Dynamic evolutionary game related to elementary large games and replicator dynamics

• Autorzy: Argasiński K.

Warianty tytułu

PL

Dynamiczna gra ewolucyjna związana zdużymi grami i dynamiką replikatorową

• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

This article contains construction of multipopulation evolutionary game based on elementary large games and replicator dynamics. For this purpose a multipopulation model with payoff depending of interspecific proportions (metasimplex concept) was developed. Article also contains a comparson of classical evolutionary game theory solutions with a new theory.

PL

Praca zawiera konstrukcję wielopopulacyjnej gry ewolucyjnej opartej o aparat elementarnych dużych gier i dynamikę replikatorową. Do tego celu wykorzystano model wielopopulacyjny uwzględniający zmienność proporcji międzygatunkowych (koncepcja metasympleksu). W pracy znajduje się również porównanie aparatu z rozwiązaniami klasycznej teorii gier ewolucyjnych.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

evolutionary eqilibrium; evolutionary stable states; metasimplex; multipopulation models; elementary large games

PL

równowaga ewolucyjna; stan ewolucyjnie stabilny; metasympleks; modele wielopopulacyjne; duża gra

• Wydawca: Instytut Podstaw Informatyki PAN
• Czasopismo: Prace Instytutu Podstaw Informatyki Polskiej Akademii Nauk
• Rocznik: 2003
• Tom: Nr 955
• Strony: 1--32
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 21 poz., rys.

Twórcy

autor

Argasiński K.

• Institute of Computer Science of Polish Academy of Sciences, Ordona 21, 01-237 Warsaw, POland,

Bibliografia

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