Unconditional security by the laws of classical physics

• Autorzy: Mingesz R. , Kish L. B. , Gingl Z. , Granqvist C.-G. , Wen H. , Peper F. , Eubanks T. , Schmera G.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

There is an ongoing debate about the fundamental security of existing quantum key exchange schemes. This debate indicates not only that there is a problem with security but also that the meanings of perfect, imperfect, conditional and unconditional (information theoretic) security in physically secure key exchange schemes are often misunderstood. It has been shown recently that the use of two pairs of resistors with enhanced Johnsonnoise and a Kirchhoff-loop - i.e., a Kirchhoff-Law-Johnson-Noise (KLJN) protocol . for secure key distribution leads to information theoretic security levels superior to those of today's quantum key distribution. This issue is becoming particularly timely because of the recent full cracks of practical quantum communicators, as shown in numerous peer-reviewed publications. The KLJN system is briefly surveyed here with discussions about the essential questions such as (i) perfect and imperfect security characteristics of the key distribution, and (ii) how these two types of securities can be unconditional (or information theoretical).

Słowa kluczowe

EN

information theoretic security; unconditional security; secure key exchange; secure key distribution; quantum encryption

• Wydawca: Komitet Metrologii i Aparatury Naukowej PAN
• Czasopismo: Metrology and Measurement Systems
• Rocznik: 2013
• Tom: Vol. 20, nr 1
• Strony: 3--16
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 59 poz., rys., tab., wzory

Twórcy

autor

Mingesz R.

autor

Kish L. B.

autor

Gingl Z.

autor

Granqvist C.-G.

autor

Wen H.

autor

Peper F.

autor

Eubanks T.

autor

Schmera G.

• University of Szeged, Department of Technical Informatics, Árpád tér 2, Szeged, H-6701, Hungary,

Bibliografia

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