Paraconsistency and consistency understood as the absence of the negation of any implicative theorem

• Autorzy: Robles G.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

As is stated in its title, in this paper consistency is understood as the absence of the negation of any implicative theorem. Then, a series of logics adequate to this concept of consistency is defined within the context of the ternary relational semantics with a set of designated points, negation being modelled with the Routley operator. Soundness and completeness theorems are provided for each one of these logics. In some cases, strong (i.e., in respect of deducibility) soundness and completeness theo- rems are also proven. All logics in this paper are included in Lewis' S4. They are all paraconsistent, but none of them is relevant.

• Wydawca: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego
• Czasopismo: Reports on Mathematical Logic
• Rocznik: 2012
• Tom: Vol. 47
• Strony: 147--171
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 12 poz.

Twórcy

autor

Robles G.

• Dpto. de Psicologia, Sociologia y Filosofia Universidad de Leon Campus de Vegazana s/n 24071 Leon, Spain http://grobv.unileon.es,

Bibliografia

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