially generous as long as the implicit Rate of Return (ROR) given on contributions throughout the pensions they receive, greater than the growth rate of contributors wage bill. Replacement rate as a measure of adequacy, in another context, compares the level of pensioner income satisfaction during retirement to the level he had exactly before retirement. As has been done for other countries, this paper attempts to analyze the benefits provided by the Jordanian Social Security Corporation (SSC) with respect to generosity measures in the context of scheme sponsors and agents. The importance of that sort of analysis stands mainly behind the issue of how these measures interact with each other to jointly alter the participants* retirement behaviour and the financial parameters of the scheme.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

pension system; Jordan

PL

system emerytalny; Jordania

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego
• Czasopismo: Zeszyty Naukowe. Prace Instytutu Ekonomiki i Organizacji Przedsiębiorstw / Uniwersytet Szczeciński
• Rocznik: 2007
• Tom: Nr 50, t. 2
• Strony: 477--495
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 19 poz., tab., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

AlZarari A. A.

autor

Rahahleh H. T. S.

• Philidelphia University, P.O. Box 142254, Al Bayader, Amman 11184, Jordan

Bibliografia

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