Eksploatacja ekosystemów a teoria gier I : gry deterministyczne niekooperacyjne

• Autorzy: Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel A.
• Języki publikacji: PL

Słowa kluczowe

PL

teoria gier; gra dynamiczna; modelowanie matematyczne

• Wydawca: Polskie Towarzystwo Matematyczne
• Czasopismo: Matematyka Stosowana : matematyka dla społeczeństwa
• Rocznik: 2001
• Tom: Nr 2
• Strony: 11--31
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 74 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel A.

• Instytut Matematyki Stosowanej i Mechaniki, Wydział Matematyki, Informatyki i Mechaniki, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Banacha 2, 02-097 Warszawa, Polska,

Bibliografia

• [1] P. Andersen, J. G. Sutinen, Stochastic bioeconomics: A review of basic methods and results, Marine Resource Economics 1 (1984), 117-136.
• [2] K. Arrow, G. Debreu, Existence of an equilibrium for competitive economy, Econometrica 22 (1954), 165-290.
• [3] R. J. Aumann, Existence of competitive equilibrium in markets with continuum of traders, Econometrica 34 (1966), 1-17.
• [4] —, Markets with a continuum of traders, Econometrica 32 (1964), 39-50.
• [5] E. J. Balder, A unifyinq approach to existence of Nash equilibria, Internat. J. Game Theory 24 (1995), 79-94.
• [6] M. Bardi, M. Falcone, P. Soravia, Numerical methods in pursuit-evasion games via viscosity solutions, 105-175, w: M. Bardi, T. E. S. Raghavan, T. Parthasarathy (red.), 1999, Stochastic and Differential Games. Theory and Numerical Methods, Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 4, Birkhäuser, 1999, 105-175.
• [7] S. Barret, Self-enforcing environmental agreements, Oxford Economic Papers 46 (1994), 879-894.
• [8] S. Barret, Trade restrictions in international environmental agreements, CSERGE Working Paper GEC 94-13, 1994.
• [9] T. Başar (red.), Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics, Lecture Notes in Econom. and Math. Systems, Springer, 1986.
• [10] T. Başar, G. J. Olsder, Dynamic Noncooperative Game Theory, Academic Press, 1982.
• [11] R. Bellman, Dynamic Programming, Princeton University Press, 1957.
• [12] P. Berek, J. M. Perloff, An open-access fishery with rational expectations, Econometrica 52 (1984), 489-506.
• [13] T. C. Bergstrom, The use of markets to control pollution, Recherches Economiques de Louvain 4 (1973), 403-418.
• [14] C. Carraro, J. A. Filar (red.), Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment, Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 2, Birkhäuser, 1995.
• [15] C. Chiarella, M. C. Kemp, N. V. Long, K. Okuguchi, On the economics of international fisheries, Internat. Economic Rev. 25 1984, 85-92.
• [16] C. W. Clark, Mathematical Bioeconomics: The Optimal Management of Renewable Resources, Wiley-Interscience, 1976.
• [17] —, Restricted access to common-property fishery resources: a game theoretic analysis, w: P. Liu (red.), Dynamic Optimization and Mathematical Economics, Plenum Press, 1980.
• [18] S. Clemhout, H. Y. Wan Jr., Dynamic common property resources and environmental problems, J. Optim. Theory Appl. 46 (1985), 471-481.
• [19] —, —, Cartelization conserves endangered species?, w: G. Feichtinger (red.), Optimal Control Theory and Economic Analysis 2, North-Holland, 1985, 549-568.
• [20] —, —, Common property exploitations under risk of resource extinctions, w: T. Başar (red.), Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics, Lecture Notes in Econom. and Math. Systems, Springer, 1986, 267-288.
• [21] —, —, Differential games — economic applications, in: R. J. Aumann, S. Hart (red.), Handbook of Game Theory, vol. 2, Elsevier, 1994.
• [22] P. Dutta, R. Sundaram, The tragedy of the commons?, Economic Theory 3 (1993), 413-426.
• [23] M. G. Crandall, P. L. Lions, Viscosity solutions of Hamilton-Jacobi equations, Trans. Amer. Math. Soc. 277 (1983), 1-42.
• [24] L. C. Evans, Partial Differential Equations, Grad. Stud. Math. 19, AMS, 1998.
• [25] H. Ethamo, R. P. Hämäläinen, Cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem, J. Economic Dynamics Control 17 (1993), 659-678.
