Identyfikatory
Warianty tytułu
Języki publikacji
Abstrakty
We define generalized market equilibria for the matching model of Gale and Shapley [1] and study relationships between the notion of equilibrium and the notion of stable matching of Gale and Shapley. Namely, we show that there is a one-to-one correspondence between full-quota matchings and the so-called simple equilibria and a one-to-one correspondence between stable matchings and the so-called stable equilibria.
Słowa kluczowe
Rocznik
Tom
Strony
77--85
Opis fizyczny
Bibliogr. 5 poz.
Twórcy
autor
- Faculty of Mathematics, Computer Science and Econometrics, University of Zielona Góra, Poland, Z.Switalski@wmie.uz.zgora.pl
Bibliografia
- [1] Gale D., Shapley L.S, College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1962), 9-15.
- [2] Crawford V.P., Knoer E.M., Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers, Econometrica 49(1981), 437-450.
- [3] Roth A.E., Sotomayor M.A., Two-sided matching. A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis, Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- [4] Jehle G.A., Reny P.J., Advanced Microeconomic Theory, Addison Wesley, Boston 2001.
- [5] Moore J.C., General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 2007.
Typ dokumentu
Bibliografia
Identyfikator YADDA
bwmeta1.element.baztech-article-BPC6-0014-0009