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The problem of collective decision making under incomplete information about the preferences of the agents is studied. Game-theoretical model, introduced below, embraces resource allocation problems in environments with private goods, planning procedures, etc. The problem of information misrepresentation is solved by applying the "geometrical" approach, which generalizes most of commonly used methods and consists in the analysis of the dictatorship sets. Sufficient conditions of truthtelling make it possible to guarantee nonmanipulability by modifying the sets of feasible messages.
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Tom
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71--78
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 6 poz., rys. 3
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autor
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- Institute of Control Science, Profsoyuznaya St., 65, Moscow 117806, Russian Federation.
Bibliografia
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Bibliografia
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bwmeta1.element.baztech-article-BPW1-0009-0007