• [26] —, —, Credibility of linear equilibrium strategies in discrete time fishery management game, Group Decision and Negotiation 4 (1995), 27-37.
• [27] R. D. Fisher, L. J. Mirman, A strategic dynamic interaction, fish wars, J. Economic Dynamics and Control 16 (1992), 267-287.
• [28] R. P. Hämäläinen, A. Haurie, V. Kaitala, Bargaining on whales: a differential game with Pareto optimal equilibria, Oper. Res. Lett. 3 (1984), 5-11.
• [29] —, —, —, Equilibria and threats in a fishery management game, Optimal Control Appl. Methods 6 (1985), 315-333.
• [30] A. Haurie, G. Zaccour, Differential game models of global environmental management, w: C. Carraro, J. A. Filar (red.), Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment, Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 2, Birkhäuser, 1995, 3-23.
• [31] G. Hardin, The tragedy of the commons, Science 162 (1968), 1243-1248 (istnieje także polskie tłumaczenie).
• [32] M. Hildén, V. Kaitala, G. Leitmann, Stabilizing managenent and structural development in open-acces fisheries, w: T. Başar, A. Haurie (red.), Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications, Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 1, Birkhäuser, 1994, 318-338.
• [33] J. Hofbauer, K. Sigmund, Evolutionary Game Theory, Cambridge, 1988.
• [34] H. S. Gordon, Economic theory of a Common-Property: the fishery, J. Political Economy 62 (1954), 124-142.
• [35] R. Isaacs, Differential Games, Wiley, 1965.
• [36] V. Kaitala, Game theory models in fisheries management: a survey, w: T. Başar (red.), Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics, Lecture Notes in Econom. and Math. Systems, Springer, 1986, 252-266.
• [37] V. Kaitala, R. P. Hämäläinen, J. Ruusunen, On the analysis of equilibria and bargaining in a fishery game, w: G. Feichtinger (red.), Optimal Control Theory and Economic Analysis 2, North-Holland, 1985, 593-606.
• [38] V. Kaitala, M. Lindroos, Sharing the benefits of cooperation in high seas fisheries: a characteristic function game approach, Natural Resource Modelling 4 (1998), 275-299.
• [39] V. Kaitala, G. Munro, The economic management of high seas fishery resources: some game theoretic aspects, w: C. Carraro, J. A. Filar (red.), Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment, Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 2, Birkhäuser, 1995, 299-318.
• [40] I. Karatzas, M. Shubik, W. D. Sudderth, Construction of stationary Markov equilibria in a strategic market game, Math. Oper. Res. 19 (1994), 975-1006.
• [41] M. C. Kemp, N. V. Long, Resource extraction under conditions of common access, w: M. C. Kemp, N. V. Long (red.), Exhaustible Resources, Optimality and Trade, North-Holland, 1980.
• [42] D. Levhari, L. J. Mirman, The great fish war: an example using a dynamic Cournot-Nash solution, Bell J. Economics 11, (1980), 322-334.
• [43] M. Malawski, A. Wieczorek, H. Sosnowska, Konkurencja i kooperacja. Teoria gier w ekonomii i naukach społecznych, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 1997.
• [44] K.-G. Mäler, Acid rain game, r. 12, w: H. Folmer, E. van Ierland (red.), Valuation Methods and Policy Making in Environmental Economics, Elsevier, 1989.
• [45] —, Acid rain game in Europe: a dynamic perspective on the use of economic incentives, w: E. Van Ierland (red.), International Environmental Economics, Developments in Environmental Economics, Elsevier, t. 4, 1994, 351-372.
• [46] A. Mas-Colell, On the theorem of Schmeidler, J. Math. Economics 13 (1984), 201-206.
• [47] G. R. Munro, The optimal management of transboundary renewable resources, Canad. J. Economics 12 (1979), 355-376.
• [48] —, Bilateral monopoly in fisheries and optimal management policy, w: L. J. Mirman, D. F. Spulber (red.), Essays in the Economics of Renewable Resources, North-Holland, 1982.
• [49] —, Fisheries, extended jurisdiction and the economics of common property resources, Canad. J. Economics 15 (1982), 405-425.
• [50] T. Parthasarathy, T. E. S. Raghavan, Some Topics in Two Person Games, Modern Analytic and Computational Methods in Science and Mathematics 22, Elsevier, 1971.
