Comparing two ways of measuring the power of party members in simple majority voting games

• Autorzy: Ekes M.
• Języki publikacji: EN

Abstrakty

EN

We examine two approaches to the problem of measuring the voting power of individuals in a voting body with an a priori coalition structure by means of the Shapley-Shubik index. In order to analyze this question we apply games with a priori unions and composite games. We compare these two approaches basing on voting games with 100 voters and different coalition structures and present our conclusions.

Słowa kluczowe

EN

simple majority voting games; games with a priori unions; composite games; Shapley-Shubik index; Owen index

• Wydawca: Systems Research Institute, Polish Academy of Sciences
• Czasopismo: Control and Cybernetics
• Rocznik: 2011
• Tom: Vol. 40, no 4
• Strony: 1189--1208
• Opis fizyczny: Bibliogr. 20 poz., wykr.

Twórcy

autor

Ekes M.

• Szkoła Główna Handlowa Al. Niepodległości 162, 02-554 Warszawa, Poland,

Bibliografia

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