• [51] L. A. Petrosjan, G. Zaccour, A multistage supergame of downstreem pollution, w: J. A. Filar, V. Gaitsgory, K. Mizukami (red.), Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications, Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 5, Birkhäuser, 1999, 387-404.
• [52] M. Pohjola, Applications o f dynamic game theory to macroeconomics, w: T. Başar (red.), Dynamic Games and Applications in Economics, Lecture Notes in Econom. and Math. Systems, Springer-Verlag, 1986, 103-133.
• [53] C. Ryll-Nardzewski, A theory of pursuit and evasion, w: M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, A. W. Tucker (red.), Advances in Game Theory, Ann. of Math. Stud. 52, Princeton Univ. Press, 1964, 113-126.
• [54] L. Samuelson, Evolutionary Games and Equilibrium Selection, MIT Press, 1997.
• [55] D. Schmeidler, Equilibrium points of nonatomic games, J. Statist. Physics 17 (1973), 295-300.
• [56] M. J. Sobel, Stochastic fishery games with myopic equilibria, w: L. J. Mirman, D. F. Spulber (red.), Essays in the Economics of Renewable Resources, North-Holland, 1982.
• [57] D. F. Spulber, A selective survey, w: L. J. Mirman, D. F. Spulber (red.), Essays in the Economics of Renewable Resources, North-Holland, 1982.
• [58] H. Steinhaus, Definicje potrzebne do teorii gry i pościgu, Myśl Akademicka 1 (1), Lwów, 1925 [tłumaczenie ang.: Definitions for a theory of games and pursuits, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly 7 (1960), 105-108].
• [59] O. Tahvonen, Pollution, renewable resources and irreversibility, w: C. Carraro, J. A. Filar (red.), Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment, Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 2, Birkhäuser, 1995, 279-298.
• [60] F. Vega-Redondo, Evolution, Games and Economic Behaviour, Oxford Univ. Press, 1996.
• [61] T. L. Vincent, An evolutionary game theory for differential equation models with reference to ecosystem management, w: T. Başar, A. Haurie (red.), Advances in Dynamic Games and Applications, Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 1, Birkhäuser, 1994, 356-374.
• [62] —, The ESS maximum principle as a tool for modeling and managing biological systems, w: C. Carraro, J. A. Filar (red.), Control and Game-Theoretic Models of the Environment, Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 2, Birkhäuser, 1995, 259-278.
• [63] J. Weibull, Evolutionary Game Theory, MIT Press, 1955.
• [64] A. Wieczorek, Simple large games and their applications to problems with many agents, Report 842, Institute of Computer Science, Polish Academy of Sciences, 1997.
• [65] A. Wieczorek, A. Wiszniewska (Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel), A game-theoretic model of social adaptation in an infinite population, Appl. Math. (Warsaw) 25 (1999), 417-430.
• [66] A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Dynamic game with continuum of players modelling “the tragedy of the commons”, w: Petrosjan, Mazalov (red.), Game Theory and Applications 5 (2000), 162-187.
• [67] —, Existence of pure equilibria in games with continuum of players, Topol. Methods Nonlinear Anal., (2000), 339-349.
• [68] —, A dynamic game with continuum of players and its counterpart with finitely many players, preprint RW 00-05 (72), Instytut Matematyki Stosowanej i Mechaniki Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2000, złożone.
• [69] —, Equilibria in dynamic games with continuum of players: discrete time case, preprint 904, Instytut Podstaw Informatyki Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 2000, złożone.
• [70] —, Static and dynamic equilibria in games with continuum of players, Positivity (2001), w druku.
• [71] —, “The tragedy of the commons” modelled by large games, w: Altman (red.), Ann. Internat. Soc. Dynamic Games 6, Birkhäuser, 2001, 323-345.
• [72] —, Static and dynamic equilibria in stochastic games with continuum of players I: Relations, 2001, złożone.
• [73] A. Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel, Static and dynamic equilibria in stochastic games with continuum of players II: Existence, 2001, złożone.
• [74] J. Zabczyk, Zarys matematycznej teorii sterowania, PWN, 1991.